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SUMMARY 
 
In the last century, markets, technical configurations, existing power relations, and 
prevailing ideologies in industrialised countries have co-evolved in ways that promote 
fossil-fuel-based systems.   Relatedly, the literature on sustainability transitions (STs) has 
gained significance in the last twenty years, primarily because of increased interest by 
those who are concern with enabling shifts towards low-carbon sources of energy. This 
research examines the kinds of changes which take place in fossil fuel path-dependent 
systems in response to the pressure imposed by the advent of greener alternatives. 
Understanding how fossil-fuelled path-dependent systems respond to such demands 
enables us to identify counter-strategies, which may help accelerate sustainability 
transitions.  
Using a combination of the multi-level perspective on socio-technical transitions and 
institutional theory, the thesis presents case studies centred on South Africa’s coal-fired 
electricity regime, which is entrenched in a system known as the minerals-energy 
complex (MEC). The case studies examine how the coal-fired electricity regime tried to 
maintain stability in the face of pressure to decarbonise by diversifying to include more 
renewables-based and gas-fired electricity generation, each of which is considered as a 
niche. 
The findings from the case studies are organised into three articles. The first paper 
presents a case study on the establishment of the MEC and shows how it became a 
vii 
 
highly path-dependent system, posing a formidable obstacle and challenge for new 
entrants. The second paper investigates the contestation between the dominant regime 
incumbent, Eskom, versus the nascent renewable energy programme. This paper 
demonstrates an evolving strategy of regime resistance in response to several gains 
achieved by the renewables niche over time. The third paper examines the emergence 
of a gas-to-power niche against a backdrop of interactions between electricity and liquid 
fuel regimes. This paper shows the highly dynamic changes that take place in a regime 
as it tries to maintain stability.  
The overall findings demonstrate that the electricity regime evolved from highly stable 
to having features of a fractured regime, or what could be understood to be a form of 
destabilisation. The thesis contributes to the ST field by suggesting several ways in which 
regime stability and change could be better understood. These include enhanced 
theorising of regime resistance through analysis of the regime’s multi-dimensional 
selection environment and mobilising endogenous institutional concepts through 
various modes of change (drift, layering, conversion and displacement) into the theory. 
Policy recommendations suggest a fractured regime requires a temporally sensitive 
displacement policy mix. This is one in which varying stages of regime stability are 
recognised and potentially exploited by corresponding niche strategies.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last century, markets, technical configurations, existing power relations, and 
prevailing ideologies in industrialised countries have co-evolved in ways that promote 
fossil-fuel-based systems (Grin et al., 2010; Kanger and Schot, 2019). However, alongside 
this dominance in fossil fuels, is the call for urgent needs to address affordable and clean 
energy access as part of the broader UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United 
Nations, [UN] 2015). 
In line with this, is the growing field of sustainability transitions which has gained 
significance in the last twenty years, mainly because of rising interests by those who are 
concern with enabling the shift towards sustainable and inclusive economic growth 
(Markard et al., 2012; Schot and Kanger, 2018). Sustainability transitions field calls for a 
broad socio-technical radical change that is needed along with societal domains in 
energy, mobility, housing, and finance, amongst others (Schot and Kanger, 2018).  A 
socio-technical system is characterised by co-evolutionary and linked material and social 
elements that influence the functionality and development of a system (Grin et al., 
2010).  Such a system consists of a combination of actors, networks, institutions, 
artefacts, infrastructure, markets and practices that together fulfil a societal function or 
needs (Geels, 2004; 2011).   
Sustainability transitions are considered radical, not necessarily in speed but due to the 
scope in changes of user practices, cultural meanings, industry structures, markets, 
policies, technologies, and supporting infrastructures  (Geels and Schot, 2010).   
In this regard, a prominent framework for understanding the dynamics of socio-
technical change is the multi-level perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2002a; Geels and Schot, 
2007), which delineates transitions as an interplay amongst three analytical levels. These 
levels are niches, which refer to protected spaces where radical innovation takes place; 
regimes, which pertain to established practices, routines and associated rules that 
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enable and constrain actors within existing systems; and landscapes, which encompass 
long-term exogenous trends (Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels, 2002a; Rip and Kemp, 1998). 
Essentially, the assumption with respect to these analytical levels is that as a landscape 
exerts enough pressure on a regime to cause destabilisation, a window of opportunity 
arises for niches to scale up and diffuse. The traditional practice in ST research is to 
represent niches as ‘green innovations’, which challenges existing and mostly fossil fuel-
based regimes to move towards sustainable transformation. Examples of green 
innovation include renewables such as solar PV systems, wind turbines, electric vehicles 
and heat pumps (Grin et al., 2010). In unsustainable regimes, counterpart technologies 
refer to traditional, deeply entrenched fossil fuel-based systems meant to service 
vehicles that run on petrol and coal used for electricity generation as a few examples 
that lock in production and consumption patterns (Schot and Kanger, 2018). The 
majority of MLP analyses have focused on ‘bottom-up’ change models, which distinguish 
between ‘heroic’ green innovations and transitions (Geels, 2014b; Geels, 2011). 
Conversely, in a more recent evolution of the MLP framework, ST scholars have noted 
that a transition to sustainable pathways is likely to be slow, uneven and delayed 
because of resistance from regimes (Geels, 2014b; Hess, 2014; Kuokkanen et al., 2018). 
Thus, given the urgency of environmental challenges and the need for an alternative to 
examinations concentrated in ‘green’ niche innovations, the processes of regime 
resistance, destabilisation, decline and erosion are regarded as equally important 
(Turnheim and Geels, 2013; Geels, 2014b; Smith et al., 2010; Geels et al., 2016; Karltorp 
and Sandén, 2012; Kuokkanen et al., 2018; Kungl and Geels, 2018). 
First, part of the problem in the lack of attention paid to the regime is its 
conceptualisation as a ‘monolithic bloc’, which refers to a conventional understanding 
of the regime as homogenous, coherent structures, dominated by rational action and 
neglecting essential differences in context (Smith et al., 2005). In this definition, the 
regime undergoes endogenous incremental change, whereas abrupt radical changes are 
exogenous: they are found either in the landscape, beyond the reach of a regime, or in 
niches, which are considered protected spaces where variety and novelty emerge (Smith 
et al., 2005). In this definition, the regime undergoes endogenous incremental change, 
whereas abrupt radical changes are exogenous and found in the landscape that is 
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beyond the reach of a regime, and niches which are considered protected spaces where 
variety and novelty emerge (Smith et al., 2005). In this orientation, the regime concept 
has been criticised because it fails to account for internal tension, conflict, power, 
politics and agency (Meadowcroft, 2011; Geels, 2014b; Smith et al., 2005). Therefore, 
seeing, as fossil fuel-based regimes are likely to resist the expansion of low-carbon 
systems, an improved understanding of how regimes respond to changes should be an 
integral part of the ST literature. 
Second, a regime is assumed to be stable under the theoretical frames of lock-in, path 
dependency and inertia (Unruh, 2000), which underpin the ideas that the reproduction 
of routines, practices and associated rules foster regular and automatic patterns (Geels, 
2014b). Countering such views, scholars in the field underscore the dynamic nature of 
regime behaviour: as actively resisting change (Geels, 2014b), as shaping regime rules 
through an institutional process (Genus, 2012; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014; Smink 
et al., 2015), as reorienting towards radical innovation (Berggren et al., 2015; Penna and 
Geels, 2015) and as engagement in multiple-regime interactions (Raven and Verbong, 
2007; Sutherland et al., 2015).  Correspondingly, portraying a regime as passive or inert 
underestimates its crucial role in STs. 
Third, research has also centred on the deliberate phasing out of mature, unsustainable 
regimes (Rogge and Johnstone, 2017; Stegmaier et al., 2014), which could contribute to 
accelerating the diffusion of niche innovations.  
Fourth, criticisms have been directed towards the applicability of the regime concept in 
more complex settings, such as those found in the Global South, which is characterised 
by the potential for the hybrid character of incumbent systems, flexible institutional 
embedding and higher forms of uncertainty (Wieczorek, 2018). Raven (2005),  suggested 
that partial regime instability is needed for niche innovations to breakthrough. However, 
it is not evident in literature, whether levels of fragmentation or absolute regime 
destabilisation is needed, which favours niche development. These issues point to the 
need for further research that can articulate and unravel the nuances of the relationship 
between regime stability and niche. Such nuances, in turn, imply ways to accelerate 
sustainable transitions, particularly under Global South conditions. 
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Reconciling all the four perspectives regarding the regime concept reveals the necessity 
of additional explorations into comprehending regime stability and change in the ST 
literature. One of the approaches to learning more about this relationship is the concept 
of ‘semi-coherent’ alignment of rules, which constitutes a regime (Geels and Schot, 
2010).   
A well-known definition of a regime is as follows:  
A regime is a rule set or grammar embedded in a complex set of engineering 
practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and 
procedures … all of which are embedded in institutions and infrastructure 
       (Rip and Kemp, 1998,  p. 340) 
Accordingly, Geels and Schot (2010) explained that regimes become unstable when 
actors begin to diverge and disagree on basic rules. This disagreement can be a source 
of change when tension arises, as is the case in a mismatch between different types of 
rules, or when actors begin to adopt different ideas, preferences, values and interests 
(Geels and Schot, 2010,  p. 44). Building on these ideas is the notion that underlies the 
mobilisation of institutional theory from which to analyse regime stability and change 
(Geels, 2004a; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). The persistence of a regime has been 
increasingly recognised as stemming from highly institutionalised social structures of 
regulative, normative and cognitive rules (Fuenfschilling and Binz, 2018). This means 
that the greater the degree to which these rules are embedded within society, the 
stronger the institutionalisation of a regime, which in turn has implications on its 
stability. Thus, given that rules form the heart of the stabilising and organising features 
of the socio-technical regime, a focus on analysing rule changes should reveal the 
dynamism of regime stability and change. To test these assumptions, and to generate 
insights, which can contribute to ST literature on regime stability and change, an 
empirical case study analysis of a highly entrenched socio-technical regime is needed.     
South Africa provides an excellent example of an emerging economy with a historically 
energy-intensive economy which has ambitious plans to lower its carbon emissions. The 
country has articulated a need to transition to a low-carbon economy,1 with plans to 
 
1National Planning Commission (NPC), Chapter 5, Transitions to a low-carbon economy. 
https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch5_0.pdf 
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implement a Just Transitions pathway.2 A Just Transitions plan is considered a 
comprehensive sustainable development plan for the country and covers water, land, 
food security and energy issues, in order to shift into a low-carbon, climate resilient 
economy and society by 2050. However, the urgency of environmental sustainability is 
placed alongside other equally critical developmental goals, known locally as the triple 
challenge: reducing inequality, poverty reduction and job creation (National Planning 
Commission [NPC], 2012). In terms of trying to achieve sustainability, South Africa has 
the complex task of balancing salient trade-offs and synergies between multiple 
priorities and objectives in different sectors.  
Using a combination of a multi-level perspective (MLP) framework (Geels, 2002a) and 
institutional theory (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), the current research explores the ways 
in which the dynamics in South Africa’s electricity regime are playing out as it struggles 
to achieve a more sustainable energy system. Specifically, South Africa has a well-
established coal-based electricity regime embedded in what is known as the minerals-
energy complex (MEC), a term used to describe a tight configuration of industries 
associated with mining, electricity and infrastructure which are essential to South 
Africa’s economy (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). More recently, however, there have been 
attempts to diversify the electricity regime towards more sustainable practices. This 
research investigates the potential displacement of South Africa’s coal-fired electricity 
generation with renewable energy and gas. Conceptually, the MEC is a socio-technical 
system within which there is the electricity regime, and Eskom is the dominant regime 
incumbent. Both renewable energy and gas-fired electricity generation are undeveloped 
in South Africa and so, for this research, are characterised as niches. 
1.1 Background and overview of the South African electricity system  
South Africa’s electricity regime has historically been embedded in what is known as the 
MEC, in which a co-evolution of mining, energy and industrial development has been 
crucial to growth and development in the country. It is estimated that South Africa’s 
mineral wealth value is around USD $2.5 trillion (GCIS, 2012). The MEC has a 
concentrated economic and political power that is held in the hands of a small number 
 
2Developing models and pathways for a low-carbon economy and resilient society. 
https://www.sustainable.org.za/project.php?id=55 
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of actors who have a privileged influence over energy and economic policy, as well as 
over access to and distribution of investments. For instance, the biggest mining 
companies in South Africa have significant investments within the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE), and these also belong to an Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG) which 
collectively (including associated industries such as materials beneficiation and 
materials manufacturing) account for 44% of the electricity demand in the country.3  
Furthermore, mining contributes 7% to the GDP, 25% of the exports and 2.5% of the 
labour force (Baxter, 2016; Statistics South Africa [StatsSA], 2017). A vital component of 
the MEC is Eskom, a state-owned vertical monopoly electricity supplier which uses coal 
as its primary resource. Coal production and consumption are intricate parts of the 
economy as they provide the country with revenues derived from a range of activities 
from export, mining and industry to synthetic fuels (Ting, 2015).4 Consequently, South 
Africa has one of the highest carbon footprints for some emerging economies – 9 tons 
per capita (tpc) of carbon emissions, almost on par with Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries’ average of 9.5 tpc.5 Thus, in a sense, 
South Africa suffers from a tight ‘lock-in’ of a high carbon pathway due partially to its 
dominant coal-fired electricity generation.  
In 2018, South Africa’s total electricity generation was from coal (83%), nuclear (6%), 
pumped storage (1.9%), independent power producers (IPPs) (4%), open cycle gas 
turbines (OCGTs) (peak 0.1%) and international purchases (3.2%) (Figure 1.1) 
(Department of Energy [DOE], 2018a).  
 
 
3Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), www.eiug.org.za 
4Ting (2015), included in this thesis as Chapter 4. 
5World Bank, carbon dioxide emission data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC 
[accessed 1 March 2019].  
7 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Total electricity generation for South Africa’s electricity system (DOE, 
2018a).6 
Although South Africa has known since 1997 from its White Paper on Energy that an 
electricity deficit would be reached by 2007, no new plants have been commissioned in 
time (Department of Minerals and Energy [DME], 1998). Thus, with an ageing electricity 
infrastructure and lack of maintenance due to low generation reserves, the country has 
undergone a series of blackouts since 2008. Moreover, the continued reliance of South 
Africa’s electricity regime on coal is increasingly under threat following the electricity 
shortfall, and under pressure to decarbonise, the regime is experiencing a period of 
rapid change involving the introduction of new sources of energy technologies and new 
actors. In response, to diversify its energy security, an integrated resource plan (IRP) was 
initiated, and in 2012, it was implemented in an ambitious Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (RE I4P) with some indicators of 
success, albeit on a limited scale compared to the overall supply (DOE, 2015a; DOE, 
2018a). By 2018, South Africa had procured approximately 6.4 gigawatts (GWs) of 
renewable energy generation projects, of which 3.2 GWs were operational and 
synchronised to the grid (DOE, 2018a). Additionally, from 2015, a gas independent 
power producers procurement programme (Gas I4P) was also initiated, totalling 3.6 
GWs for power generation (DOE, 2016). Furthermore, in parallel, two new coal plants 
 
6 Wheeling here is defined as access between a non-Eskom generator (NEG) and Eskom to facilitate 
trading of energy. The NEG uses the national grid to transport electricity from where it is produced to a 
location of end use.   http://www.eskom.co.za/Whatweredoing/Pages/Wheeling_Of_Energy.aspx 
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with a combined installed capacity of 9.6 GWs for the national grid are being 
implemented (DOE, 2018a). 
Considering the country’s plans for additional coal usage and the initiation of gas as a 
power source, it appears that there will be increasing investments in fossil fuels and the 
associated infrastructure. It should be clear, then, that South Africa's energy policy could 
be characterised as contradictory: on the one hand, it promotes sustainable 
development while, on the other, it promotes the extraction and consumption of 
polluting (and unsustainable) resources. As such, South Africa is facing a difficult period 
in the transition of its energy systems while working within sustainability constraints, 
mainly because there are powerful vested interests at play when considering the 
influences of the MEC, as well as the social dimensions of employment in the coal 
industry linked to trade unions. It is this continued carbon lock-in and the attempts by 
the South African government to achieve certainty of the country’s electricity supply 
that provides the context for this research. This leads to the main research question.  
1.2 Research question, audience and relevance 
What explains stability and change in South Africa’s electricity regime over time? 
This research seeks to understand how South Africa’s deeply entrenched coal-based 
electricity regime is attempting to maintain its stability in the face of the pressures and 
threats from renewable energy and gas-fired electricity generation.  
This thesis’s primary academic audience consists of those concerned with sustainability 
transition (ST). Here, I have two research objectives: the first is to open up the analysis 
on the regime as this is a known source of inertia and path dependency. In this way, the 
thesis aims to contribute to ST by finding ways that can effectively unlock regimes, and 
by implication, accelerate the diffusion of niche innovations. The second objective is to 
investigate the applicability of the regime concept as it is found in Global South contexts. 
In this regard, some scholars have noted the complexity of higher forms of uncertainty 
found in Global South conditions (Ockwell et al., 2018; Wieczorek, 2018; Swilling et al., 
2016; Baker et al., 2014). There is, therefore, a need to better understand the regime as 
it is found in these complicated settings.  
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A second audience to which the thesis aims to contribute is the community of 
practitioners concerned with electricity changes in South Africa. The country has a well-
established coal-based electricity system, but it is under pressure to decarbonise to a 
lower carbon trajectory. Against this background, there is increasing momentum for a 
‘Just Transition’ pathway (NPC, 2012) in which there are plans for an inclusive, climate 
resilient society. Here, the research aims to contribute to the domestic agendas on 
climate change and inclusive economic growth and, at the same time, provide insights 
into similar emerging economies that are attempting to achieve their sustainable 
development goals.  
1.3 A brief introduction to the theoretical lens  
 
LANDSCAPE
REGIME
NICHE
Path dependence
Inertia 
Lock-in
Retention
 
Figure 1.2: A multi-level perspective (MLP) illustrating the main theoretical concepts in 
the regime, adapted from (Geels, 2002a; Wieczorek, 2018). 
In an attempt to contribute to the ST literature, the primary focus of this research is on 
the role of regimes in stability and change.  
Socio-technical regimes are characterised as path-dependent because they involve five 
factors: (1) incumbent actors who have been vested in maintaining the status quo, (2) a 
network of actors that represent organisational capital, (3) regulations and standards 
that enable continuity of the regime, (4) cognitive routines and practices that can blind 
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actors to realities outside of their own focus and lastly (5) material elements such as 
infrastructure enabling lock-in due to sunk investments (Verbong and Geels, 2007) 
The evolution of the MLP regime concept in earlier transition research was based on 
theoretical knowledge of evolutionary economics and neo-institutional theory. As 
elaborated in Chapter 2, these concepts tend to favour an inherent bias towards 
processes of stability and resilience. For instance, in evolutionary economics, there is an 
emphasis on routines, bounded rationality and market selection, whereby firms choose 
instead to ‘satisfice than optimise’ (Geels, 2014a,  p. 263). However, part of the 
limitation in evolutionary economics is that it downplays intentionality and strategy and 
that it has a lack of concern for the role of beliefs, cognitions and interpretation of the 
actors (Geels, 2014a). 
Similarly, while neo-institutional theory sees actors competing for social legitimacy 
rather than economic efficiency, the view is of actors as ‘cultural dopes’ that simply 
conform to its institutional pressures (Geels, 2014a). Both theoretical insights brought 
forth the notions of technological trajectories, path dependency, inertia and lock-in, 
explaining that technological innovation develops incrementally (Dosi, 1982; Rip and 
Kemp, 1998; Unruh, 2000). Hence, there is the inclination to accept the regime as a 
‘monolithic bloc’ subject to a radical change from exogenous shocks (Figure 1.2).  
In line with this concept is the idea that radical change is brought about at the level of a 
niche (Geels, 2002). Hence, the MLP tends to assume that, as the regime becomes 
unstable, a window of opportunity is created for a niche to develop. However, it is not 
evident in the literature on how regime instability can lead to niche opportunities 
(Smith, 2007; Geels and Schot, 2007).  Moreover, several scholars have indicated that 
Global South countries tend to be in a constant state of flux due to greater levels of 
uncertainty in their political and economic conditions (Wieczorek, 2018), with the 
potential for varying degrees of regime stability over time (Köhler et al., 2019). 
Accordingly, Köhler et al., (2019), indicated that more research is needed which can 
provide empirical insights into the various forms of regime stability, particularly from 
the Global South, other than the presumed monolithic concept. In line with Köhler et 
al., (2019) call, this research focuses on opening up the analysis on the regime.  
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To do so, it is argued that a punctuated equilibrium approach to understanding regime 
change is limiting. This is because punctuated equilibrium implies a sharp distinction 
between long periods of incremental change on the one hand, and abrupt radical change 
on the other (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Sorensen, 2014). In the MLP literature, the 
tendency is to assume incremental change within the regime, while radical innovation 
takes place in the niche. This conceptualisation can be problematic because, according 
to notable institutional scholars, the punctuated equilibrium approach is more helpful 
in understanding resilience than change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005,  p. 6). Moreover, 
institutions do change while appearing to show stability or not change while there is an 
exogenous shock (Pierson, 2004).  As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) reason, there could 
be internal institutional reconfigurations during times of apparent stasis or stability. This 
research contends that there is potential value in analysing endogenous regime changes 
(apart from incremental change) in response to pressure from its internal and external 
environment as it plays out during a transition.  
Thus, this research uses an institutional theory approach because it helps to focus the 
analysis on the rules that provide the stabilising features of regimes. The rules are 
regulative (laws, standards), cognitive (beliefs, search heuristics) and normative (values) 
(Scott, 2014). The understanding is that rules are endogenous organising and 
coordinating features that guide the behaviour of a set of actors in a regime (Geels and 
Schot, 2010). Hence, it is the reproduction of these rules, through routines, practices, 
and norms in society, which maintain regime stability. Conversely, when the 
interpretation of these rules starts to diverge, this can be the sources of conflict, as 
actors begin to disagree on shared ideas, preferences, standards and beliefs (Geels, and 
Schot, 2010). Accordingly, analysing rule changes is one of the ways in which regime 
stability and change can be evaluated.  
An evolved conceptualisation of the regime includes the use of institutional theory 
(Geels et al., 2016; Andrews-Speed, 2016; Smink et al., 2015; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 
2014; Geels, 2004a), as well as expanding structuration theory to delineate actors’ use 
of rules (Schot and Kanger, 2018). Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2014) in particular, 
operationalised the regime as the dominant institutionalised structure in an 
organisational field, subject to constant negotiation between strategic actors. Thus, 
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Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2014), characterises regime stability as levels of structuration 
and degrees of institutionalisation. 
To elaborate, this thesis defines an organisational field as a selection environment in 
which technologies are selected by the society in which they are embedded, where the 
selection mechanisms have material, political, cultural and sociological characteristics.  
It is for these reasons, that the regime is considered highly institutionalised structure 
because once technologies are adopted in society, there is a process of ‘retention’ and 
‘reproduction’ – or ‘lock-in’ – that occurs through established regulations, market 
parameters such as scale and sunk investments, as well as sociological structures that 
include cognitive routines, and power and politics, making changes away from the 
retained technologies difficult (Geels, 2014b; Smith and Raven, 2012; Meadowcroft, 
2011; Geels and Schot, 2010).   
An organisational field includes a community of actors who interact with each other to 
produce similar services or products (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). This thesis considers 
the community of actors to include businesses, suppliers, producers, user groups 
(households, industries), societal groups (civil society) and public authorities (e.g. 
regulators, national ministries) (Geels, 2004a) 
Structure is a foundational concept in ST, taking into consideration that it is both a 
medium by which actors draw upon rules and resources and an outcome of social 
practices (Giddens, 1984). Therefore, in this thesis, I develop a meta-conceptual 
framework that delineates regime stability as levels of structuration with an associated 
agency (Chapter 3). These various degrees of regime stability are conceptualised as high, 
limited and low.  In these various forms of regime stability, I then use institutional theory 
(discursive institutionalism and endogenous institutional theory) to reveal the kinds of 
internal regime changes in relation to shifting core rule changes over time.  The 
assumption is that, the greater the rules are institutionalized in society, the greater the 
stability. By inference, the instability of the regimes is a process of dis-embedding of 
these rules.    
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In sum, by using changes in rules to examine regime stability and change, there is then 
an opportunity to open up the regime to more endogenous scrutiny and not simply 
considering it as a ‘monolithic bloc’. 
1.4 Research design/methodological approaches  
This thesis assumes that the nature of socio-technical transitions involves complex 
dynamics, non-linearities, and structural change (Geels and Schot, 2010).  The MLP, in 
particular, focuses on co-evolutionary interactions between ongoing trajectories, and a 
selection environment that is multi-dimensional because it involves markets, 
regulations, social legitimacy and infrastructure (Geels and Schot, 2010).   
For these reasons, transitions research requires a methodological approach that is rich 
in context and tracks complex developments over time. A qualitative case study 
approach is seen to provide such a method because it allows detailed study of event 
sequences and identification of patterns and their underlying mechanisms (Geels and 
Schot, 2010).   
Overall case study choice and the unit of analysis  
The research question of how incumbents and institutions interact is set against the 
background of a fossil fuel system transition that proceeds gradually. South Africa was 
chosen as a case study because it has an example of a coal-based electricity regime that 
is highly path-dependent but is undergoing significant changes. Revealing the ways in 
which a regime responds to changes could provide meaningful research into 
sustainability transitions. My unit of analysis was based on the rules of the regime, 
reasoning that efforts to maintain, alter, reinterpret and repurpose can reveal the 
dynamics of regime stability and change.  
Selection of specific case studies 
The case studies were selected according to the establishment of the country’s 
electricity regime (stability), and the kinds of regime responses in relation to the two 
niches (change). In doing so, analysing both the establishment and changes to the 
regime should provide rich theoretical and empirical insights into the ST literature. The 
thesis is organised into three papers, which form the empirical case studies. 
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The first paper traces the establishment of the country’s MEC (Chapter 4), which outlines 
the relationship between mining and energy in South Africa’s energy sector. This 
relationship provides a contextual preamble of a highly path-dependent and historically 
derived carbon-intensive energy sector.  
The second empirical case study considers the RE I4P renewable energy programme and 
its relationship with the dominant incumbent, Eskom (Chapter 5). The main objective of 
this case is to examine regime resistance through a multi-dimensional regime selection 
environment.  
The third study investigates the Gas I4P (Chapter 6) and examines multiple regime 
interactions between electricity and liquid fuels.  
Data collection 
In terms of data collection, this includes multiple sources of evidence using both primary 
and secondary data. For primary data collection, I used qualitative, in-depth semi-
structured interviews supplemented with field notes, documenting remarks, reflections 
and views throughout the fieldwork (See Appendices A and B).   
Secondary data included document reviews of government policies and strategies, 
scientific articles, books, doctoral theses and reports published in the grey literature (see 
Appendix C).    
The data analysed in the empirical cases were collected in two phases: 
1) The first phase of fieldwork took place in Johannesburg, Pretoria with follow-up 
teleconference calls from June to October 2015. 
2) The second phase of fieldwork took place in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape 
Town from March to July 2016.  
The purpose of the first phase was to pilot the case studies in order to evaluate the 
theoretical concepts with empirically grounded research. The first phase, had a broad 
range of relevant stakeholders, including experts in the field, government authorities 
and researchers were interviewed in order to determine the relevance of some of the 
preliminary research ideas and themes. Moreover, there was an opportunity to 
familiarise with the case studies, establishing contacts, gathering preliminary data, and 
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expanding interviewees by a snowballing method. This phase effectively expanded the 
number of interviewees, references and access to official documents.  
The second phase of the fieldwork built upon the first phase by going into more depth 
with some interviewees and initiating additional interviews in order to widen the 
research as much as possible. For the Gas I4P, I did follow-up interviews in February 
2018 to update the relevance of my findings. A snowball technique is used from the 
chosen interviewees and contacts. The selection of interviewees was based on ensuring 
that actors from government, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), the private 
sector, academia and think tanks were included (Table 1.1, Appendices A and B). Across 
these two phases, I conducted 67 semi-structured interviews. The duration of interviews 
was anything from 30 minutes to more than 2 hours.  
Furthermore, another literature review (theoretical and empirical) was undertaken to 
incorporate some of the insights gained after the first phase.  Consequently, a more 
evolved interview protocol was prepared to better suit the case studies. In this instance, 
in refining the design of the case studies, the goal was an analytical generalisation, 
providing an opportunity that may modify, reject or expand current research (Yin, 2013,  
p. 41). To do so, I operationalised the normative, regulative and cognitive rules’ outline 
in the regime and related them to the adapted endogenous institutional modes of drift, 
layering, and conversion (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). After, operationalising the 
analytical concepts from the MLP (niche and regime) and endogenous institutional 
modes of change, I translated them into questions that could be comprehensible to the 
interviewees. 
In general, semi-structured interviews were useful for gaining nuanced and deep 
insights into the decisions made by different actors, while also providing flexibility to 
explore other insights that may be relevant. Moreover, the semi-structured interviews 
focussed on probing areas of tensions, compromises and instances of collaboration, in 
order to go deeper than publicly available material can provide.   
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Table 1.1 List of interviews indicating the type of actors who were interviewed 
Interviews by organisation 
Industry/ 
private 
sector 
State-owned 
enterprises 
(SOEs) 
Government 
ministries 
Think 
tanks 
Consultants Academia NGOs 
18 5 16 6 7 9 6 
Final Total  67 
 
Data analysis  
For the analysis, I combined the different sources of information (academic literature, 
newspaper articles, policy documents, organisational websites, see Appendix C) and 
interviews according to the MLP dimensions and triangulated these as far as possible. I 
chose to anonymise all respondents who took part in my research. Each empirical 
chapter outlines the methodology concerning the types of institutional theory used.   
On triangulation, I identified several kinds of issues that needed to be addressed, each 
of which is elaborated below along with concrete examples of the strategies I used to 
address them. These strategies were applicable in all three papers:  
1) In preparation for interviews, I would use statements made by interviewees in 
public documents such as newspaper articles, parliamentary hearings, 
government documents (see Appendix C) and pose them as questions or points 
for clarification.   
I weighed these claims against multiple sources of evidence. For example, gas 
development has been claimed as a ‘game changer’ in the country’s energy landscape 
(DOE, 2016b,  p. 24) (see Chapter 6).  Moreover, there were claims that gas could provide 
greater flexibility to the electricity grid in order to counter the intermittency of 
renewables, as well as reduce the risk of creating stranded assets due to its modular 
infrastructure (DOE, 2016). As part of triangulation, I asked interviewees about evidence 
to support or otherwise such claims (and see below on opposing claims).   
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2) In trying to establish a fact, as in determining dates and events, I used multiple 
sources of evidence.  
For example, in the case of the multi-year price determination (MYPD), which is an 
annual electricity price increase, specific events were determined through publicly 
available documents such as the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) (see 
Chapter 5). Here, Nersa has detailed accounts of the MYPD process in which Eskom 
outlined its reasons for price increases through customer growth projections, sales 
volume, plant performance, and the costs of IPPs, among others. From these 
documents, I was able to determine the different cycles of the MYPD, which was 
important to trace the development of the RE I4P and Eskom’s operational performance 
over time (MYPD 1= 2006-2009, MYPD 2= 2009-2012, MYPD 3=2013-2018) (see Chapter 
5).  
3) In trying to establish the validity of opposing claims, I interrogated a range of 
information in order to make an assessment. But see point 4 on opposing claims 
that could not be resolved. 
For example, Eskom had claimed the following:  
“Eskom wishes to assert that it remains committed to government’s energy procurement 
programmes and intends to sign budget quotations and power purchase agreements 
related to these programmes (RE I4P). This commitment … takes into consideration value 
for money and whether South Africa’s customer base can afford the IPP tariffs.”7 
These claims were weighed against multiple sources of evidence (interviews and grey 
literature). For instance, in contrast to supporting renewables, Eskom had publicly 
delayed the progress of the RE I4P by blocking power purchase agreements (PPAs) (see 
Chapter 5). Moreover, the argument of value for money could no longer hold, as the bid 
prices for renewables became competitive with the new coal plants Medupi and Kusile. 
 
7 Eskom, (2017), Eskom supports renewables, but flags cost-recovery uncertainty as a worry. 
http://www.eskom.co.za/AboutElectricity/FactsFigures/Pages/EskSupprtRenewbls.aspx 
[Accessed 1 August 2019]  
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Furthermore, there were claims that Eskom “frustrates the entry of IPPs and private 
investment through the disingenuous use of facts, the political brinkmanship and what 
lawyers’ term malicious compliance, through the quiet subversion of government policy 
by actions such as delayed access or inflated grid-connection costs for IPPs.” (Eberhard, 
2016).  In this case, I compared the evidence relevant to Eskom’s claim of supporting the 
RE I4P. Given the numerous sources supporting the position that Eskom resisted the RE 
I4P compared with those claiming the opposite (most of which were from Eskom), it is 
most likely that Eskom did resist the progress of renewables, and this is further 
supported by considering that renewables were a threat to the status quo that clearly 
benefited Eskom. 
4) In cases where there were opposing claims that could not be resolved using 
available evidence, I stated the claims but took the discussion no further.   
For example, there were claims that Eskom is included in the broad issues related to 
‘state capture’, which is a term used to describe state-owned entities who are exploited 
– through procurement allocations, for example – to benefit powerful elites (PP, 2016; 
Budlender, 2017; Bhorat et al., 2017). In this instance, there have been opposing claims. 
In one claim, Eskom denies allegations of ‘state capture’, in the “absence of concrete 
evidence of wrongdoing” (Creamer, 2016). However, there are multiple sources of 
evidence claiming Eskom has been involved in awarding coal contracts that did not 
follow due diligence, which is an indication of fraud (see more in PP, 2016; Budlender, 
2017; Bhorat et al., 2017). Establishing the validity of these claims would require 
substantial evidence, especially given the sensitivity of the allegations. Doing so was 
beyond the capacity of my resources and would, in any case, add little to my analysis. 
Instead, I decided to state these claims (see Chapter 5) in order to highlight an aspect of 
the political economy associated with Eskom, but I did not take the issue any further.   
1.5 Thesis arguments and contributions  
This research combines the MLP with institutional theory, as lenses in which to analyse 
regime stability and change.  The thesis contribution helps to explain, the kinds of 
responses the regime has in relation to the shifting core rules, as it plays out in a 
transition over time.  It provides a more nuanced understanding of the dynamism in 
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regime stability and change.  This, therefore, adds to our knowledge on regime 
destabilisation, erosion, decline, and suggestions for phase-out. I delineate the 
contributions into theoretical, empirical, and policy recommendations.  
Theoretical  
First, this thesis reveals that, in all three case studies, there was no neat pattern of scale-
up from the niche level to destabilise South Africa’s electricity regime. Instead, there is 
an evolution of a highly stable regime towards features of a fractured regime as a 
gradual form of destabilisation. In this thesis, ‘fractured’ refers to different types of 
regime changes that emerged depending on the structural conditions of the regime over 
time. To elaborate, maintenance of the regime was possible when the structural 
conditions were relatively stable, but regime actors began to reform and reinterpret and 
started to defect from, existing rules as the structure became weak. Hence, the 
understanding of regime changes is more nuanced than simply incremental, 
appreciating the role of structures in regime stability and change more fully. 
This notion of a fractured regime contributes to ST research, by appreciating the 
possibility of progressive endogenous regime changes that can add up to destabilisation 
in contrast to the assumed concept of a regime as a monolithic bloc, subject to 
exogenously induced punctuated change. It is worth noting that the van Welie et al. 
(2018) reference to a splintered regime is different from the fractured regime as defined 
in this thesis. Van wellie et al., propose the coexistence of complementary 
heterogeneous regimes in the Nairobi sanitation sector, each of which has its own 
unique set of characteristics depending on social fitness and spatial configuration. 
Second, this thesis delineates specific parts of the regime selection environment that 
enables regime resistance. In this case study, the dominant incumbent, Eskom, made 
use of the various dimensions in its selection environment, particularly discursive 
structures, to resist the rise of renewables. Conversely, discursive structures were also 
helpful for the niche by influencing the terms of the debate, exacerbating regime 
tensions and gaining public support. Thus, discursive structures were useful dimensions 
to reveal regime–niche dynamics. However, it may be different in other cases, and so 
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more research is needed in making use of the regime multi-dimensional selection 
environment to further theorise regime resistance and niche challenges.  
Third, I argue that the implication of regime instability on niche opportunities is 
emergent and dynamic. For example, as the structure of the regime becomes weak, then 
the organisational field opens up to more actors that have various preferences, interests 
and ideas, resulting in different opportunities for strategic deliberation and negotiation. 
The assumption that too much regime instability causes a decrease in niche opportunity 
has instead, in this case, study, revealed a niche opportunity. Hence, a better nuance is 
needed between the implication of regime stability and a niche because this relationship 
would be dependent on the actors’ present, their ability to change the rules, their access 
to resources, organisational field conditions and temporal sequences that may already 
have unfolded.  
In sum, this thesis examines the strategic actions by regime actors over rule changes as 
a way of maintaining their preferred regime selection environment. It is through these 
varying regime responses, which helps explain the kinds of agency expressed in relation 
to the structural change in a regime.  Thus, the findings of this research provide a more 
nuanced elucidation of the dual nature of the regime, in the form of fractured 
destabilisation.   
Empirical  
South Africa is deliberating on the need to shift its energy systems towards a Just 
Transitions pathway. This research suggests that to do so, both the decline in the use of 
coal and stimulating alternatives need to be tackled simultaneously so that a direction 
towards sustainable development becomes feasible. Directionality requires deliberate 
attempts to abandon existing unsustainable pathways because failing to do so can mean 
existing trajectories may simply be replicated or extended. 
Policy recommendation  
The research recommends that instead of wholesale destabilisation policies, a fractured 
regime requires a temporally sensitive ‘displacement’ policy mix. This is one in which 
varying stages of regime stability are recognised and potentially exploited by 
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corresponding niche strategies. Each of these points is further elaborated in Chapter 7, 
which summarises the critical contribution of the research.  
1.6 Outline of the thesis  
This thesis is organised into seven chapters, which includes this introductory Chapter 1. 
Each chapter of the thesis is discussed in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs.  
Chapter 2: A literature review 
This chapter begins with a discussion on ST as the primary academic audience on which 
I base my thesis. Next, I discuss a few prominent theoretical lenses from the 
sustainability transition literature, giving my rationale for selecting the MLP as my 
chosen framework. This is followed by a critique of the literature gap regarding regime 
concepts, such as regime resistance, regime destabilisation and regime–niche linkages. 
Given these gaps, I suggest that institutional theory could be a useful lens through which 
we can focus on how to contribute towards a more nuanced understanding of the 
dynamism in regime stability and change.  
Chapter 3: Conceptual meta-framework 
The conceptual meta-framework was developed in order to find a way of problematising 
regime stability into parts that enable the study of regime stability and change. To do 
this, regime stability was delineated into three parts: high, limited and low, defining 
them according to the dual nature of a regime, which is structure and agency. I then 
discuss two theoretical frameworks – discursive institutionalism and endogenous 
institutional theory in Chapters 4 and 5–6, respectively. It was expected that institutional 
theory would provide useful theoretical concepts in which to operationalise changes in 
regime rules because rules provide the stabilising features of regimes. Moreover, 
endogenous institutional theory, derived from Streeck and Thelen (2005), stems from a 
theoretical approach, which challenges the notion of punctuated equilibrium, because 
it is argued to be better at explaining institutional resilience than institutional change 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Moreover, these authors provided four endogenous 
incremental rule changes, which were drift, layering, conversion and displacement. 
Drift, layering and conversion were then operationalised in Papers 2 and 3, as a way to 
analyse regime responses to the pressure derived from the renewables and gas niches, 
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respectively. Displacement was not covered by any of the papers but is included in 
Chapter 7 where that discussion builds on the findings from Papers 2 and 3. It was 
expected that such analysis could reveal the complexity associated with endogenous 
regime change and therefore, open up the analysis on the regime.  
The next three chapters outline the three papers (Table 1.2), which form the empirical 
case studies.  
Chapter 4: Historical review of the relationship between energy, mining and the South 
African economy  
The main research question here is: 
How and why did South Africa’s MEC become a powerful, entrenched regime? 
The purpose of this research was to trace the establishment of rules and resources that 
resulted in the creation of the MEC and how that enabled Eskom to maintain its 
dominance in the system.  
This chapter forms the first empirical case study and was published in October 2015 as 
part of a book entitled Earth Wind and Fire: Unpacking the Political, Economic and 
Security Implications on the Green Economy (Ting, 2015). The chapter is a detailed 
analysis of the MEC in South Africa, where the core rules of the electricity regime are 
embedded. It demonstrates the entrenched nature of the MEC and provides the 
empirical context of South Africa’s electricity regime. It also explains the 
institutionalisation of the MEC into a prominently obdurate structure which 
demonstrates a formidable obstacle and challenge for new entrants.  
Chapter 5: Eskom and the rise of renewables: regime resistance, crisis and the strategy 
of incumbency in South Africa’s electricity system 
 The main research question here is: 
 How has Eskom responded to the introduction of renewable energy electricity 
generation in South Africa? 
The purpose of this research was to examine the kinds of endogenous regime change 
that took place when the regime was subjected to pressure from a renewable niche.  
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This chapter discusses a contribution to a more nuanced understanding of regime 
resistance and regime niche linkages by characterising the regime selection 
environment as the battleground whereby strategic actors compete to influence and 
shape outcomes. The empirical case study is on South Africa’s dominant regime 
incumbent Eskom versus the recently introduced RE I4P. Drift and layering were used as 
analytical concepts in which to observe incumbent resistance and niche development, 
respectively, based on analysing struggles over rule changes. Drift was useful in 
understanding how Eskom responded to change and thereby maintained stability. Drift 
occurs when rules within the regime remain constant despite the change in situational 
context (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Mostly, Eskom was able to delay, resist and slow the 
progress of the RE I4P over time. It was able to do this through evolving resistance 
strategies that were hidden to open and visible contestation with the RE I4P. Initially, 
Eskom had resisted the introduction of the RE I4P by confining debates to hidden spaces 
amongst its organisational networks, such as inaction on policy reforms, delaying market 
changes and moderating the need for additional electricity generation and information 
asymmetry. However, continuous resistance strategies meant that the electricity regime 
failed to adapt to changing circumstances, which led to a significant crisis, as 
demonstrated by massive blackouts in the country from 2008 through 2019. This crisis 
provided a window of opportunity for the renewables niche, and the IPPs programme 
was implemented in such a way that it was not an attack on Eskom’s monopoly power, 
which was considered as layering. Layering is defined as new rules added alongside 
existing ones. In this research, layering revealed that the introduction of the RE I4P did 
not require, nor did it result in, a complete destabilisation of the regime incumbent. 
Instead, the steady progress of the RE I4P coexisted alongside the Eskom’s dominance. 
Geels et al. (2016) adaptation of Streeck and Thelen (2005) layering concept described 
it as incremental adjustment and called it ‘fit-and-conform’ in which niche innovations 
are developed within the existing regime selection environment. Layering is feasible 
when an institutional environment is not conducive to radical disruption, therefore 
allowing new and old institutions to coexist over time. 
As the RE I4P niche made significant material gains, Eskom’s drift strategy of close and 
hidden contestation appeared to be failing. Thus, Eskom then evolved its resistance into 
24 
 
open and visible arenas of contestation by finding other ways to exploit its incumbency. 
These strategies involved blocking the finalisation of RE I4P contracts, changing grid 
connection rules and recruiting political support and action through the regime’s 
organisational networks by drawing the powerful trade unions into the contest.  
The paper concluded that a systematic analysis of rule changes in a regime selection 
environment is a significant way to demonstrate regime resistance and niche challenges. 
This, in turn, has implications on characterising regime resistance more fully and 
identifying the types of policies that can erode its power in favour of more sustainable 
regimes.  
The overall relevance of this paper to the thesis is that it revealed the kinds of regime 
and niche actions that emerged as the renewable niche coexisted alongside the 
dominant incumbent, Eskom. It showed early forms of regime disintegration as regime 
actors began to diverge and disagree on the core rules, which resulted in limited regime 
stability.  
Chapter 6: Multiple regime interactions, conversion, and South African liquefied 
natural gas (LNG)  
The research question here is: 
What explains regime interactions in the course of developing South Africa’s LNG 
for power and industrial use? 
The purpose of this paper was to examine the kinds of endogenous changes which take 
place when a regime has undergone some form of regime instability.  
This chapter discusses a contribution to ST literature on multiple regimes’ interaction in 
institutional terms and the lack of empirical research on the development of gas-to-
power and industrial use in South Africa. To illustrate this, the case study traces the 
emergence of South Africa’s LNG for power and industrial use, considered a niche, 
against a backdrop of two established regimes. These were electricity and liquid fuels, 
which we argued developed a closer interaction over time, as observed through 
conversion. Conversion defines institutions as ‘multipurpose tools’ which means they 
can be used at differing ends, depending on who is powerful enough to utilise them in 
their favour (Hacker et al., 2015). The mechanisms of conversion are the redirection of 
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the institutional resource over political or other forms of mediation and contestation 
over what functions and purposes an existing institution should serve (Hacker et al., 
2015).  
Applying these insights, it becomes evident that the interaction between the two 
regimes was motivated by landscape pressures due to regional gas discoveries and 
significant shale gas potential in the country’s Karoo region, as well as significant global 
trends in LNG on trade, gas prices and liquefaction. In parallel, the persistent electricity 
crisis, which started in 2008 and continues to the present, caused significant tension 
within the electricity regime. Thus, the electricity sector was described as engaging in a 
‘distant search’ because options for radical alternatives and new knowledge bases were 
explored. One suggestion is that the LNG niche has the potential to increase 
institutionalised norms and practices because it has the support of powerful extractive 
base industries present in both regimes. This is evident by changes in industrial 
mindsets, at least in the extractives industry, and the inclusion of gas in the country’s 
national development plans, which suggests that gas is increasingly embedded within 
the normative goals of both regimes. Changes in core beliefs, mission and identity, are 
considered deeper forms of institutional change (Geels, 2014a). This means that linkages 
between the two regimes can lead to an enduring connection and more significant 
configurational transformation (scope and depth) over time.  
From 2015, the electricity regime was encouraged to implement the LNG niche given 
the relative success of the IPP policy instrument used to introduce the RE I4P, as well as 
a shared similarity of an already well-established liquid fuels regime. The DOE, an 
electricity regime actor, planned to import LNG to provide an ‘anchor demand’ for 
electricity generation and collaborate with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
a liquid fuels regime actor, to beneficiate LNG for industrial use for an overall gas 
economy in the country. Thus, the two regimes had interacted because of perceived 
opportunities and mutual benefit derived by developing the LNG niche. They did so by 
repurposing existing cognitive, normative and regulative rules, which were considered 
as conversion. In this way, new institutions are not created, but instead, existing ones 
are repurposed to serve new goals or interests. However, the repurposing of existing 
rules was not a simple process; it required a series of cohesive efforts to develop linkages 
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between the two regimes. These efforts required the interface between the two regime 
communities to refine technical knowledge, operational processes, infrastructure 
development and the funding mechanisms necessary to implement the LNG niche. Over 
time, a gradual expansion of shared industrial mindsets, maturity in knowledge basis 
and societal expectations developed, which led to the alignment of interests and the 
formation of actor networks between the two regimes.  
The paper highlights the significance of an actively resourceful electricity regime which 
had repurposed an existing policy instrument at first used for RE I4P, but subsequently 
adapted it to procure gas, coal and other energy sources from IPPs. The research findings 
demonstrate the implication of how powerful actors can modify or co-opt existing 
institutions and redirect them for their own benefit.  
The overall relevance of this paper to the thesis is that electricity regime actors 
continued to diverge from and enact the core rules differently. This was evident by 
aligning several efforts with the liquid fuels regime to develop the LNG niche. As such, 
as the electricity regime stability decreased, repurposing existing institutions was 
necessary. Likewise, ST can unfold in different directions but is subject to ongoing 
mediation amongst strategic actors at a given time.  
Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusion  
This chapter revisits the research questions, synthesises the results from the empirical 
cases and discusses the main contributions of the work. This research concludes that 
combining institutional theory and the MLP provided a useful theoretical framework for 
analysing regime stability and change. Finally, there is a discussion on the limitations of 
the study and recommendations for future research are posited.  
Summary 
This chapter has introduced the main theoretical concepts and empirical context for this 
thesis. Primarily, this thesis aims to contribute towards closing the gap in ST research 
related to regime stability and change. Given that regimes are known sources of inertia 
and resistance, the empirical cases for this research can provide theoretical and 
empirical contributions by analysing how an emerging economy such as South Africa is 
trying to achieve its sustainable development goals. Table 1.2 outlines in detail the three 
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papers which form the empirical cases for this thesis. The next chapter is a literature 
review on the main theoretical frameworks used in ST, justifying the case for the MLP. 
This is followed by the significance of institutional theory in helping to focus the use of 
rules as units of analysis for examining regime stability and change.  
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Table 1.2: A summary of the three papers presented in this thesis, outlining the main research questions, and its overall significance 
Papers Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 
Title Historical review of the 
relationship between energy, 
mining and the South African 
Economy. 
Eskom and the rise of 
renewables: regime resistance, 
crisis and the strategy of 
incumbency in South Africa’s 
electricity system. 
Multiple regime interactions, 
conversion and South African 
Liquefied Natural Gas 
Aim of the research An in-depth case study on the 
role of mining in the 
development of the energy 
sector in South Africa. 
An empirical case study on South 
Africa’s electricity regime that 
demonstrates the contestation 
between an entrenched 
incumbent, namely the state-
owned utility Eskom versus the 
nascent RE I4P. 
The paper examines the 
emergence of Gas I4P in South 
Africa against a backdrop of 
liquid fuels and electricity 
regimes. 
 
Secondary research questions How and why did South Africa’s 
MEC become a powerful, 
entrenched regime? 
How has Eskom responded to the 
introduction of renewable 
energy electricity generation in 
South Africa? 
What explains the regime 
interactions in the course of 
developing South Africa’s LNG for 
power and industrial use? 
Conceptual approach Discursive, institutional theory Endogenous institutional theory 
using the modes of drift and 
layering 
Endogenous institutional theory 
using the mode of conversion 
Significance The analysis demonstrates the 
entrenched nature of the MEC 
and provides empirical context. 
The chapter explains the 
institutionalisation of the MEC 
into a prominently obdurate 
structure which demonstrates a 
The paper reveals the dynamics 
of regime resistance and niche–
regime interaction in institutional 
terms. The paper’s central 
insights are the ability of the 
entrenched incumbent to contest 
change in both closed and open 
The paper reveals that a 
cumulative effect of landscape 
changes and regime tensions 
influences the search heuristics 
to another regime, depending on 
perceived similarities in both 
functional and operational 
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formidable obstacle and 
challenge for new entrants. 
areas. By operationalising the 
regime selection environment as 
a battleground for rule changes, 
regime resistance was 
characterised more 
systematically. The implications 
are pertinent to the discussion of 
theorising regime resistance. 
parameters. Thus, in an effort to 
search for solutions, a regime 
repurposed existing cognitive, 
normative and regulative rules to 
favour the gas niche. The 
significance of this research was 
to demonstrate that the regime 
enabled the development of the 
gas niche. 
Dissemination Chapter in a book: 
 
TING, M. B., 2015. Historical 
Review of the Relationship 
between Energy, Mining and the 
South African Economy. In: 
MYTELKA, L., MSIMANG, V. & 
PERROT, R. (eds.) Earth, Wind 
and Fire: Unpacking the Political, 
Economic and Security 
Implications of Discourse on the 
Green Economy. Johannesburg: 
Real African Publishers. 
This has been published as an 
article in Energy Research and 
Social Science (ERSS).   
 
Presentation:  1st Energy 
Research and Social Science 
conference, 2-5 April 2017, 
Sitges, Spain. 
 
 
 
This chapter has been published 
as a working paper: 
 
TING, M. B., 2019. Multiple 
Regime Interactions, Conversion, 
and South Africa’s Liquefied 
Natural Gas. SPRU Working 
Paper Series (SWPS), 08, 1-30. 
 
Presentation: Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) 
Annual forum, Innovation and 
Industrialization, 30-31 May 
2019, Midrand, South Africa 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, a literature review on sustainability transitions (ST) literature is 
discussed, focusing on the MLP and institutional theories as frameworks for this thesis. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this research uses endogenous institutional theory to analyse 
the kinds of effort taken by the regime in response to shifting core rule changes over 
time.  
The next section outlines the MLP as the primary framework in the research. The MLP 
has traditionally been comprised of the evolutionary terms of selection, variation and 
retention. In particular, the regime has been conceptualised as highly stable, where lock-
in and path dependency persist (Geels and Schot, 2010). However, there are conceptual 
limitations of the regime, such as the tendency to understand it as a ‘monolithic bloc’, 
or stability is perceived as automatic due to its path-dependent properties (Section 
2.1.5). Hence, some scholars have a more evolved understanding of the regime which 
mobilises institutional theories to describe regime stability as levels or degrees of 
institutionalised structures (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). Thus, I introduce concepts 
related to the institutional theory of reproduction (Section 2.2) and change (Section 2.3), 
leading to a discussion on the duality of the regime (Section 2.4). 
 Sustainability transitions 
The ST community has produced significant theories, concepts and debate concerning 
fundamental shifts in the social and economic systems necessary in achieving inclusive, 
sustainable growth. For these reasons, I consider STs as sources of information that 
guide the research task.  
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The urgency to address sustainability challenges has grown over the last few decades 
because of rapid depletion in natural resources, rising greenhouse emissions, air 
pollution and energy security and access, amongst others (Markard et al., 2012), all of 
which have been articulated in the United Nations (UN) sustainable developmental goals 
(SDGs) (UN, 2015). Due to the inter-relatedness amongst the challenges in achieving 
sustainable development, the term transitions have been used to frame a need for 
systemic changes (Smith et al., 2010). Transitions scholars believe that a systemic 
change is needed in societal domains that encompass energy, mobility, housing and 
finance, amongst others (Smith et al., 2010; Schot and Kanger, 2018). These systems 
require radical changes in production, distribution and consumption (Markard et al., 
2012; Schot and Kanger, 2018). 
In a similar deliberation, an emerging research agenda called ‘transformative innovation 
policy’, an initiative between academics and policymakers, is finding new ways to frame 
innovation policies that are relevant to achieving the SDGs (Schot and Steinmueller, 
2018; Kuhlmann, 2018; Diercks et al., 2019). Sustainable development is a crucial issue 
amongst this transformative innovation policy community, and there is a critical 
reflection on the role of current innovation policies which may be the source of 
externalities such as climate change and exclusive economic growth.8 The thinking is 
that innovation policies need to be democratised (broad participation of actors), 
inclusive (addressing issues of capacity and access) and resilient (addressing issues 
relative to vulnerable and marginalised groups). Thus, part of the discussion on 
transformative innovation policy speaks to the ST field, where there is a need to 
understand unlocking path-dependent systems, through experimental forms in policy 
engagements (Schot et al., 2019). I have been part of the Transformative Innovation 
Policy Consortium (TIPC) initiated by the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) since 2016, 
undertaking fieldwork in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and South Africa. I have witnessed first-
hand, amongst senior policymakers and practitioners, the urgent need to align national 
innovation plans with the SDGs. It has been clear from these deliberations and 
engagement in this community that a step change from the norm is needed. There is a 
 
8Transformative Innovation Policy Consortium (TIPC). http://www.tipconsortium.net/ 
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growing understanding in this community that technological choices are not neutral, but 
instead, they are a socially driven co-evolutionary process.  
Overall, in STs, the focal point for change is usually centred around the ‘technological 
regime’, which represents a dominant and persistent configuration of a societal system. 
(Rip and Kemp, 1998; Grin et al., 2010). This is discussed in subsequent sections.  
Technological regime 
From its inception, transition scholars were concerned with strategies for reorienting or 
managing regimes towards sustainability (Markard et al., 2012). Such interest resonated 
with the concerns of sustainability researchers, with research focusing on a transition 
away from fossil fuel energy systems towards a shift in low-carbon development (Rip 
and Kemp, 1998; Smith et al., 2010). 
The ‘technological regime’ was first introduced by evolutionary economists Nelson and 
Winter (1982) primarily to describe the shared beliefs, heuristics and routines used by 
engineers to find solutions for a given problem. In evolutionary economics, actors are 
presumed to act in bounded rationality,9 and searching for solutions to problems tends 
to be localised and close to existing routines. These shared routines are what Dosi (1982) 
calls a technological paradigm that aggregates towards a pattern and subsequently to a 
natural, technological trajectory. Over time, Rip and Kemp (1998) refined this concept 
by adding rules that are embedded not just within engineering practices but in a much 
more extensive range that encompasses production processes and skills.  
Geels (2002a) developed the concept further by using the term socio-technical regimes 
so that social groups that include policymakers, users and scientists are as crucial in 
socio-technical systems. A socio-technical system is characterised by the co-
evolutionary linkages between material and social elements and has an influence on the 
functionality and development of a system (Grin et al., 2010).  Such a system consists of 
a combination of actors, networks, institutions, artefacts, infrastructure, markets and 
practices which together fulfil a societal function or needs (Geels, 2004; 2011).   
 
9Bounded rationality is defined by Geels (2011, p. 30) as a type of agency which is restricted to routines, 
search activities and learning by trial and error.  
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In this way, a socio-technical regime is defined as a collection of varying actors that 
operate amongst different sets of regulative, cognitive and normative rules (Scott, 2014) 
which guide their activities towards functions that meet societal needs (Bosman et al., 
2014; Geels and Schot, 2010). By broadening the regime concept further (beyond 
markets and science), a reconceptualization began to include socio-institutional 
dimensions. Smith et al. (2010) noted the following:  
A sociological sensibility extends the regime notion to embrace institutions (such 
as regulations and markets), heterogeneous networks (including devices and 
people), user relations, and social expectations. Mutual reinforcement across 
these plural processes creates the structural patterns that shape innovation and 
creates trajectories of social development.  
(p. 440)  
Given this socio-technical perspective, regimes are considered stable and path-
dependent, because they are constituted from a co-evolutionary accumulation and 
alignment of the following: (1) incumbent actors which have become vested in 
maintaining the status quo, (2) a network of actors that represent organisational capital, 
(3) regulations and standards that enable continuity of the regime, (4) cognitive routines 
and practices that can blind actors to realities outside of their own focus and, lastly, (5) 
material elements such as infrastructure that enable lock-in due to sunk investments 
(Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
Against this background, ST scholars have been concerned with strategies that 
contribute to regime shifts, arguing that a broad systemic change is achieved through 
user practices, cultural meanings, industry structures, markets, policies, technologies 
and supporting infrastructures (Geels and Schot, 2010). Here, there are three 
frameworks that have achieved some significance in ST research. These include the MLP, 
strategic niche management (SNM) and transition management (TM). I have 
investigated these in turn in order to determine a suitable framework within which to 
anchor my research task.  
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 Different theoretical lenses applied in ST literature 
MLP 
The MLP is a heuristic tool that seeks to understand the complex dynamics of socio-
technical change (Geels, 2002a; Rip and Kemp, 1998). It defines transitions which 
interface changes at three levels: experiments with innovative practices at the niche, 
structure and established practices and associated rules (the regime) and long-term, 
exogenous trends (the landscape) (Geels, 2004c; Geels, 2011). These three levels are 
functional relationships amongst actors, structures and practices that are interlinked 
(Raven and Verbong, 2007; Geels, 2004c). These levels are not meant to be hierarchical 
but to be interpreted at different levels of structuration and stability (Geels and Schot, 
2010). This means the higher the level, the greater the coherence and alignment of 
activities amongst actors, institutions, organisational networks and the markets over 
time (Grin et al., 2010). The main assumptions are that system innovations start in socio-
technical niches, diffuse, and breakthrough due to the linkages between developments 
at multiple levels (Geels, 2004c). Examples which describe changes using the MLP are 
sailing to steamships (Geels, 2002a), horse-drawn carriages to automobiles (Geels, 
2005) and cesspools to sewer systems (Geels, 2006).  
SNM 
Closely related to the MLP, SNM is concerned with the deliberate creation and support 
of a niche to stimulate regime shifts (Schot and Geels, 2008; Kemp et al., 1998; Raven 
and Geels, 2010). Niches are defined in MLP as protective spaces wherein a radical 
alternative is safeguarded from the same selection pressures operating on the regime. 
According to Smith et al. (2010), a niche is dependent on a multitude of actors who 
enable legitimacy and, ultimately, the broader adoption of niche innovation. SNM 
scholars have expanded on the critical dynamics associated with niche development in 
four processes: expectations, learning, network formation and societal embedding 
(Smith and Raven, 2012; Byrne, 2011; Raven, 2005). Related to expectations, these are 
promises that technology may provide a worthwhile social or commercial future. 
Therefore, time and effort are invested for it to succeed. Learning is about 
experimentation on niche technologies that lead to an improvement in performance or 
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economic feasibility (Schot and Geels, 2008). Social networks sustain expectations or 
articulate new demands and enable more resources for niche development. Societal 
embedding refers to how niche technologies are institutionalised within society and the 
diffusion of niche structures into the mainstream (Byrne, 2011).  
Niche actors that succeed in creating protection constructs do it in a manner that 
involves active support from regime actors. A niche does not exist in isolation, nor can 
it be shielded indefinitely. At some point, contestation between the regime and niche 
actors is inevitable. Smith (2007) alluded to this by indicating that niches alone are 
unlikely to transform regimes. Successful transitions would have to include positive 
critical feedback from niches, such as profit, meeting societal needs that are insufficient 
within the regime and a critical mass of actors (from the regime and niches) who have 
aligned interests. The particular relationships involved with how niches link to or 
confront a stable regime under conditions of change that can lead to transition is under 
the studied topic. It is presumed that linkages occur in a ‘haphazard’ way (Smith, 2007,  
p. 431), and there is no account of regime stability with varying stages of niche 
development (Geels and Schot, 2007). A niche innovation must align with expectations 
dominant in the regime, and so would be constrained or enabled through dominant 
regime structures.  
The SNM literature would not be suitable as a framework for this thesis, as it is more 
concerned with niche formation and development. For this research, the analysis is 
concerned with the regime itself and the implication of regime changes on niche 
development. However, it is acknowledged that the findings of this research contribute 
to SNM, as opening up the analysis on the regime can reveal insights for practical 
strategies that could enable niche development.  
TM 
TM is a set of governance tools aimed at purposely creating transition arenas with the 
regime, niche and other actors, where they envision and jointly experiment with new 
pathways to sustainability (Rotmans et al., 2001; Loorbach, 2010; Schot and Geels, 
2008). The goal is to actively influence the regime through niche experiments, problem 
structuring reflexive monitoring and evaluation. TM considers that change in achieving 
36 
 
sustainable development (Loorbach, 2010) requires 1) long-term goal setting, 2) 
promoting change in structures, cultures and practices and 3) learning about different 
perspectives. TM concentrates on tackling change at the regime level. In this respect, 
Loorbach (2010) suggests that barriers, such as regulations, institutions, consumer 
routines and infrastructures, be addressed through a coalition of authoritative actors. In 
this way, a change originates within a regime, as a transition is translated within an 
organisation. The TM approach has been applied in various European countries, but it 
has been acknowledged that its applicability and diffusion to other countries remains 
untested. In a more critical interpretation, Schot and Geels (2008, p. 542) emphasised 
that many of the visioning exercises prescribed by TM have become an ‘impression 
management’ tasks, where there is a limitation in translating them to real-life 
experiences. Moreover, I would argue that this type of approach overestimates the 
capacities that authoritative actors have in managing the complexities of the tasks 
involved. For instance, in Global South conditions, given the complicated and often ad 
hoc nature of policymaking, the reliance on consistent and capable actors could be 
challenging for TM. As such, TM would be unsuitable for this thesis because the tools 
provided lack with the means to open up the analysis on the regime. It may be helpful 
in creating conditions for regime shifts, but the focus for my research is to make a more 
in-depth analysis of why and how regime shifts do occur.  
 Choosing MLP as the framework  
Transitions are inherently complex phenomena to study because there are relationships 
amongst multi-actors along multi-dimensions (markets, regulations, cultural, social 
movements, infrastructure and social legitimacy) over an extended period of time (Geels 
and Schot, 2010,  p. 96). Moreover, this research is concerned with the diffusion of 
technologies, their sedimentation into background structures and processes which may 
unlock regimes. Thus, the MLP is an appropriate framework to use.  
Moreover, MLP scholars suggest that a heuristic device which guides an analyst in 
identifying patterns and underlying mechanisms is more appropriate than simple cause 
and effect models  (Geels and Schot, 2010; Geels, 2011).  
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There are primarily three ways in which the MLP is best suited to the current research: 
 First, the MLP appreciates the co-evolutionary nature of socio-technical change; 
therefore, various theoretical roots (economic and social considerations) are 
mobilised that can trace patterns and regularities over time. In this regard, the 
MLP is open to interpretive frames, such that a researcher is able to analyse 
alignment and linkages amongst different processes across temporal changes. 
 Second, the MLP uses a narrative explanation which describes outcomes as 
‘event sequences, and timing and conjunctures of event-chains’ which helps to 
‘capture complex interactions between agency and changing context and 
changing identities’ (Geels, 2011,  pp 34-35). 
 Third, the causality in a narrative explanation is considered as ‘probabilistic’, and 
there is a need to describe ‘twists and turns’ of certain events (Geels and Schot, 
2010,  pp 95-99). Here, the MLP strength is that it helps to organise case studies 
as structured according to landscape, regime and niches. However, it is 
acknowledged that specific patterns or the speed of a particular transition are 
dependent on local contexts. Therefore, the generalizability lies in the degree to 
which the MLP is applicable in various local cases (Geels and Schot, 2010,  p. 95). 
The greater the applicability to various empirical cases, the more chances there 
are in enhancing the exploratory power of the MLP’s concepts. This is only 
possible if further local cases are tested, examined and interrogated. It is this call 
to which the South African case studies aim to contribute. 
Having identified the MLP as my framework, I now move the discussion towards regime 
lock-ins, which are fundamental concepts to this research.   
 Regime lock-in  
Much of the current literature on path dependency and lock-in pays particular attention 
to bottom-up emerging radical innovations that might displace these resistant 
incumbents (Smith et al., 2010; Unruh, 2000). In an analysis similar to Dosi (1982) on the 
notion of ‘technological trajectories’, Geels (2011) and Unruh (2000) point out that 
established technical competencies can be inflexible in a way that limits innovation to 
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incremental and predictable changes in firms. This means that regime actors may have 
preconceived ideas and beliefs about the relevance of new technologies concerning fit, 
form and compatibility within an existing system. For technologies, lock-in can occur 
because economies of scale favour adoption and increased learning effects as evidenced 
by the often used example of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985). The QWERTY 
keyboard is an example of long-lasting technological path dependency, because the 
design achieved a dominant market position early on, leading to economies of scale and 
crowding out alternative designs that followed. This example elucidates how, once an 
initial choice gets locked in, a change is challenging even if there are more efficient 
technologies available (Thelen, 2003).  
Moreover, another lock-in mechanism is due to regulatory mechanisms that enable the 
status quo and sunk investments in infrastructure, as well as extended lifetime capacity 
(Penna and Geels, 2012; Geels, 2011). For socio-technical systems, increasing returns 
can be mutually reinforcing through a process of co-evolution of technologies, shared 
mindsets and regulatory institutions (Foxon, 2011) (Table 2.1). Consequently, these lock-
in mechanisms indicate that innovation is incremental, with predictable technological 
trajectories. Therefore, the regime is the source of inertia which radical innovation 
needs to overcome. In the MLP conceptualisation, radical innovation takes place at the 
niche level.  
Table 2.1 Sources of industrial regime lock-in, adapted from (Geels, 2014a; Unruh, 
2002)  
Lock-in Examples 
Technological  Dominant design, standard technological architectures and 
components, compatibility  
Shared mindsets, 
cognitive frames 
Routines, preferences, blinding actors to development outside 
their focus, cognitive schemas 
Industry  Industry standards 
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Regulatory 
institutions  
Government policy, legal frameworks, departments 
 
After this description of the regime, the discussion will now turn towards the current 
gaps of the regime in the literature.   
 Regime critiques in the literature  
One of the critiques of the regime relates to its interpretation as a monolithic or 
homogenous bloc (Smith et al., 2005) which fails to account for internal tensions, 
conflicts and incoherencies (Fuenfschilling and Truffer 2014; Smith et al., 2010; Holtz et 
al. (2008). These micro fluctuations may not be accurately depicted because a regime is 
assumed to be a unified block that faces pressures from the outside, such as niche 
innovations and landscape developments. In response to this assumption, Geels (2011) 
indicated that regimes operate within semi-coherent rules, which do allow for tension, 
conflict and disagreement amongst rules from different regime dimensions (Geels, 
2011). Moreover, he noted that it might be helpful to understand regimes as having 
‘coherence, shared rules and similarity’ and simultaneously ‘containing variety, 
disagreements, debate and internal conflict’ (Geels, 2011,  p. 31). In this regard, Geels 
(2011) stresses that such conceptualisation would require an empirical analysis to 
strengthen the argument.  
Second, regime behaviour is another stream of research in transitions literature that has 
gained prominence. Regime behaviour relates to the idea that, instead of understanding 
regimes as having automatic stability due to routinised norms and practices, there are 
scholars in the field who see regimes as actively resisting change (Geels, 2014b), as well 
as shaping regime rules through an institutional process (Genus, 2012; Fuenfschilling 
and Truffer, 2014; Smink et al., 2015), a reorientation towards radical innovation 
(Berggren et al., 2015; Penna and Geels, 2015) and engaging in multiple regime 
interactions (Raven and Verbong, 2007; Sutherland et al., 2015).  
Third, a collection of research is termed the ‘flipside’ of transitions, in reference to how 
old regimes are weakened or destabilised or deliberately phased out, creating space for 
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new regimes to emerge and become established (Turnheim and Geels, 2012; Turnheim 
and Geels, 2013; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016; Kern and Rogge, 2018). For instance, Turnheim 
and Geels (2013) conducted a historical study of the British coal industry that indicated 
that destabilisation was at first slow, hindered by regime inertia lasting a few decades, 
but gradually changes in user preferences, technological competition and a decline in 
market position over time ultimately led to the demise of the UK coal industry.  
Fourth, some ST scholars argue that theoretical and conceptual frameworks developed 
in the Global North will likely encounter challenges when applied in Global South 
contexts (Hansen et al., 2018). These scholars assert that countries in the Global South 
tend to have higher levels of political and economic instability, greater social inequality 
and rely more heavily on informal institutions (Wieczorek, 2018; Hansen et al., 2018; 
Sengers and Raven, 2014). For example, ‘informal’ transport in Bangkok is the dominant 
form of mobility, and it is often unregulated and lacks proper public sanction because of 
rampant socio-spatial inequalities in the city (Sengers and Raven, 2014). Others have 
noted the undemocratic nature of regimes due to the continuation of rent-seeking 
activities in South Africa’s renewable energy sector (Swilling et al., 2016). Moreover, 
Wieczorek (2018) has raised research questions on whether there is a continuum of 
regime stability from monolithic to hybrid configurations and the need for nuancing 
regime characteristics in the Global South context.  
Similarly, van Welie et al. (2018), examined the sanitation sector in Nairobi, Kenya using 
the regime concept. These scholars have also iterated that, in a developing country 
context, there is a highly uneven distribution of infrastructure and complexity of 
essential services. In this work, they identified five different types of service regimes, all 
of which have their own unique set of characteristics depending on social fitness and 
spatial configuration. They concluded from their research that a ‘splintered’ regime, 
with weak alignment amongst the different types of services, represented the Nairobi 
sanitation sector. They stressed in their work that understanding the differences 
between cohesive and fragmented regimes allows for a better understanding of 
complex arrangements within regimes, and therefore, policies such as city and service 
planning are better able to address societal challenges.  
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 Opening up the regime 
One of the ways to open up the analysis on regime stability and change to a more useful 
enquiry is by drawing on the central crossover theoretical positions in the MLP – 
evolutionary economics and interpretivism (Geels, 2010) (Table 2.2). In socio-technical 
change, evolutionary economics focuses mainly on firms and the market in which actors 
behave in a boundedly rational way, using routines and standard operating procedures 
to solve everyday problems (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Conversely, 
interpretivism provides a constructivist approach to shared interpretations and 
meanings. Here, a solution to problems is realised through debate, discourse and sense-
making (Geels, 2010). Using both of these theoretical positions, ST scholars developed a 
quasi-evolutionary approach that helps explain the socio-technical change that is 
inclusive of sociological dimensions (Rip and Kemp, 1998). They assumed that socio-
technical change is filtered through variation (not only through firms’ competition but 
also expectations and social fitness), selection (markets with social, cultural and political 
dimensions), and retention (behavioural learning, as well as interpretive and strategic 
deliberation of institutionalisation) (Geels, 2010).  
Both theoretical positions are essential in the MLP because the assumption is based on 
creative actors as knowledgeable agents who are embedded in regimes (Geels, 2010). 
Moreover, both have a fundamental focus on process and development over time (Geels 
and Schot, 2010; Geels, 2010). Therefore, while evolutionary economics is focused on 
‘technological trajectories’ (Dosi, 1982), the MLP does allow the space for cognitive 
learning which emphasises reflection and learning from experiences (Geels, 2010). 
Relatedly, Geels (2010) noted that a radical change is possible through a cumulative 
endogenous process such as second-order learning in cognitive frames.  
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Table 2.2 A crossover of theoretical positions within the MLP: evolutionary 
economics and interpretivism (Geels (2010) 
Theoretical positions Default orientation Explanation of 
transitions 
Evolutionary economics  Dynamic stability 
(incremental change) 
and radical change 
(niches) 
Exogenous changes in 
selection pressures 
Interpretivism/constructivism  Ongoing change Radical change through 
an endogenous process 
in second-order learning 
(change in cognitive 
frames)  
 
To develop these ideas, I have therefore drawn on an interpretive approach in 
strengthening an endogenous institutional theory with which to observe the process of 
regime change. In socio-technical transitions, a growing number of researchers have 
turned to institutional theory in analysing the regime (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Geels et 
al., 2016; Smink et al., 2015). For instance, Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2014) used insights 
from institutional theory to argue that the rigidity and strength of a regime can be 
determined by the degree of structuration, which is due to the process of 
institutionalisation of its core elements.  
 Using Institutional theory to analyse regime changes 
Building on institutional theory, Fuenfschilling (2014) suggests that the regime is 
described as a highly institutionalised socio-technical structure, and that regime stability 
is dependent on actors who are capable of strategic deliberation and interpretation of 
rules in an organisational field. Fuenfschilling (2014) goes on to assert that the degrees 
of institutionalisation or coherence of structures present in a socio-technical system can 
offer information on the probabilities that change may take place. For this statement, 
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she conceptualised agency as part of an institutional work, whereby regime actors either 
engage in the creation, maintenance or disruption. In other words, the Fuenfschilling 
(2014) approach provides a way to analyse the interplay of structure and agency in 
socio-technical change. 
In a similar effort, Smink (2015) also used institutional theory to analyse incumbents’ 
role in STs. Furthermore, Smink highlighted that incumbents that are traditionally part 
of the fossil fuel system could slow down the introduction of new (opposing) technology 
through institutional work, thereby limiting the pace at which STs could unfold. Here, 
institutional work meant that incumbents would emphasise the disadvantages of new 
technology and use media channels to enlist the support of the public by, for example, 
arguing that the new product is insufficient. Smink (2015) expected that institutional 
maintenance work is a feature of incumbents that aim to protect the status quo (Smink, 
2015,  p. 18). Similarly, new entrants or niches are likely to enact an institutional work 
of creation (for example, institutional entrepreneurship) or disruption (Smink et al., 
2015).  
There is also Lockwood et al. (2017) who used historical institutionalism as a way of 
understanding positive feedback in politics which caused inertia in transitions. Here, 
feedback could relate to the ways in which existing institutional arrangements, such as 
governance settings, transparency and inclusivity in decision-making, and the 
importance of discursive context were all critical factors that may either hinder or 
accelerate transitions.  
Some researchers have elaborated the idea that different institutions can introduce 
variation regarding the strength of incumbents and how their interests are served, as 
well as the tendency of policy and regulatory process captured by elite groups 
(Lockwood et al., 2017,  p. 8). For example, the UK had long-established ties to a 
centralised electricity system after the Second World War. This institutional 
arrangement enabled the concentration of large utility incumbents in the hands of a few 
after the liberalisation of the sector. As such, the distribution of powerful elites is 
confined to a small number of incumbents, and therefore highly exposed to capture by 
the interests of the elites, with changes likely to be incremental (Lockwood et al., 2017). 
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This can mean new entrants have considerably higher barriers to overcome and making 
changes in their favour is far more complicated. 
Conversely, Germany is one of a few countries that had a radical shift in sustainability 
transitions, partly due to a historically sympathetic tradition to environmental 
movements (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Geels et al., 2016). However, it is essential to note 
that transitions can shift between pathways of incremental change such as ‘fit and 
conform’ or radical pathways such as ‘stretch and transform’ (Geels et al., 2016; Smith 
and Raven, 2012). Thus, transitions are dependent on continuous battles amongst actors 
over preferences for technologies and policies, as well as learning that can occur over 
time (Geels et al., 2016,  p. 900). An example is that Germany, as stated, may have had 
rapid growth in renewable energy (RE) deployment, but recent problems of system 
integration caused by intermittent RE has resulted in incumbent utilities fighting back 
(Geels et al., 2016). In this way, (Geels et al., 2016) have argued that Germany’s energy 
sector is shifting from radical to incremental transitions.  
Institutional theory has long informed the development of the MLP and the regime 
concept in general and also low-carbon energy transitions (Geels, 2004b). Relatedly, 
Geels (2004b) used a combination of neo-institutional theory, evolutionary economics 
and science and technology studies (STSs) to enrich the understanding of dynamics in 
socio-technical systems. Likewise, the socio-technical regime in the MLP drew heavily 
from institutional theory regarding rules, which provide ‘deep structure’, where 
structures are both the context and outcome of actions (Geels, 2004b; Geels, 2011).  
However, regime stability and change are understudied topics in transitions research. It 
is assumed that regime stability is an interplay between structure and agency in which 
change is brought about by exogenous events in the form of punctuated equilibrium 
(Geels, 2002). Yet, this understanding has been criticised for failing to give an account 
of a clearer operationalisation of the regime concept (Genus and Coles, 2008; Smith et 
al., 2010).  
The work of Fuenfschilling (2014) and Smink (2015) using institutional theory has 
advanced the regime concept. Yet, there are still some limitations because it reinforces 
the idea of the sharp distinction between regimes enacting reproduction and niches as 
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the source of innovation. These assumptions fail to account for instances when regimes 
could also drive innovation at the niche level (as previously described in Section 2.1.5 
with Berggren et al. (2015), or when regime actors could potentially engage in 
undermining their own institutions as part of the institutional disruption process. 
Therefore, instead of assuming ideal types of regime responses to various mechanisms 
of institutional work, it is essential that the kinds of effort or response by the regime in 
its reaction to external and internal pressure become an empirical point of analyses. 
Notably, this thesis argues that a punctuated equilibrium approach of understanding 
regime changes limits the value of analysing internal regime responses to shifting core 
rules as it plays out during a transition.  
To analyse endogenous regime changes, I maintain Fuenfschilling and Truffer, (2014) 
work on using institutional theory in delineating regime stability as levels of 
structuration and degrees of institutionalisation. Hence, I reasoned that an institutional 
turn would thus be an essential approach for this research.  
Using an institutional approach, there are two groups of ideas. The first is institutional 
reproduction, which describes how institutions traditionally homogenise into stable 
structures and thus emphasise stability and continuity. The second is related to 
institutional change, which focuses more on agency, deliberate strategy and 
interpretation of rules. These are discussed in the subsequent sections.  
2.2 Institutional reproduction  
This section begins by stating that parts of the theoretical foundations of the socio-
technical regime, which include evolutionary economics and neo-institutional theories, 
as suggested, have an inherent bias towards processes of stability and conformity. Later, 
in Section 2.3, the discussion will be extended towards the evolved concepts of the 
regime, which draw on institutional change. In this way, there is a distinction between 
the understanding of a regime that subscribes to path dependency, lock-in and inertia, 
at the centre of regime stability – towards calls for differentiating regime stability as 
levels of structuration – and degrees of institutionalisation (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 
2014), thereby opening it up to analysis which explains how change may develop in 
regimes.   
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Institutional reproduction refers to the notion that institutions are conservative forces 
that guide actors into homogenous entities and are therefore better at explaining 
stability, continuity and persistence. The replacement of old technologies by new ones 
in the MLP has been premised on path dependence and punctuated equilibrium (Geels, 
2004b). For example, from a transition perspective, path dependency has been 
informed particularly from evolutionary economics, which assumes that incumbents 
conform to pressures derived from the market as part of a competing selection 
environment. Here, the emphasis is on adaptation through routines, standard operating 
procedures as the basis for decisions and search heuristics that are close to existing 
capabilities (Geels, 2011,  p. 263). Due to a shared pattern of routines and capabilities 
amongst industries, these then aggregate towards ‘technological trajectories’ (Dosi, 
1982). Hence, there is an emphasis on mechanisms dealing with increasing returns and 
positive feedbacks. Fundamentally, positive feedback is understood as some action that 
is rewarded such that there is an incentive for repetition. Pierson (2004) indicated that 
the initial choice of technology could get locked in, making it hard to change even under 
conditions where the competing technology is more efficient. Changes in path-
dependent systems are assumed to occur endogenously and incrementally, which is in 
line with institutional adaptation, whereas abrupt radical changes are exogenous (a 
form of punctuated equilibrium) which results in institutional discontinuity (Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010,  p. 8). Consequently, path dependency and punctuated equilibrium 
create a biased view of regimes as monolithic and homogenous blocks subject to 
external radical change. Moreover, these assumptions tend to describe regime stability 
as having an automatic logic (Geels, 2014b).  
Similarly, the regime is complemented with sociological mechanisms and processes, for 
instance, neo-institutional theory, which widen the selection environment beyond 
market terms. However, the neo-institutional theory has been criticised as being too 
deterministic, treating actors as ‘culture dopes’ that naturally conform to institutional 
pressures, and being better at explaining continuity and stability than change (Geels, 
2011,  p. 265).  
Following on from these criticisms is that path dependency is problematic because 
increasing returns and feedback are more ‘helpful in understanding institutional 
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resilience than institutional change’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005,  p. 6). Moreover, 
institutional analysis has shown that institutions do change while appearing to show 
stability, or not change while there is an exogenous shock (Pierson, 2004). Thus, 
assuming change that originates exogenously can overlook change occurring 
endogenously. As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) reason, there could be internal 
institutional reconfigurations during times of apparent stasis or stability. Applying these 
criticisms to transitions research and supposing change as exogenous to the regime, 
there is then a tendency to underestimate endogenous regime changes, which could 
point out how spaces open up for niches to successfully breakthrough.  
Considering the value of endogenous regime change, it would be helpful to understand 
the process of institutionalisation further, as this research can then suggest the ways in 
which change may transpire. In the following sections, there will be a discussion on the 
processes of institutionalisation and the types of pressures that influence the outcomes 
of institutionalisation.  
 Process of institutionalisation  
Conventional institutional theories conceptualise firms which operate in an 
organisational field, and these, in turn, are influenced by their institutional environment 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983).  Moreover, an organisation field is the selection 
environment which places organisations in similar institutional settings, such that their 
structuration is deemed similar or ‘isomorphic’ (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983).  According 
to Dimaggio and Powell (1983,  p. 148), an organisational field is composed of 
‘establishments that are recognised in society, and these include key suppliers, resource 
and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organisations that produce 
similar services or products’  
Fuenfschilling (2014) noted that the process of institutionalisation usually follows three 
mechanisms in increasing order of alignment, coherence and stability. These are 
habituation, objectification and sedimentation. Habitualisation is a process whereby 
innovation is localised within a small group of actors, whose activities are unstable and 
uncoordinated. At this stage, there is no precise alignment of values, user practices or 
social legitimacy. The second mechanism is objectification, whereby actors engage in 
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problem definition, framing and solving, to the extent that the public recognises and 
justifies a need for change (Tolbert, 1999). Lastly, sedimentation is the full 
institutionalisation in both breadth and depth, such that the formation of the structure 
is perpetuated for an extended period (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014; Tolbert, 1999). 
The notion of sedimented structures is especially important, as it qualifies the research 
interest of the socio-technical regime. These obdurate structures pave the way for 
systems which are locked in and highly path dependent.  
2.2.1.1 Three types of rules 
Essential in this process of institutionalisation is the endogenous organising and 
coordinating principles of rules, of which there are three types: regulative, normative 
and cognitive (Scott, 2014) (see more in Appendix D). Regulative rules refer to laws 
imposed by standards, regulations and legislation (Geels, 2014a). Normative rules refer 
to values, behavioural norms and role expectations. Lastly, the cognitive frames are 
belief systems, guiding principles, goals, mental maps and search heuristics. The 
cognitive rules are regarded as deep-seated because these are taken for granted, and 
actors are usually unaware of the genesis of their foundations (Geels, 2014a). It is the 
process of alignment and embedding of these rules within society, as well as their 
ongoing reproduction and enactment, which leads to the creation of structures (Geels 
and Schot, 2010). Moreover, Fuenfschilling (2014) asserts that the degrees of 
institutionalisation or embedding of rules reflects the levels of structuration in a given 
system, and this, in turn, has consequences for the stability of the regime. In applying 
these views to socio-technical research, the strong embedding of rules is reproduced or 
demonstrated by the following: (1) scale and scope of diffusion of practices, (2) historical 
embedding of institutions, (3) coherence and (4) impermeability to social resistance 
(meaning the acceptance of rules to the point where they are taken for granted and as  
‘coercive fact’) (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014; Penna and Geels, 2012; Genus and 
Coles, 2008; Geels, 2011).  
 Different types of pressures that influence institutionalisation  
The second part of institutionalisation is what Dimaggio and Powell (1983) indicated as 
consisting of different types of pressures which influence institutionalisation towards 
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homogenisation, in the direction of increasing compatibility to its external environment, 
which they referred to as ‘isomorphism’. In other words, since actors operate within an 
institutional environment that has prevailing pressures placed upon them, the 
assumption is that structuration is deemed similar or ‘isomorphic’ (Fuenfschilling and 
Binz, 2018). Dimaggio and Powell (1983) specified three types of institutional pressures 
which influence direction towards isomorphism or homogeneity. These are the 
following: (1) coercive isomorphism, related to formal and informal pressures exerted 
on organisations due to expectations by society brought on by government mandates 
and regulations, (2) normative pressures, related to professional expectations such as 
conditions and methods of work and lastly, (3) mimicry, which is where organisations 
imitate or copy others that are successful in order to eliminate uncertainty and minimise 
complexity. The implication of isomorphism is that organisations are rewarded for their 
resemblance to others because there are certain benefits, such as legitimacy, 
respectability and accrued political power (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). Therefore, 
institutional isomorphism makes it difficult for established organisations to change, and 
it creates a high barrier for new entrants to overcome.  
A combination of organisational isomorphism with discursive institutionalism has also 
shown how institutional reproduction could also be established through ideologies, 
interests and its interactions with both formal and informal institutions. For example, 
Kern (2011) demonstrated the interplay of discourses, institutional contexts and 
interests in shaping institutional outcomes and also established the interaction of 
discourses, institutional contexts and interests in shaping policy initiatives in low-carbon 
policy programs in the Netherlands and the U.K. Kern (2011) had shown that discursive 
interplay amongst actors was influenced by informal (e.g. norms, habits and customs) 
and formal institutional rules (e.g. laws, regulation, standards). Kern (2011) established 
that, when UK civil servants associated with climate change programmes that had long-
standing beliefs in the importance of free-market competition and market-based 
approaches, they preferred market solutions for a low-carbon economy. Conversely, in 
the Netherlands, when civil servants had a culture of open service, with a tradition of 
collaboration amongst the state, consultants and researchers, this led to the emergence 
of transitions that were supportive to experimentation on new ideas about future 
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policies (Kern, 2011). Kern (2011) also mentioned that the translation of new narratives 
faces daunting challenges when it confronts dominant discourses which are embedded 
in robust institutional arrangements. He concluded that analysing the relationship 
between new discourse against existing interests and institutions is a systematic way of 
explaining the sort of changes that may lead to moderate policy or radical changes.  
In this brief account of the process of institutionalisation towards homogeneity, a 
question is posed on how change can occur. According to Garud et al. (2007), privileging 
structure could lead to overly deterministic models, placing primacy on reproduction, 
stasis and continuity. Likewise, it is essential how we are able to understand regime 
change, given the literature on path dependency and punctuated equilibrium is better 
at explaining stability than change. Relatedly, a question raised by institutional scholars 
is the notion of how actors can change the very institutions which have conditioned 
them (Battilana and D'Aunno, 2009). To elaborate on this, the next section turns its focus 
to institutional scholars who are interested in change, tension and conflict (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996). In doing so, the research begins to uncover insights that could be 
suitable in appreciating the dynamics of regime change.  
2.3 Institutional change 
To discuss institutional change, it is essential to draw on several authors who pay 
considerable attention to the role of agency, tensions and conflict (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1991). There is, for example, Oliver 
(1991) who referred to ‘active agency’ where organisations engage in ‘acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation’. Likewise, Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) distinguished that institutional change could be analysed by considering the 
internal dynamics of organisational interests, values, power dependencies and capacity 
for action. Similarly, Oliver (1992) described how organisational entropy could 
eventually lead to gradual acceptance that some institutionalised practice is no longer 
valid (a process she called dissipation), as well as the outright rejection of the established 
organisational practice.  
Institutional change is also influenced by the conditions in an organisational field as 
these have consequences on how actors respond to changes. These conditions can 
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include the plurality of institutions, as different institutional arrangements are likely to 
have more competing interests and motivations. There are also the conditions of 
uncertainty, which are closely associated with the degrees of institutionalisation 
(Fuenfschilling, 2014). Fuenfschilling (2014) has asserted that during times of 
uncertainty, the strategic action is to recover towards stable, secure and predictable 
norms. Alternatively, the greater the uncertainty or de-institutionalisation, the more 
likely there is scope for an agency in a direction towards institutional change.  
Overall, institutional change necessitates a form of distributed agency (Garud et al., 
2007), in which actors are not ‘cultural dopes’ or passive rule followers, but are 
‘knowledgeable agents’ that can reflect and engage in ways other than their taken for 
granted social rules (Geels and Schot, 2010,  p. 30). A distributed agency means an 
agency that is dispersed within the structures that actors themselves have created 
(Garud et al., 2007). Lawrence et al. (2011) highlighted that there is a potentially large 
number of actors in an organisational field, and therefore distributed agency means a 
set of coordinated and uncoordinated efforts, which can lead to institutional change. 
Thus, structures can be constraining features on actors in which they are embedded, but 
also a platform for enabling activities. Moreover, actors could draw on their structures, 
through deliberate strategy and interpretation of rules (Geels, 2014a). The distributed 
form of agency suggests that altering the formal, cognitive and normative rules can lead 
to a transformation in the social structure (Garud et al., 2007). Here, a useful description 
of different types of agency that leads to institutional change is Hall and Thelen (2009) 
description which includes: (1) reform (institutional change explicitly directed or 
endorsed by the actors), (2) defection (when actors no longer adhere to existing rules) 
and (3) reinterpretation (when the actors enact or interpret existing rules differently).  
Additionally, Geels and Schot (2010) specify that, by incorporating agency, actors go 
beyond routine base actions, whereby learning, anticipation, and deviating from existing 
norms are conceived. Hence, variation is not blind but directed, because some room for 
creative interpretation by actors is included (Geels and Schot, 2010), thus conceiving of 
agency as ‘embedded’, where actors either try to maintain the status quo through the 
reproduction of rules or as ‘distributed’, which is when there is the capacity to deviate 
or disassociate from the established rules.  
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As one of the ways of understanding why there is an agency that leads to institutional 
change in the first instance is the seminal work by Pierson (2004), who expanded on 
path dependency beyond economic terms. He stressed that institutions are also subject 
to increasing returns due to political feedback. He claimed that political systems are 
subject to dominant groups, which can enhance the asymmetries of power. Likewise, he 
recognised that there is a slow-moving causal process (cumulative causes, threshold 
effects and causal chains) which does not conform to the widely accepted theory on 
punctuated equilibrium. Implicitly, institutions are not automatically locked in, nor do 
they stand still; instead, continuity is a constant mobilisation of resources (Sorensen, 
2014,  p. 28).  
Broadening these insights further are institutional scholars Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
and Mahoney and Thelen (2010), who offered different perspectives on how 
institutional change may occur. In reassessing the assumption of the punctuated 
equilibrium model, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) viewed ‘change as a constant search or 
flux’, and therefore implied that institutions do not reach an optimum. Instead, a 
progressive form of change over time is posited, as opposed to abrupt or wholesale 
transformations (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Moreover, rather than accept a sharp 
distinction of change between institutional reproduction and innovation, an alternative 
is that ‘stability is just anomaly’ (Sotarauta and Pulkkinen, 2011,  p. 106).  
 What is also helpful with Mahoney and Thelen (2010) approach is characterising 
institutions as ‘distributional elements laden with power implications’ (p. 8). This means 
institutional outcomes can be reflective of powerful groups that have designed 
institutions according to their own needs, or constitute differing goals due to 
‘ambiguous compromises’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010,  p. 8). Hence, power and 
authority through public institutions are relevant sources of positive feedback.  
Further, assuming institutions as path-dependent takes for granted reinforcing features 
of institutions. However, in reality, institutional outcomes are due to compromises or 
continuous negotiations and, as such, are susceptible to shifts in distributional power 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In other words, power and agency are important in 
explaining both continuity and change in path dependent process (Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010).   
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As Thelen (2003) stated, there is a need for better conceptual tools that can capture 
institutional evolution and change.  
Here she asserts that: 
. . . introducing somewhat more structure at the “front end” of institutional 
development . . . and injecting more agency and strategy at the “back end” is a 
way of actors responding to changes in the political and economic contexts.  
        (Thelen, 2003,  p. 6)
         
In sum, reconciling both institutional reproduction and institutional change relates to 
the classic debate on the ‘paradox of embedded agency’ (Garud et al., 2007; Battilana 
and D'Aunno, 2009). The paradox of embedded agency refers to questions raised by 
institutional scholars of how actors can change the very institutions which have 
conditioned them (Battilana and D'Aunno, 2009). In other words, if actors are embedded 
within an organisation field, subject to rules that structure their perceptions, interests, 
and characteristics, how would they be able to imagine alternative realities, practices 
and norms? (Garud et al., 2007). The next section discusses the notion of ‘duality’ as 
part of Giddens (1984) work on addressing this paradox.  
2.4 Structure and agency  
In attempts to address issues of agency and structure, we must consider Giddens (1984) 
work on duality wherein the structure is both a medium by which actors use and an 
outcome of social practices. Duality, as defined by Giddens (1984) is that structures are 
considered as ‘rules and resources’ which guide but do not determine action. Moreover, 
actors are not ‘cultural dopes’, but are preferably those who interpret and enact rules, 
which then lead to variety during the instantiation of rules. Rather than separating 
theory between agency and structure, Giddens (1984) argues that both are inextricably 
linked. Therefore, embedded structures may constrain actors in consigning them to 
maintaining institutions but may also offer them fertile ground for institutional change.  
Here, it is essential to note that, for the MLP, rather than being in between two different 
positions of structure and agency, the regime is considered as dual in nature (Geels and 
Schot, 2010; Geels, 2011; Svensson and Nikoleris, 2018). Thus, Geels and Schot (2010) 
recognised Giddens (1984) structuration theory as being useful in the MLP because of 
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the discerning feature between actors and social systems versus actors and social 
structures (Figure 2.1). These distinctions provided the contextual embeddedness by 
which actors operate, whether horizontally (in social systems) or vertically (in social 
structures). To clarify, the vertical component concerns actors drawing on structures 
that pertain to formal, cognitive and normative rules (Geels and Schot, 2010), while the 
social system is a concern about the mutual dependency amongst actors, described as 
trying to build ‘seamless web’ that aligns heterogeneous elements into a configuration 
that works (Geels and Schot, 2010,  p. 53). Thus, the attention is a horizontal view 
between the interactions of actors with social systems and the contestation, exchange 
and negotiation it entails.  
 
Figure 2.1: The underlying theories that constitute the MLP, adapted from (Geels and 
Schot, 2010). 
The reasons why these distinctions are helpful is that the regime can be understood as 
the relationship in how actors draw upon their structures, and the ways in which those 
structures are expressed in the socio-technical system. Primarily, the structure in the 
regime exists due to instantiation and reproduction of rules in routines and practices 
(Geels and Schot, 2010). Thus, contextual embeddedness is a crucial component for this 
thesis because it locates the research interest on actors and social structures.  
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Discussing these concepts of structure and agency, as part of understanding the dual 
nature of the regime, becomes essential in constructing my conceptual meta-
framework.  
2.5 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical positioning of the thesis by highlighting the 
current gaps in the existing ST literature related to regime stability and change. 
Essentially, the research puzzle is how changes in structure can reveal the ways in which 
a regime maintains stability. Therefore, the focus is on actors drawing on rules and 
resources, and the various efforts related to regime stability and change. Moreover, 
despite the given understanding of the regime as dual in nature, there is still a lack of 
nuance in the relationship between endogenous regime changes and niche 
opportunities. To address this gap, Chapter 3 develops a conceptual meta-framework 
that problematises regime stability into parts which enable scrutiny and analysis. It does 
so by mobilising concepts related to the dual nature of the regime and institutional 
theory as it helps to focus the analysis on the rules that provide the stabilising features 
of regimes.  
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CONCEPTUAL META-FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Having discussed in Chapter 2 the multi-level perspective of sustainability transitions 
and problematised the notion of regime stability and change, this chapter focusses on 
developing a conceptual meta-framework for bringing together the insights from the 
case study Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The conceptual meta-framework draws on Giddens 
(1984) structuration theory on duality, in which structure is both a medium by which 
actors use rules and resources and an outcome of social practices. Moreover, it builds 
on Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2014) work on characterising regime stability as levels of 
structuration and degrees of institutionalisation. Their study operationalised the regime 
as a highly institutionalised socio-technical structure, and the regime’s stability is 
considered dependent on actors, who are capable of strategic deliberation and 
interpretation of rules in an organisational field. 
In this chapter, I first discuss the foundational concepts of an organisational field, the 
distinction between homogenous and heterogenous actor network composition, 
followed by the notion of actors as rule-makers versus rule-takers, and lastly the 
difference between rules and institutions. I then develop a conceptual meta-framework 
for characterising regime stability and change in terms of structure and agency. 
Following this, the chapter introduces the three case studies, discussing how each 
contributes to our understanding of regime stability and change. The chapter finishes 
with a summary of the conceptual meta-framework. 
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Organisational field 
An organisational field includes a community of actors that interact with each other to 
produce similar services or products (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). In an organisational 
field, the understanding is that the institutional environment places prevailing coercive, 
normative and mimetic pressure onto the community of actors, such that the 
structuration of activities is deemed similar (Fuenfschilling and Binz, 2018). It is this 
structuration that leads to trajectories or pathways resulting in lock-in. This research 
considers the community of actors to include businesses, suppliers, producers, user 
groups (households, industries), societal groups (civil society) and public authorities (e.g. 
regulators, national ministries) (Geels, 2004a).  
Homogenous and heterogeneous actors 
This research considers a network composed of a homogenous set of actors as having 
similar ideas, preferences, interests and values in maintaining a coal-fired electricity 
regime. This would, for example, include a network of public authorities (national 
ministries), civil society (trade unions), and market-based actors (energy intensive users 
groups, such as Eskom, as well as mining and associated industries). Likewise, a network 
composed of a heterogeneous set of actors is one which has different preferences other 
than coal and can include market actors, such as IPPs, civil society (climate change 
advocacy groups) and public authorities (regulators, national ministries amongst 
others).   
However, it is essential to note that interests and preferences by actors are not rigid, 
but can change over time (Geels, 2004a). It is often the case that actors are driven by 
self-interest, such that their strategies or actions change in pursuit of improving their 
position and control over resources (money, market, power, social legitimacy) (Geels, 
2004a). A way of understanding how actors’ preferences or interests may change is the 
notion of rule-makers and rule-takers as outlined in institutional theory.  
Rule-makers vs rule-takers 
This research recognises that rules of socio-technical regimes account for the main 
stabilising and lock-in features of socio-technical systems (Geels and Schot, 2010,  p. 20). 
Therefore, the interpretation is that changes in rules reflect the dynamism of regime 
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stability and change. Moreover, it is the expression of those rules in a system, in what 
Geels (2011) considers ‘tangible’ (artefacts, market shares, infrastructure, regulations, 
consumption patterns and public opinion), which is essential for this research. Given 
that the stability of the regime is dependent on the continual reproduction of rules and 
practices’ this also means it is subject to ongoing mediation between motivated actors. 
Therefore, a focus on rule changes can be a useful way of analysing regime stability and 
change. 
Transition researchers do acknowledge that the MLP is a ‘quasi-evolutionary’ approach 
whereby ‘actors anticipate, give meaning, search, and can deliberately deviate from 
existing routines and rule regimes’ (Geels and Schot, 2010,  p. 30). Furthermore, Geels 
and Schot (2010) indicated that regimes become unstable when actors begin to diverge 
from and disagree on basic rules. This disagreement in rules in the regime can be a 
source of change when tension arises, such as a mismatch between different types of 
rules, or actors begin to have different ideas, preferences, values and interests (Geels 
and Schot, 2010,  p. 44). To develop these ideas further, a systematic analysis of what 
changes in rules could mean for regime stability and change is posited.  
For this, a turn to scholars of endogenous institutional theory, such as Streeck and 
Thelen (2005), is helpful because they recognise that regimes typically consist of rule-
makers and rule-takers who are embedded in society (Figure 3.1). Conceptually, in this 
way, there is a level of play or interpretation in how rule-takers act upon rules. Rule-
takers do not objectively implement the rules, but some of their activities may modify 
them, or they may merely implement them differently in respect to their originally 
intended purpose. Institutions, amongst other things, are constituted by actors with 
‘divergent interests, varying normative commitments, different powers and limited 
cognition’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005,  p. 16).  Hence, power and agency are essential in 
explaining both continuity and change in path dependent process (Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010).    
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of rules-makers and rule-takers, adapted from Streeck and 
Thelen (2005).  
Expanding on these concepts, I propose that a relationship between rule-makers and 
rule-takers needs to include feedback and learning loops, such that a dynamic process 
ensues. At this point, learning would mean that actors, over time, familiarise themselves 
with rules associated with the regime. In this way, there is an inherent variation between 
rules as they are created and their implementation over time. According to Mahoney 
and Thelen (2010), rules are vague and ambiguous, and therefore they are an essential 
source of ‘critical openings for creativity and agency’. There is also a feedback loop, 
whereby rule-makers could adjust the rules depending on how they are instantiated in 
practice. Therefore, the process of implementing rules is marked by variability because 
of ‘knowledgeable actors’. In line with Giddens (1984), having knowledgeable actors 
means that interpretation or compliance with rules can vary over time. Even if a rule is 
formally codified, there remain “struggles over its meaning, application and 
enforcement” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010,  p. 11). In sum, this research postulates that 
analysing endogenous changes in the ways that regime actors maintain, alter, 
reinterpret and repurpose rules is likely to reveal the dynamics of regime stability and 
change. To test this assumption, I discuss in Section 3.4 four modes of institutional 
changes derived from Streeck and Thelen (2005), and these refer to drift, layering, 
conversion and displacement. Coming from the political sciences literature, these 
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concepts describe different types of institutional changes. However, I adapt and apply 
these concepts to analysing rule changes which follow Scott (2014) normative, 
regulative and cognitive rules.  
Rules vs institutions  
It is essential to qualify the differences between rules and institutions. This research is 
in line with ST scholars who define rules as the underlying deep structures in regimes, 
as earlier stated in Chapter 2. Examples of these are cognitive (engineering beliefs, 
heuristics, rules of thumb, routines), regulative (standards, laws, policies) and normative 
(social expectations, values) (Geels and Schot, 2010). These rules are endogenous 
organising and coordinating features which guide the behaviour of a set of actors in a 
socio-technical system. The appreciation is that these rules are embedded in a socio-
technical system. Examples are found in artefacts, market shares, infrastructure, 
regulations, consumption patterns and public opinion (Geels, 2011). It is the process of 
embedding and expression of these rules and the ways in which they are widely diffused 
and adopted by a broad section of society that creates an institution (Schot and Kanger, 
2018).  
In sum, this research places the MEC in an organisational field, where the coal-fired 
electricity regime represents the highly institutionalised structure in the field where 
Eskom is the dominant incumbent. Moreover, the organisational field constitutes a 
community of ‘knowledgeable’ actors who act as rule-makers and rule-takers who can 
change ideas, preferences and values depending on the field conditions. Given these 
foundational concepts, the next section develops a conceptual meta-framework, that 
problematises regime stability and change, in terms of structure and agency, preserving 
the notion of ‘duality of the regime’. 
3.2 Problematising regime stability and change 
 Structure  
My aim of problematising regime stability and change is to develop an analytical 
separation between structure and agency. In the MLP, the structure is necessary 
because each analytical level represents different degrees of stability and practices. As 
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such, niches have limited structure because there is a high degree of uncertainty and 
fluidity, and networks are small and unstable (Geels and Schot, 2010). Niches are 
protective spaces wherein actors can experiment with new routines, alternative visions 
and ideas, which diverge from the norm (Smith and Raven, 2012). Conversely, regimes 
are considered more stable than niches because routines are embedded in more 
extensive systems of organisation, networks and infrastructures. Thus, the degree of 
embeddedness (embeddedness can mean sedimentation of structures in institutional 
fields, political cultures and networks) in a regime provides its durability, predictability 
and limits to incremental change (Grin et al., 2010). At the landscape level, this 
represents the broader exogenous environment, which is outside the direct influence of 
the regime and niches (Geels and Schot, 2010). Examples of the landscape level are 
climate change, urbanisation, demographic changes, wars and globalisation (Svensson 
and Nikoleris, 2018; Geels and Schot, 2010).  
Structure is essential in the MLP because regime stability or instability can shape the 
opportunities for niche development (Raven, 2005). Regime instability does not 
automatically mean there are opportunities for niche development. This is because the 
timing of interactions between the regime and niches is important (Geels and Schot, 
2007). The presumption from the MLP is that regime destabilisation needs to occur in 
order to create opportunities for niches. However, Raven (2005) indicated that 
differentiated regime stability should instead be recognised as comprising three 
separate parts. These are high (I), limited (II), and low regime stability (III) (Figure 3.2). 
This means low regime stability does not necessarily mean more opportunities for niche 
development. At some point, this relationship becomes paradoxical, where too much 
regime instability causes a decrease in niche opportunities. 
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Figure 3.2: The relationship of regime stability and niche development (Raven, 2005). 
According to Raven (2005), it is limited regime stability that offers the best opportunities 
for niche development because the incumbent is forced to look for solutions during 
challenging times. Furthermore, the shared rules and resources that pertain to network 
relations, regulatory frameworks and market rules are still intact (Raven, 2005,  p. 271). 
In this regime condition, actors are seeking solutions outside their own environments, 
and this provides resources for niches to draw upon for development. 
Conversely, low regime stability is unfavourable to niche development because there is 
too much uncertainty, and regime actors are no longer aligned in the search for 
heuristics or shared visions under this challenging condition. Equally, in this situation, 
the technological base is too diversified, and hence the associated regulatory framework 
does not exist, nor are user preferences or clear markets. Therefore, the bottom-up 
change of niches overcoming regimes described in the MLP may not be as clear-cut as 
portrayed. Instead, a period of shared resources between regimes and niches may 
coexist until technology takes off and becomes dominant over time. In line with this 
theoretical hypothesis, Verbong and Geels (2010) offered an empirical example to 
support Raven (2005) postulation in the case of biomass gasification in India. In this 
work, it was noted that a large upscaling of biomass gasification had required a limited 
level of regime stability because clear understandings of grid conditions, as well as user 
preferences and investor certainty, where needed.  
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Using Raven’s (2005), differentiated regime stability approach, I developed various 
forms of structure relative to regime stability. To conceptualise structure in this study, 
it was essential that I attended to Giddens (1984) definition of ‘rules and resources’. The 
rules referred to are based on Scott (2014) cognitive, normative and regulative frames. 
Rules are embedded in society along the dimensions of technology, user practices and 
the market, techno-scientific knowledge, policy, infrastructure and socio-cultural 
aspects (Geels, 2004a). From an institutional perspective, the embedding process 
creates a highly institutionalised socio-technical structure, which is the regime 
(Fuenfschilling, 2014). The greater the institutionalisation, the stronger the structure of 
the regime. Resources refer to economic, knowledge, social and political means, which 
have an influence on how actors deliberate on strategic decisions (Geels and Schot, 
2010). For example, some actors have more access to money, information, 
organisational and social capital and political power, which enables them to maintain 
their interests.  
The idea is that actors are embedded in these structures, but also reproduce them 
because it is through instantiation and reproduction of rules in practice that structures 
are created and maintained. Hence, it is for these reasons that structures are dual in 
nature, being both a medium and an outcome of an action (Geels and Schot, 2010). 
Importantly, for this research, actors draw upon their rules as knowledgeable agents to 
make sense of their world, and in doing so, some variety is created in local practices. In 
the work of Fuenfschilling (2014), she asserted that the degree of institutionalisation or 
embedding of rules reflects the levels of structuration in a given system, and this, in turn, 
has consequences on the stability of the regime. This thesis builds upon these 
theoretical foundations, but the aim is to further develop the ‘dual’ nature of the 
regime. There are three levels of structure according to different regime stability. These 
are the following: 
 Strong: close alignment of rules, along with the availability of sufficient 
resources (of various kinds), provides a strong structure to enable actors to 
maintain their current practices, routines and relations, in pursuit of their 
shared interests.  
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 Moderate: when there is disagreement in rules amongst the regime actors and 
resources begin to decline, thus leading to a moderate structure. 
 Weak: when there is substantial incoherency in rules such that regime actors 
are no longer aligned, and resources are not readily available, and thus a weak 
structure is postulated.  
Next, I define different types of agency corresponding to levels of regime stability.  
 Agency 
In this research, agency is defined as the capacity of actors to express action through 
routines, habits, the imagination of possible alternatives of the future and practical 
judgement of ambiguous or constantly evolving circumstances in the present (Emirbayer 
and Mische, 1998). Applying these concepts to my research, there are two factors which 
may influence the type of agency that emerges relative to the stability of the regime, 
and these are: (1) the conditions of the organisation field, and (2) the actor network 
composition and the strength of actor coalitions.   
The conditions of the organisational field have an influence on actors in recognizing the 
features of the rules that are either constraining or enabling (Fuenfschilling, 2014; 
Battilana and D'Aunno, 2009). For example, there could be disturbances such as changes 
in economic or socio-political environments (e.g. changes in user preferences, increasing 
competition, normative contestation in social movements, power struggles and 
adoption of new laws), or there could be a crisis in the field which emerges from an 
extreme event (e.g. wars, environmental disasters [Geels and Schot, 2010]), all of which 
create uncertainty (Turnheim and Geels, 2013; Geels and Schot, 2007). Thus, field 
conditions impact on actors’ preferences, behaviour and responses to corresponding 
changes (Battilana and D'Aunno, 2009). 
In terms of actor network composition and the strength of actor coalitions (Geels et al., 
2016), plausibly, if the actor composition is homogenous, then the actors are likely to be 
involved in the reproduction of the core rules of the regime. If the actor composition 
starts to become heterogeneous, such that there are new actors in the field, who have 
different interests and preferences and may not agree on the core rules of the regime, 
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then this can be a source of contradictions and competing alternatives, ideals or norms, 
which, in turn, undermine the reproduction of the rules in the field.  
3.2.2.1 Multi-dimensional types of agency 
To conceptualize the types of agency, which may emerge relative to the stability of the 
regime, some assumptions must be recognised. The MLP approach accepts that 
transitions are dependent on three factors: (1) different social groups, (2) actors who 
can change their preferences, interests and identity during transitions, and (3) 
explanations which require the tracing of twists and turns, the alignment of event 
sequences and trajectories (Geels and Schot, 2010,  p. 95). From this perspective, it is 
possible to have multiple types of agency, where there are varieties of rational, routine 
and interpretive action during a transition (Geels and Schot, 2007). The multiple types 
of agency proposed by Geels and Schot (2007) surprisingly lack further application, given 
that, in a recent article by Schot and Kanger (2018), the nature of the relationships 
amongst structures, rules and resources, or ‘duality’, remains unclear in ST research. 
Building on these ideas, this research conceptualises different types of agency in relation 
to different levels of stability of the regime. According to the work of such institutional 
scholars as Battilana and D'Aunno, (2009) and Hall and Thelen (2009), there are four 
types of agency related to regime actors which are conceptualised: maintenance, 
reform, reinterpretation and defection.  
 Maintenance: when actors enact the type of actions which relate to the 
reproduction, repairing and defending as part of maintaining existing rules.  
 Reform: considered a highly visible form of change because it is explicitly 
endorsed or mandated by governments.  
 Reinterpretation: enacting the existing rules differently. 
 Defection: the abandonment of existing rules because those rules might no 
longer work to promote actors’ interests.  
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 Three different forms of regime stability  
I now characterise regime stability into three forms, which are high, limited and low, 
taking into consideration structure and agency (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1: Characterising regime stability into high, limited and low, with various 
forms of structure and agency  
Structure Agency Stability of the 
regime 
Strong Maintenance High 
Moderate Reform Limited 
Reinterpretation 
Weak  Defection  Low 
 
High stability of the regime 
Strong structure  
When there are coherent or aligned rules – those of a taken-for-granted character (deep 
structures, such as cognitive routines which make actors blind to options outside their 
focus), normative rules (broad consensus amongst a population or group of actors over 
shared rules) and regulative ones (e.g. legally binding contracts are in place) – the regime 
structure is considered strong (Geels and Schot, 2010). Moreover, if the resources that 
include economic (e.g. dominant market position), social legitimacy and power 
distribution remain intact and are amenable to the regime actors, then this contributes 
to strong regime structure. Thus, with rules aligned and resources available for 
maintaining the status quo, the regime can appear to show a strong structure.  
Agency 
Where field conditions display high degrees of certainty or institutionalization, they 
contribute to high regime stability. In this field condition, rules are clear and coherent, 
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in such a way that it leads to regular patterns of practices and routines (Geels and Schot, 
2010).  
Moreover, when there is alignment amongst regime actors over the regime rules, it is 
assumed that shared common goals are present and that there are vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo.  
Therefore, with field conditions that are certain, and regime actors aligned, it is likely 
that regime actors are associated with maintaining the core rules of the regime.  
Limited stability of the regime 
Moderate structure  
If there is disagreement in the core rules of the regime, then it is likely that the structure 
of the regime begins to be uncertain or moderate. For example, if the embeddedness of 
specific institutional arrangements begins to disentangle (Fuenfschilling, 2014), then the 
structuration influences, such as cognition, coordination or guidance over regime actors, 
may start to decline.  
Agency 
When there are disturbances in the field, which include changes in economic or socio-
political environments, or a crisis brought about by extreme events or internal 
accumulation of regime tension over time, these may elicit a response by regime actors.  
There could also be an increasing heterogeneity in actor composition in the 
organisational field, which can disrupt the alignment between regime actors. This has 
an effect on changes in expectations amongst the regime actors, as well as introducing 
varying interests and ideas at play, which can lead to tension, conflict and disagreement 
over the core rules of the regime (Geels and Schot, 2010).  
Under an increasing plural set of actors and uncertainty in the organisational field, 
according to Fuenfschilling (2014), actors will work strategically – using their diagnoses 
of the causes of disturbances and their risk evaluations – to try to recover stability. If the 
patterns and trends are identified, and if the risks can be evaluated, the type of agency 
could involve reform, which is an active endorsement for change by the government 
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(Hall and Thelen, 2009). Reform is considered a minor modification of existing 
institutions to improve problems in the organisational field (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
For example, if there are issues in the regime that are perceived as risks to societal 
needs, policymakers may introduce new regulations that establish performance 
standards that cannot be met by the existing technology (Geels and Schot, 2010). If there 
are more significant structural weaknesses, regime actors could be forced to reinterpret 
existing rules differently. The assumption here is that, with more significant structural 
weaknesses, there is then more uncertainty in the field conditions. As a consequence, 
reinterpretation, compared with reform, is considered a higher degree of disassociation 
from established practices, routines, and core assumptions. In these instances, regime 
actors gradually change their interpretation of the regime rules and, thus, its practices, 
without defecting from or dismantling the existing rules (Hall and Thelen, 2009). 
Low stability of the regime  
Weak structure  
There can be further shifts or changes in rules such that regime actors continue to 
deviate and differ over the core rules. There are also a reduced flow of economic 
resources (e.g. market relevance), loss in social legitimacy (e.g. political and public 
support) and weakening in the endogenous commitment of firms or industries 
(Turnheim and Geels, 2012), which taken together can make it difficult to reproduce the 
core elements of the regime, leading to a weak structure.  
Agency  
When field conditions continue to have a substantial level of uncertainty, such as an 
ongoing regime crisis, or exogenous changes, such as climate change or urbanisation 
impacts on the regime, then actors could enact existing rules differently.  
Where regime actors are no longer aligned in search of heuristics or a shared vision of 
the regime core rules, the technological base can become too diversified (for example, 
in the South African case, diversity could mean many types of electricity generation 
resources, such as solar, wind, biogas, nuclear, coal and hydro), and hence the 
associated regulatory framework would perhaps not exist, nor would user preferences 
(Raven, 2005). Moreover, when there is a proliferation of different types of actors, there 
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is a likely chance that there are more competing interests, perceptions and motivations, 
as well as a lack of trust in existing technologies. Therefore, in a combination of complex 
field conditions, such that it is difficult to anticipate or predict the risks and further 
variety of actors into the field, some actors may start to defect or abandon the core 
regime rules (Hall and Thelen, 2009). 
Summary  
Moving forward, by means of conceptualizing regime stability according to different 
forms of structure and agency, retains the notion of duality as accepted in the MLP. The 
plausibility of this conceptual meta-framework is evaluated against empirical evidence 
presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. To do so, the rationale for the three cases is as follows 
(Figure 3.3). Chapter 4 helps explain the establishment of rules and the resources 
needed for creating the coal-based electricity regime. This demonstrates the kind of 
obdurate structure that the electricity regime became over time. The subsequent papers 
then analyse how the regime responded to the changes in rules (Chapter 5 and 6).  
Following this rationale, there are two theoretical frameworks that I use for the three 
papers (Figure 3.3). The first paper uses discursive intuitionalism to analyse the 
establishment of the MEC and the significance of the electricity regime in the country 
(Chapter 4). Then, using endogenous institutional theory, the next two papers examine 
the type of regime changes that emerge when the country introduces renewables 
(Chapter 5) and gas (Chapter 6), described as niches, respectively. In doing so, analysing 
both the establishment and changes to the regime should provide rich theoretical and 
empirical insights into the ST literature. The next section discusses the first framework 
developed for Paper 1.  
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Figure 3.3: The theoretical frameworks used relative to the three papers in this thesis. 
 
3.3 Paper 1: Analysing the establishment of the regime: discursive institutionalism 
Some ST scholars argue that theoretical and conceptual frameworks developed in the 
Global North will likely encounter challenges when applied in the Global South context 
(Hansen et al., 2018). In this regard, a few scholars have noted the complexity and higher 
forms of uncertainty that are found in Global South conditions (Ockwell et al., 2018; 
Wieczorek, 2018; Swilling et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2014). In line with these perspectives 
is the call for more research that pays attention to the dynamics of power, politics and 
agency (Ockwell et al., 2018; Wieczorek, 2018; Swilling et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2014). 
Drawing on insights from political economy, Geels (2014b) differentiated views of power 
that span material, institutional and discursive forms. For example, a long-term coalition 
between policymakers and businesses with a broad consensus from civil society can 
form a powerful hegemonic bloc. The assumption is that a hegemonic bloc is able to 
assert dominance through the coercive and bureaucratic authority of the state (Swilling 
et al., 2016; Levy and Egan, 2003) and establish market position with industrial elites, 
along with generating and reproducing leading storylines or narratives as a form of the 
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‘best story’ (Kern, 2011,  p. 1119), which key actors draw upon to influence potential 
solutions in a specific direction (Bosman et al., 2014).  
There are also examples of broad institutional power that is embedded in political 
cultures, ideology and governance structures (Geels, 2014b). South Africa’s case 
regarding the MEC is an example which has institutional power, wherein the 
government privileges powerful regime actors because they have more capabilities and 
financial resources, such as Eskom which has a monopoly on the market.  
Discursive forms of power are when incumbents hold a privileged position over 
prevailing ideologies and beliefs amongst powerful elites, maintaining those ideas as 
accepted norms that structure relevant discourses. Conceptually, core regime alliances 
are able to set the terms of discourse, as well as how issues are deliberated, negotiated 
and contested (Geels, 2014b; Schmidt, 2010). Reconciling elements of power, politics, 
ideology and institutions is discursive institutionalism. Discursive institutionalism 
describes how political and social realities are shaped by the interactive processes of 
discourse within its institutional context. Discourse can be defined as ‘a specific 
ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced reproduced and 
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995,  p. 56). Discursive institutionalism is helpful 
because it makes use of how ideas are articulated, considered and disputed through a 
political arena by state actors, social movements and the public (Schmidt, 2010).  
As will be later discussed, the South African government has a strong ideological stance 
that the electricity system is an essential means of delivering on its socio-economic 
objectives. Historically, this has meant cheap and affordable electricity using coal as the 
dominant resource, in order to sustain mining activities in the country, as part of its 
industrial and economic developmental plans (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). As such, 
changes in the country’s electricity system, both past and present, are often entangled 
in ideological mismatches between the actors associated with the MEC and those actors 
which foresee alternative options (Eberhard, 2007; Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013; Fine, 
2010). 
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Relevant for this research, discursive institutionalism seems an appropriate framework 
to analyse the historical establishment of mining and energy in the case study. Paper 1 
is expected to contribute to our understanding of regime stability and change in South 
Africa’s coal-fired electricity regime. It does so by using discursive institutionalism to 
describe how ideologies, interests and institutions established the rules and the 
resources needed for creating the coal-based electricity regime. Paper 1 examines how 
the structure of the electricity regime became established over the period from the 
1920s until the present day. During this time, the state ensured that resources were put 
in place, such that energy policies promoted the interests of the MEC by establishing 
Eskom and by providing government incentives, tax subsidies, and import substitution 
to foster the mining and energy-intensive industries and a labour market that had a 
steady supply of low-cost labour (Makhaya and Roberts, 2013; Roberts and Black, 2009). 
Consequently, the coal-fired electricity regime became a highly institutionalised 
structure, with various amenable resources that enabled its dominance. Paper 1, 
therefore, provides a contextual preamble, relative to the kinds of pressures placed by 
the two niches of renewables and gas in subsequent papers.  
3.4 Papers 2 and 3: Analysing changes in the regime through endogenous 
institutional theory 
Taking into consideration that there is variability in how rules are enacted between rule-
makers and rule-takers over time, the different types of rule changes developed by 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) become helpful. In the next section, the four different 
institutional modes of change clarifying how the assumptions built into these will be 
applied to analyse regime stability and change.  
 The four modes of institutional change  
The following discusses drift, layering, conversion and displacement, developed by the 
original authors Streeck and Thelen (2005),  Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Hacker et 
al. (2015).  
Drift occurs when regimes hold onto existing rules, by resisting or refusing to adapt to 
changing circumstances. This may result in the system ceasing to function the same as 
it had previously (thus the term drift) (Hacker et al., 2015). This may seem counter-
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intuitive for drift actors not to respond when its rules are becoming irrelevant, thereby 
yielding a risk towards insignificance and decline. However, actors that seek drift are 
trying to avoid public debate so that they can try to persuade governing actors to 
maintain existing rules, without having to deal with contesting views. Hacker et al. 
(2015) note that, with drift, change is not achieved with an ‘electoral spectacle’ nor with 
‘big legislative battles’; instead, contestation is fought with less scrutiny, away from 
public sight and through quieter, less prominent channels. This is because clashes in 
highly visible spaces have the potential to spark initiatives that could lead to mobilisation 
of competing interests. 
Moreover, Hacker et al. (2015) indicated that the abilities of actors that seek change 
through drift are very much different from those who are outside the incumbents’ inner 
domain. Here, drift actors tend to possess insider knowledge, insights and views across 
numerous arenas for a much more extended period (Hacker et al., 2015). The point of 
drift is that by delaying and shifting the contestation into hidden channels, the 
opposition actors are unable to gain sufficient knowledge to mobilise efforts against the 
incumbents, such as forming coalitions, articulating contesting narratives or provoking 
public protests.  
For this example, Hacker et al. (2015) noted that the US minimum wage, which is not 
indexed to inflation, could decline in value over time unless new federal legislation is 
enacted. Drift here would mean blocking the updating of existing rules despite the need 
to do so. This means that refusing or deliberately neglecting to update an existing rule 
to reflect the environment can cause the system to drift.  
Layering is one of the concepts most developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005) and is 
defined as the addition of new rules alongside an existing one. Here, an example would 
be the introduction of the private pension system in the US within an existing welfare 
public system. Furthermore, the private pension was implemented as a voluntary 
alternative and, importantly, did not attack or directly undermine the existing system. 
Eventually, the private pension system grew to such an extent that the old system 
started to lose support from key constituencies, and ultimately, this led to its stagnation 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  
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The assumption in layering is that adding a new rule means that it causes ‘path altering 
dynamics’, whereby the new rule eventually crowds out the old, which could end up 
declining over time (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 23).   
Conversion defines institutions as ‘multipurpose tools’, which means they can be used 
for differing ends, depending on who is powerful enough to utilise them in their favour 
(Hacker et al. (2015). Conversion occurs through actor discontinuity ‘because actors that 
were not involved in creating the original rules now seek ways to repurpose them for 
their own interests’ (Hacker et al., 2015, p. 184). The mechanisms here are the 
redirection of the institutional resources over political or other forms of mediation and 
contestation over what functions and purposes an existing institution should serve. In 
other words, existing institutions are redirected into new goals or purposes according 
to those who are powerful enough to do so.  
An example is the British Labour Party which came to power in 1945 and which inherited 
several policy instruments because of wartime emergency measures (Hacker et al., 
2015). Here, the policy instruments were not dissolved but instead redirected to serve 
new goals, which were to serve peace. The instruments were used to strengthen the 
role of the state through the power of redistributing wealth. Hacker et al. (2015) go on 
to mention that conversion, in this case, was a strategy used to emphasise continuity to 
enlist the support of those who were already vested in existing institutions, as well as to 
neutralise those who were opposed to sudden changes, resulting in political feasibility 
or expediency.  
Displacement is the removal of an old institution, through radical or gradual 
replacement over time (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This is the least developed 
concept, and Thelen mentioned that displacement is ‘rare in the politics of reform in 
contemporary advanced capitalist economies’ (Thelen 2009, p.488). Moreover, in large 
technical systems, wholesale displacement from old to new has also been claimed as 
exceptional, given the long duration of path-dependent systems (Sovacool et al., 2018). 
I, therefore, suggest possible means of displacement, drawing on increasingly important 
literature, such as phase-out policies (Rogge and Johnstone, 2017), creative destruction 
(Kivimaa and Kern, 2016) and ‘discontinuation governance’ (Stegmaier et al., 2014). 
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These four different types of rule changes are summarised in Table 3.3, which outlines 
their definitions, mechanisms of change and their implications.  
Concluding this section  
To conclude this section, Papers 2 and 3 cover three of the institutional theory modes 
(drift, layering and conversion), and each paper will be discussed in more detail in turn. 
The fourth mode is not covered by any of the papers but is included in the discussion 
and conclusion chapter, where that discussion builds on the findings from Papers 2 and 
3.   
Paper 2 draws on institutional modes of drift and layering to illuminate the types of 
institutional changes which are evident when a relatively stable regime (with a strong 
structure that enables actors to maintain their current practices) is subjected to 
pressures from a niche.  
Paper 3 contributes to the discussion on regime stability and change by analysing the 
kind of institutional changes which take place when a regime that has limited stability 
(disagreement in core rules amongst regime actors, leading to moderate structure) faces 
further pressure when a gas programme is introduced into the electricity system. 
3.5 Summary of the chapter 
 In sum, this chapter has explained how the main concepts used for this thesis are 
mobilised in order to address the research task. In doing so, a conceptual meta-
framework was developed, which problematises regime stability into three forms: high, 
limited and low (Table 3.2). In delineating these three different forms, structure and 
agency were used as a way to maintain the notion of the duality of the regime. Having 
differentiated regime stability, I am then able to test these concepts by means of the 
empirical cases, using institutional theory as a lens through which to observe 
endogenous regime change. The next three chapters form the empirical case studies in 
this thesis, and their purpose is to establish how the coal-fired electricity regime was 
established (Chapter 4) and to provide an analysis of regime responses to the 
introduction of renewables (Chapter 5) and gas (Chapter 6). 
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Table 3.2: Summarises regime stability and change as differentiated levels of structure and agency  
 
Structure 
 
Agency Stability of the 
regime 
Rules 
 
Resources Type of structure Organisational field 
conditions 
Actor network composition and 
strength of coalitions 
Type of agency 
Coherent  Resources are intact and 
amenable to actors 
Strong Certain  Homogenous  
 
Coalition is strong 
Maintenance High 
Disagreement  Reduced flow of 
resources 
Moderate Uncertain patterns and 
trends are identifiable; risk 
can be evaluated  
Heterogenous  
Coalition is disentangling  
Reform 
 
Limited 
Disagreement More reduced flow of 
resources 
More uncertainty Heterogenous  
Coalition is disentangling  
Reinterpretation 
Incoherent  Substantial loss in 
resources  
Weak Substantial level of 
uncertainty; it becomes 
challenging to anticipate or 
predict the risks 
Complex set of actor configurations, 
competing interests, perceptions and 
motivations 
Coalition is weak 
Defection  Low 
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Table 3.3: The four different types of gradual transformation of drift, layering, conversion and displacement, adapted from Streeck and 
Thelen (2005) 
 
 Drift Layering Conversion Displacement 
Definition Rules are deliberately held 
constant in the face of 
significant contextual shifts.  
New rules are added alongside 
existing ones;  
New rules do not attack existing 
institutions. 
Redeployment of old institutions 
to new purposes.  
Removal of existing rules and 
replacing them with new 
ones. 
Mechanisms of 
enactment 
Deliberate neglect or delay in 
reforms.  
Involves amendments, revision or 
addition. 
 
Gaps between rules and 
enactment due to subversion; 
existing rules are reinterpreted.  
The existing rules are 
abandoned, as they are not 
tenable.  
Institutional 
outcome  
Continuity is attempted through 
hidden channels to prevent the 
mobilisation of opposing 
interests.  
The new rule sets path altering 
dynamics, which can result in more 
significant impact of new 
institutions at the expense of the 
old.  
 Existing institutions are 
repurposed, redirected into new 
goals.  
A displacement of the old 
institution with the new.  
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Paper 1: Historical review of the relationship 
between energy, mining and the South African 
economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This has been published as TING, M. B. 2015. Historical Review of the Relationship 
between Energy, Mining and the South African economy. In: MYTELKA, L., MSIMANG, V. 
& PERROT, R. (eds.) Earth, Wind and Fire: unpacking the political, economic and security 
implications of discourse on the Green Economy. Johannesburg: Real African Publishers. 
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4.1 Abstract 
Mining, energy and industrial development have been crucial to growth and 
development in South Africa. It is estimated that South Africa's mineral wealth value is 
around $2.5 trillion (GCIS, 2012,  p. 4).  Mining and the electricity industry co-evolved 
together due to the abundance of inexpensive coal. The electricity industry was spurred 
by the needs of a flourishing mining industry around the beginning of the twentieth 
century. South Africa’s electricity industry is embedded in what is known as the 
Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC). The MEC is described as the relationship between 
mining, energy-intensive mineral processing, the coal-to-electricity sectors, and parts of 
the supportive transport and logistics infrastructure (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). 
However, the continued reliance of South Africa's electricity system on coal is 
increasingly under threat from international pressure to mitigate climate change. 
Additionally, sustained dependence on a resource-based economy is risky, not only 
because of finite supply but, more importantly, because an emphasis on a global 
commodity market renders the economy vulnerable to short-term volatile capital flows, 
and less long-term labour absorbing economic growth. The main objective of this 
chapter is to discuss how South Africa faces the challenges and demands towards 
sustainable transitions.  
This chapter first provides a brief overview of South Africa’s mining and energy and the 
need for sustainable development. After which, the underlying theoretical derivatives 
and framework are discussed. Subsequently, it centres its discussion on interest, ideas, 
and institutions. It will analyse how policies, discursive narratives and vested interests 
related to mining and energy have previously interacted and currently interact, 
effectively creating barriers for the innovation of more sustainable technologies.  
As a way forward, a discussion takes place on a proposed implementation for 
sustainable mining and energy that includes: the necessary requirements to adequately 
capacitate the socio-technical systems that govern and implement mining and energy 
developments; continuous monitoring and evaluation once policies are implemented; 
understanding the concept and implications of carbon lock-in given the long-term life 
span of energy expansion; and meta-coordination of strategy implementation. Lastly, a 
recommendation for further research is given on shifting from a resource-based 
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economy towards a knowledge-based economy. South Africa needs to go beyond 
beneficiation. Instead, it should expand the process underlying the knowledge in 
obtaining these minerals and use it to diversify or enhance other sectors of the 
economy. These could include technological innovation in the mechanisation process, 
machineries, parts, tools and equipment – all of which could spill over into essential 
sectors such as transportation, information technology, construction, and 
manufacturing.  
4.2 Introduction 
South Africa initially built its economy on two major primary sectors: mining and 
agriculture. Mining has been the foundation of South Africa’s industrialisation and later 
the financialisation of the economy. Over time, mining, energy and industrial 
development have been crucial to growth and development in South Africa (McDonald, 
2009; Winkler and Marquard, 2009; Gentle, 2009).  It is estimated that South Africa’s 
mineral wealth value is around USD $2.5 trillion (GCIS, 2012). A term to describe a tight 
configuration of industries associated with mining is often called the Mineral Energy 
Complex (MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). The MEC is described as the relationship 
between mining, energy-intensive mineral processing, the coal-to-electricity sectors and 
parts of the supportive transport and logistics infrastructure (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). 
Despite the recent years of the poor performance of the mining sector, mining continues 
to be an essential part of the South African economy, and this is unlikely to change for a 
few decades. South Africa has many strategic minerals of global importance. 
South Africa’s mining history and its relevance to its economy can be traced as far back 
as the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1871 and the Witwatersrand main gold 
reef in 1886. The wealth of its mineral resources is evident with one of the largest 
reserves of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs), chromium, gold, manganese (high-grade 
ore), alumino-silicates, vanadium and other minerals in the world Table 4.1. In addition, 
the mining sector has also been a source of other competencies such as engineering, 
technical and production expertise, and broad research and development activities. 
Most of South Africa’s mineral wealth is exported as ores, concentrates, alloys or metals 
with some degree of beneficiation downstream. The exceptions are iron and steel, as 
well as polymers from oil and coal, which are used as inputs into the manufacturing 
81 
 
sectors (ANC, 2012). As depicted in Table 4.1, the mineral wealth reserves in the country 
have a long lifespan and are expected to continue to play an essential role in the country.   
Table 4.1: A summary of South Africa’s mineral reserves and their relative global 
production percentages (ANC, 2012). 
 
 Mining and Energy 
Mining in South Africa and its associated sectors include iron and steel, chemicals, non-
ferrous metals, non-metallic minerals, electricity and transport. The mining industry is 
also essential to manufacturing as it is linked via activities such as minerals beneficiation 
and metals production (Winkler and Marquard, 2009) as well as backward linkages in 
mining equipment. Therefore, the contribution of the MEC to the economy cannot be 
viewed in isolation, nor can it be measured in absolute terms. The largest energy-
intensive industrial subsector in South Africa is iron and steel, which consumes around 
27% of the total energy used by the industry sector (DOE, 2010). The South African 
mining and electricity industries co-evolved together due to the availability and 
abundance of inexpensive coal. The electricity industry was spurred by the needs of a 
flourishing mining industry around the beginning of the twentieth century (Gentle, 2009; 
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Winkler, 2009). The major challenge for sustainable development in the context of 
climate change mitigation lies in the energy sector, which accounts for more than 70% 
of Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. The share of final energy demand can be 
distributed as follows: industry (38%), residential (18%), and transport (28%) and other 
minor contributions (DOE, 2012). Underlying the energy sector is an intensive coal-
based system, the result of which is nine tons per capita (tpc) of carbon emissions, 
rivalling that of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries with an average of 11 tpc (World Bank, 2010). Thus, a case for sustainable 
energy development in the country is relevant because it is considered to be ‘carbon 
intensive’. The continued reliance of South Africa’s electricity system on coal is 
increasingly under threat from international pressure to mitigate climate change. 
Furthermore, resource-based economies are subject to finite supply and to global 
commodity cycles that are increasingly cognisant of trends towards environmental 
sustainability.  
The main objective of this chapter is to provide insights into the barriers in South Africa’s 
mining and energy complex that must be addressed in order for sustainable 
development to be feasible.  
4.3  Framework 
The analysis used for investigating the feasibility of sustainable energy development in 
the mining sector was structured around interests, ideas, and institutions framework 
The primary theoretical derivative for this framework is drawn from Hajer (1995); Kern 
(2011); Schmidt (2010) using discursive institutionalism, and Giddens (1984) 
structuration theory as a means of understanding human social behaviour.  
The work of Giddens (1984) on the distinction between three types of structures, all of 
which influence action through different mechanisms, becomes relevant in this 
research. He outlined that there are structures of i) signification, where meaning is 
realised in practice, ii) legitimisation, where normative views are embedded within 
societal norms and values, and iii) domination, which is about how power is applied. For 
example, although each structure is applicable across all domains, a legitimisation 
structure is best suited to a domain pertaining to law, the significance of meaning is 
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more applicable to culture, and domination is most applicable to economics and politics. 
Table 4.2 summarises the degree of applicability of each kind of structure against each 
institutional domain, where the number of plus signs indicates the degree of 
applicability. This overlap between structuration and the institutional domain is an 
important schematic approach for my research. 
Table 4.2: The type of structures related to institutional domains (Giddens, 1984; 
Geels and Schot, 2010). 
Institutional 
domains 
Signification Legitimisation Domination 
Economic ++ + +++ 
Political ++ + +++ 
Law + +++ ++ 
Culture +++ + ++ 
 
These three types of structures are then applied to ideas (signification), institutions 
(legitimisation), and interests (domination), as defined categories by discursive 
institutionalism (Kern, 2011). Discursive institutionalism describes how political and 
social reality is shaped by the interactive processes of discourse in its institutional 
context.  Discourse can be defined as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced reproduced and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 
1995,  p. 56).  Discursive institutionalism is helpful because it makes use of how ideas 
are articulated, considered and disputed through a political arena by state actors, social 
movements, and the public (Schmidt, 2010).   
The following concepts of ideas, institutions and interests are now defined: 
Ideas refer to meaning and signification that is realised in practice. More specifically, it 
focuses its analysis on discursive narratives, ideologies, belief systems, guiding 
principles, and mindsets that are related to mining and energy in the country. 
Empirically, this chapter discusses the structure of the economy related to mining and 
the role it may play in strategy or policy formulation around sustainable development, 
84 
 
historical availability of cheap coal and its relevance to trade and competitiveness, the 
recent trends in the uncertainty around the oil price, the Long-Term Mitigation Strategy 
(LTMS), which has conscientised the efforts needed to lower carbon emissions, and the 
role of labour and trade unions, which have engaged in essential debates in these and 
related issues.  
 In terms of institutions, these are socially embedded systems of rules through legislation 
and regulation. To put it another way, institutions are rules of the game and 
organisations are players that abide by these rules within a system. It is the interaction 
between institutions and organisations that configure a socio-economic system. 
Relevant for this chapter, institutions look at the legislative mandate governing the 
mining sector that enables the rules of the game; financialisation that serves to 
strengthen profits and favour the MEC; the role of lobbying and the influence of financial 
contributions to political parties and, lastly, the essential Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 
that determines energy decisions in the country. 
The last section is on interests, and this refers to domination and how power is exercised.  
The aim is to investigate influential groups and the power they may have in lobbying 
issues relative to their agendas. These groups include the powerful MEC sectors, the 
influential role of the state-owned power utility, Eskom, and continued reliance on coal 
for energy security.  
By discussing these three areas, it is hoped that a holistic argument can be made for 
clarifying the obstacles for sustainable development in mining and energy in South 
Africa.
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4.4 Ideas 
  South Africa’s mineral wealth is due mostly to its platinum reserves, followed by coal, 
palladium, gold, titanium, copper and others. The biggest mining companies in South 
Africa have significant investments within the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), and 
these also belong to an Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), which collectively 
(including associated industries such as materials beneficiation and materials 
manufacturing) account for 44% of electricity demand in the country10. Furthermore, 
mining provides critical foreign exchange via trade exports; it contributes around 20% 
to the GDP (direct and indirect) and is an essential source of jobs in the country. It is 
estimated that a social multiplier for mining is a ratio of 10 to 1, thus, given the 
employment of 1.3 million people, the totality of people dependent on the mining 
industry can be as high as 13 million. The mining sector was built upon a model of high 
labour and low wages. However, to what extent this will continue in the future remains 
unclear, not only because of increasing trends towards mechanisation but also because 
of instability within the labour force and wildcat strikes.  
Furthermore, the interlinkages of growing inequality and social unrest cannot be 
ignored because most miners earn wages that are not adequate to support large 
families. However, this labour model is historically derived and embedded within the 
socio-economic framework. It should be appreciated that sustainable energy 
development is only a part of a complex set of problems that policymakers need to 
address. The country is experiencing developmental challenges that include widening 
inequality (Gini-coefficient of 0.6), an unemployment rate of 25%, and slow real 
economic growth of less than 2% GDP per year (NPC, 2012). Sustainable energy 
development is part of a much broader set of issues facing the country. To move 
forward, it is vital for critical decision-makers to realise that some of the underlying 
issues are rooted within ideologies that constrain progress. The following sections will 
now discuss key ideological issues.  
 
 
10 Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), www.eiug.org.za 
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  Coal as the dominant resource 
Coal accounts for 70 to 75% of primary energy supply, 93% of electricity generation and 
30% of liquid petroleum fuels (Eberhard, 2011; Winkler and Marquard, 2009; Winkler, 
2009; Davidson, 2006). Coal production and consumption are intricate parts of the 
economy. The revenues are derived from a range of activities from export, mining, to 
the manufacture of synthetic fuels. South Africa has abundant coal reserves, albeit low 
in quality (high ash content). The low-grade coal has an average of 4,500 kcal per kgash 
content of 29.5% and sulphur of 0.8% (Eberhard, 2011). The approximated coal reserve 
stands at 32 billion tonnes, making it the world’s largest recoverable deposit (WEC, 
2013). South Africa’s energy landscape has historically been tied to the strategic needs 
defined by the government at specific times. Therefore, between 1948 and 1994, the 
central imperative from the government was energy independence and self-sufficiency 
(mainly as it grew isolated from the international community due to sanctions and other 
forms of isolation). Thus, the apartheid government decided to secure its energy supply 
by utilising the coal to liquids (CTL) process for fuel production, meaning that large 
quantities of both electricity and fuel are produced from coal: Eskom and the latter by 
Sasol provide the former. Sasol is the world leader in the processing of coal to synthetic 
fuels, having started production in the 1950s. It produces more than 40% of South 
Africa's domestic fuel and contributes 4 to 5% of the country's GDP (Sasol, 2009,  p. 4). 
Coal accounts for more than 90% of the electricity produced in the country; the rest 
comes from nuclear power stations (5%), hydro and pumped storage (4%), as well as 
biomass, solar, and wind, which together account for less than 1% (Heun et al., 2010; 
Pegels, 2010; Davidson, 2006). 
Sasol and Eskom have a combined carbon dioxide emission of 300 million tonnes (Mt), 
which accounts for 67 to 69% of the total GHG output (Sasol, 2010,  p. 79; Eskom, 2014,  
p. 39). Coal is an entrenched regime with influential industrial players that have a 
considerable role to play in the country’s economy. To what extent the country reduces, 
its reliance on coal is indeed a central issue in terms of barriers to sustainable 
development. It is this balance between ensuring energy security through its abundant 
coal reserves, but also through contemporary sustainable practices, which require the 
least economic trade-offs. However, choosing carbon-intensive pathways that continue 
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to lock in and reinforce business as usual practices may, in fact, undermine desired 
developmental goals. Sustainable development can offer ways of diversifying the 
economy in a manner that is in line with global trends towards greener economies.   
  The challenge of cheap coal and electricity 
The availability of inexpensive coal was critical to the establishment of the mining and 
electricity industries. The term ‘mineral-energy complex' (MEC) was developed by the 
seminal study called The Political Economy of South Africa, by Fine and Rustomjee 
(1996). The MEC has fundamentally formed the energy economy of the country, which 
in turn has a significant role in the energy landscape of the country. The close 
involvement of the MEC has resulted in the country having one of the lowest electricity 
prices in the world. It is reported that South Africa’s electricity prices were consistently 
40% of the average United States prices for the last four decades (Winkler and 
Marquard, 2009). Eskom, through its association with the MEC, has taken advantage of 
large economies of scale in coal mining and power generation. Thus, guaranteed 
demand meant that favourable contracts could be negotiated over the long term. 
Furthermore, most of Eskom’s assets relating to electricity generation had been paid off, 
which means that its expenditure was limited to low running costs. Although South 
Africa has known since 1997 – as shown in its White Paper on Energy – that an electricity 
deficit would be reached by 2007, no significant new plants had been commissioned by 
this time (DME, 1998). Thus, with an ageing electricity infrastructure and lack of 
maintenance due to low generation reserves, the country has undergone a series of 
blackouts since 2008. This means that, for a period of seven years, the country has been 
experiencing an uncertain electricity supply. To mitigate electricity shortfalls, diesel 
generators have been used at a significant cost. Unfortunately, the country's state-
owned power utility has recently faced a series of credit downgrades, and the cost of 
using diesel has only aggravated this situation and has severe implications for its ability 
to borrow money for new energy builds.  
Cheap coal and cheap electricity have been central to South Africa’s competitiveness. 
Specific industrial policy has promoted electricity intensive investments such as mineral 
processing (Winkler and Marquard, 2009). Moreover, special electricity supply contracts 
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between, for instance, Eskom and BHP Billiton and its aluminium smelters were revealed 
in 1992, and again in 2001, showing sales at below cost prices (Steyn, 2006). The 
exclusive deal had effectively tied Eskom to supplying BHP Billiton with cheap electricity 
for more than twenty years. To this day, these exclusive deals continue to stress Eskom's 
finances. However, new electricity builds require financing, and the reality of cheap 
electricity cannot continue. Any adjustments to the dominant paradigm in the electricity 
sector are bound to have an impact on energy prices, as well as the labour force, and 
disrupt a valuable source of investment and income for the country. Cheap electricity 
can no longer be considered for new plants. The present new build programme, 
irrespective of the sources (coal, nuclear or renewables), must factor in current levelised 
costs. 
  Coal and its relevance to civil energy and households 
It is important to note that coal not only provides the country with significant liquid 
fuels, but it is also a means for the government to provide basic energy access. ‘civil 
energy' has been described as a social development goal by providing energy to 
households, commerce and services (Winkler and Marquard, 2009,  p. 51). Energy is 
crucial for lighting, cooking, heating, clean water and sanitation, health care, transport, 
industries and telecommunication. A strong narrative of the post-apartheid government 
was to address the imbalances of the past by ensuring basic services such as ‘electricity 
for all’. Almost two-thirds of the South African population did not have access to basic 
electricity before 1994. The rapid electrification programme resulted in electrification 
rates that grew from 30% in 1990 to 73% in 2006 (Winkler and Marquard, 2009). 
Household electricity access and final energy residential demand should not be 
confused. As referred to earlier, in the context of overall energy demand, the share of 
residential consumption stands around 15%, but electricity access to the national grid is 
currently around 70 to 80%.   
Thus, post-1994, South Africa had a period where the available electricity infrastructure 
did not match the rapid growth in demand. At present, the country suffers from a double 
‘lock-in' of a high carbon pathway due to the dominance of the MEC, but also its 
continued reliance on coal for its civil energy. Civil energy is a strong principle for the 
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government because it is a developmental objective for energy access. Historically, this 
meant access to grid connection with coal as the primary resource. This carbon lock-in 
makes it challenging to address issues of sustainable energy development because there 
are sunken investments, entrenched regimes, and historical vested interests. Thus, in an 
energy policy setting, it can be appreciated that the complexity of issues has to be 
carefully considered.   
 Influence of labour: the role of trade unions 
Carbon cycles do not follow political cycles; in that climate change requires a long-term 
vision. Its effects are anticipated in the medium term, which, though beyond the 
duration of most politicians’ careers, requires immediate action. Hence, the certainty of 
mitigating options such as renewable energy needs strong arguments to achieve buy-in 
from sectors that will ensure their implementation. In this respect, one must factor in 
the influence of members of society and their awareness of the effects and mitigation 
of climate change. Moreover, people’s sentiments equal votes, which cannot be 
underestimated given that this is the lifeblood of politics.  
 
 while voters tend to be strongly supportive of the idea of compliance with the 
international environmental treaties, they can simultaneously be strongly 
resistant to the reality of higher taxes and energy prices … the political incentives 
thus can be very different between ratification and implementation of that 
international commitment … 
      (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2007,  p. 15) 
 
In South Africa, a sector that is influential and important to the vote is that of the trade 
unions. 
 Attending to the issues raised by them will constitute the surest route to 
electoral success   
(Stedman, 1994) 
 
Through the Tripartite Alliance, it is often the case that the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) field their preferred 
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candidates through the African National Congress (ANC), and consequently hold senior 
positions in the ANC as well as influence party policy and dialogue (Budeli, 2012). Some 
influential people hold various positions in one or more of the parties that constitute 
this alliance. Added to this complexity is that the trade unions emerged mostly from 
minerals and mining sectors. Hence, their significance cannot be underestimated since 
it permeates both the political and economic spheres. In addition, hundreds of 
prominent unionists now play leading roles in institutions of the new South Africa and 
can influence the broader processes of change that are unfolding. Thus, a formidable 
group of people from politicians, trade unionists, to business people are all interlinked 
with each other.  
The effects of continued mining strikes in the country are indicative of how intricately 
the mining sector is embedded in the economy. The five-month platinum strike from 
January to June 2014 resulted in economic contraction during the first quarter of that 
year by as much as 0.6%.  Mining strikes affected manufacturing, as well as industries 
that included petroleum, basic chemicals and iron ore (Singh, 2014). Also, tensions 
within Cosatu and its affiliates have resulted in the exit of the National Union of Metal 
Workers of South Africa (Numsa), which accounts for an estimated 17% of Cosatu’s 
membership (Letsoalo et al., 2014).  
Part of the tension in this regard derives from contestation over economic policy, and 
this cannot be taken lightly. It can lead to policy formulation that is logical but often 
hampered at the implementation stages due to the tensions among various actors. 
Evidence of this is the National Development Plan (NDP), which has ambitious, bold 
plans for the country and yet seems to be hampered at the level of implementation due, 
in part, to these tensions (NPC, 2012). As long as these ideological mismatches are not 
addressed, they will continue to be a source of policy incoherence and implementation 
inertia.  
 Uncertain oil price 
In a world where the oil price has been assumed to take an upward trajectory, energy 
investments are decided accordingly. These pertain to new projects in oil and gas 
exploration and production, as well as renewable energy technologies. Often these 
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investments are decided based on economic costs mainly associated with the price of 
crude oil. However, the basis of these assumptions no longer holds, given that between 
June 2014 and January 2015, the oil price dropped by 60%. Thus, associating energy 
investments with the prediction of an oil price is becoming increasingly uncertain. Added 
to this are unpredictable geopolitics, global economic developments, and competing for 
alternative energy options. Renewable energies are also increasingly on par in terms of 
economic costs in comparison to new fossil fuel derived plants. A good example is the 
cost of some solar technologies becoming competitive with natural gas. Again, these 
expectations may change as the oil price fluctuates. The main point is uncertainty, 
mainly since there are now more competing energy sources available. Conversely, it has 
been noted that, despite these uncertainties, the development of flex/fuel engines can 
provide ways to bypass such ambiguities.  
Again, under these conditions, an important balance is needed in choosing the optimal 
technology that caters to societal needs. South Africa does have vast amounts of coal 
reserves; potential shale gas in the Karoo region and the Northern Cape is an ideal place 
for renewable solar plants. Moreover, there are examples of a hybrid solar Photo Voltaic 
(PV) cell usage combined with diesel engines at a scale of 1 MW being used in Chile and 
South Africa (Lazenby, 2014). Perhaps a modular approach of hybrid engines comprising 
solar energy with gas could apply to South Africa given its historical transmission 
configuration and natural endowments.     
  Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) 
In 2007, the Long-Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) project was published, and this 
landmark project developed various scenarios using energy and macro-economic 
models to explore the consequences of various policy interventions at reducing GHG 
emissions (Winkler and Marquard, 2009). The LTMS proposed that the country peak its 
carbon emissions by 2025, plateau for a decade and then decline thereafter (DOE, 
2013a). This process is known principally as ‘peak, plateau and decline’ (PPD), a common 
phrase in the country’s climate change circles (DOE, 2013a). According to the 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), the PPD was defined as an upper limit of 
428 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (Mt)/per annum in 2050 and a lower limit of 212 
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MT/per annum CO2. A scenario in the IRP update was that electricity-derived carbon 
emissions would peak around 275 Mt/pa CO2 in 2022, plateau for 10 years, and start to 
decline around 2034 (DOE, 2013a,  p. 26). The decline scenario was either moderate, 
which would result in reaching 210 Mt/pa CO2  in 2050 or an aggressive decline that 
would enable a low limit of 140 Mt/pa CO2 (DOE, 2013a).  However, it is estimated that 
the two new coal-fired power plants (Kusile and Medupi) and the return to service of 
three stations mothballed in the 1990s are expected to have a combined coal 
consumption of over 50 Mt per year, adding more GHG emission in the near future 
(Rafey and Sovacool, 2011). The LTMS study was critical because it showed clearly the 
requirements for the country to reduce its future carbon emissions. However, with two 
new coal plants, and more coal plants envisioned in the future, South Africa's energy 
policy can be characterised as somewhat contradictory: on the one hand, it promotes 
sustainable development whilst, on the other, it seems to be increasing its reliance on 
the extraction and consumption of polluting (and unsustainable) resources.  
4.5 Institutions 
 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) 
Currently, the primary legislative framework for mining and petroleum resources in 
South Africa is the MPRDA, which is under review. The most relevant section regarding 
sustainable development pertains to environmental authorisation and management. 
This section covers cross-cutting issues such as water, environment and licenses to 
operate. According to the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), it will designate 
itself as the Competent Authority for the implementation of the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) on mining and prospecting sites, and the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs will be the appeal authority. The DMR has noted that a single 
piece of legislation implemented across departments will require resources and, more 
importantly, coordination, particularly in areas of monitoring and evaluation of 
compliance (DMR, 2013). Coordination is one of the critical issues in implementing 
policies and strategies in government. This requires inter- and intra-departmental 
consistent efforts where delineating ownership, responsibility and accountability are 
paramount. Furthermore, various amendments to the MPRDA do send signals of 
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legislative uncertainty to the mines on the conditions they should operate in, as well as 
which policies are applicable. Thus, speedy resolution of these issues, which is a crucial 
factor in private sector decision-making, is critical. 
Adding to this complexity is the need for nexus thinking, where interlinking issues need 
to be tackled holistically. According to the Mining Charter codes of good practice, 
environmental management is captured under sustainable development and growth. 
However, these standards are more reactive-based practices relative to compliance and 
monitoring and not enough towards pro-active measures. The DMR does have state-
owned entities (SOEs) under its jurisdiction, such as Mintek and the Council for 
Geosciences, where excellent research and development are taking place. If a nexus 
approach were to interlink energy, water and waste as a means of ensuring sustainable 
development in the mining sector, more interdisciplinary research needs to take place 
in these areas. South Africa is not only a water scarce country with a carbon-intensive 
energy system, but the legacy of mining is also showing, with significant signs of 
cumulative waste such as acid mine drainage. Solutions to these issues could enhance 
or complement a more efficient process as environmental externalities can no longer 
continue to be on the periphery. 
  Influence of the business lobby on political parties and elections 
South African legislation that currently governs elections is the Electoral Act of 1998 and 
the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of 1997. The former requires 
parties to commit to free electioneering, equal participation of women in political 
activities, allowing media access to electioneering activities, and full cooperation with 
the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2006). The latter 
determines the amount of money allocated to parties relative to the number of seats in 
both the national and provincial legislatures. The proportional amount accounts for 90% 
of the funding, and the remaining 10% is based on a threshold payment (Robinson and 
Brummer, 2006). The main concern concerning these two acts is the complete absence 
of matters on private funding.  
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The following is observed:  
 … there are no legal limits on how much parties can spend on electioneering or any 
requirements for disclosure of the sources or amounts of private donations … 
      Lodge and Scheidegger (2006)  
Thus, wealthy benefactors can (intentionally or unintentionally) become indispensable 
sources of funding with hidden or visible motivations attached to such funding. 
According to Saffu (2002), in Africa countries without disclosure laws outnumber those 
with by a ratio of five to one. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
region, the majority of member states (Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) do not have disclosure provisions for the 
privately raised political party and campaign funds. Namibia is an exception – while it 
does not require full disclosure, it obliges the disclosure of foreign donations. 
Weissenbach (2011) further pointed out that transitional states and young democracies 
tended to have fewer disclosure regulations. Of the twenty-seven countries in Africa 
surveyed, 66% did not have financial disclosure in place. This is indicative of apathetic 
accountability on this issue, and it has serious implications, particularly for resource-rich 
countries. Collier (2007) stated that the natural resource trap is where bad governance 
in resource-rich countries leads to the stifling of the economy. 
Furthermore, there is a tendency for minimal regulation in these countries, undermining 
their capacity to gain full control of the sector. Combined with this is a considerable 
propensity to rely on guaranteed sources of income. As such, the state is less held to 
account by the people.  
In resource-rich countries, the implications of this abuse are increasing linkages between 
political sponsorship and the advocacy of self-interests, cronyism and party funding 
(Robinson and Brummer, 2006). Besides direct contributions to the parties, it would 
seem that, in order to gain the sympathy of the ruling party, many companies could buy 
influence by transferring some portion of their assets to favoured groups in the context 
of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). 
One consequence of BEE is the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between those in 
power and those who are now empowered in critical economic sectors.  Robinson and 
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Brummer (2006) indicated that with the allegiances between these two groups comes 
certainty, which is an enviable corporate asset. In South Africa, a study revealed that in 
the 1999 election period the political parties spent in the order of R300 million to R500 
million on their election campaigns, but only R66 million came from public money 
(Robinson and Brummer, 2006). No legislation at present forces political parties to 
declare their funding sources. The ANC secretary-general at the time, Kgalema 
Motlanthe (South African president from 2008 to 2009), revealed that the ANC was 
heavily reliant on donor funding. It was reported that the ANC receives the largest share 
of South African corporate funding amounting to 70% (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2006).  
This report went further in identifying that the principal donors, amongst others, were 
the ‘mining sector’ (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2006,  p. 35). Civil society is campaigning for 
transparency in the identification of funders, which could go a long way towards tackling 
the links between economic interests and political influence, to the extent that such 
influence can impact negatively on socio-economic policy, including matters to do with 
the environment. However, without disclosure laws, it is easier for businesses to field 
their interests through politicians by some form of influence peddling in exchange for 
guaranteed investment deals. Given the entrenched nature of mining and energy in the 
country’s history, it should be appreciated that underlying interests in keeping the status 
quo are not easy challenges to overcome.  
 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has updated its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) with a 
decrease in demand from 454 terawatt-hours (TWh) to a range of 345 TWh–416 TWh 
by 2030  (DOE, 2013a). Thus, a reduction of demand meant a decrease of 6.6 gigawatts 
(GW) of electricity capacity required.  The IRP update was apparent that modelling 
energy demand based on an economy with high GDP growth and a significant shift away 
from energy-intensive industry would be difficult to accomplish (DOE, 2013a).  What was 
more realistic was a lower GDP forecast with minor changes in industry structure. Thus, 
energy investment decisions had to take into account enough supply based on practical 
demands, but not oversupply that would result in stranded capacity (DOE, 2013a). 
Ultimately, the IRP update argued that the more aggressive the constraint was for 
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carbon emission, which included carbon taxes, the higher the cost to the country's 
economic competitiveness.  
This is an important narrative to take note of, as the country does not foresee 
decoupling carbon emission from economic growth at a cost to overall development. 
Again, balancing key issues of competitiveness with climate change mitigation is a 
constant debate within the country. In other words, it would seem the sentiment is that 
appropriate economic growth for the country should not limit overall developmental 
goals and, while GHG mitigation is essential, it may not be the most significant or 
decisive factor.    
 Financialisation 
Financialisation is a term that is used by some to describe a combination of short-term 
capital inflows with a long-term outflow of capital through an offshore listing of 
domestic corporations (Ashman et al., 2011). The issue is essential to this chapter 
because the MEC is a classic example of such financialisation. As South Africa's financial 
sector and the system has matured (rated the strongest in Africa), so the financialisation 
of the MEC has become a dominant feature of the mining sector (Ashman et al., 2011). 
The MEC developments have favoured short-term portfolio-based capital inflows rather 
than foreign direct investments, which are long-term in nature (Ashman et al., 2011). 
The size of stock portfolios demonstrates the extent to which this has evolved the mining 
companies occupy within the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The JSE market 
capitalisation is more than double the size of the actual economy, which is part of the 
global speculative commodity markets resulting in prices that are often not matched by 
production costs and demand (Isaacs, 2014). The MEC has historically favoured a more 
exclusive model – at first, the development and wealth creation of a white minority and, 
later, over the last twenty years, the new black elite as well as an international capital.  
The political economy of the MEC itself, in turn, has a significant influence on the 
structure and ethos of other parts of the economy as the inter-linkages between elites 
are strengthened (Ashman et al., 2011). An emphasis on a global commodity market 
renders the economy vulnerable to short-term volatile capital flows and less long-term 
labour-absorbing economic growth. Essential for transformative change in the country 
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is less focus on short-term shareholder value, addressing the dependency on the MEC, 
and identifying new areas of the economy that can be de-linked from the MEC. 
South Africa faces enormous problems that will take years to fix. These include a high 
current account deficit (6% GDP), low economic growth and continued labour friction, 
given infrastructure backlogs, an inadequate education system, and toxic labour 
relations. When there is macro-economic volatility, the rand exchange rate has to bear 
the brunt of this adjustment process (Isaacs, 2014). Furthermore, profits from the MEC 
need to be structured in a way that addresses long-term investment in the country and 
used appropriately to achieve development objectives, including the diversification of 
the economy.  
4.6 Interests 
  Mineral Energy Complex (MEC) 
The MEC is a set of activities that locked in and co-evolved several industries together: 
intensive mining, mineral processing, the energy sector and associated industries. As a 
result, the MEC over time was central to the South African economy. Alongside this 
dominance is the integration of economic sectors across mining, manufacturing and 
finance. Therefore, the contribution of the MEC to the economy cannot be viewed in 
isolation, nor can it be measured in absolute terms. In a sense, South Africa suffers from 
a double ‘lock-in' of a high carbon pathway dependency due to its dominant MEC, but 
also reliance on coal for its domestic energy derived from the MEC. The MEC also 
includes powerful and influential actors in the energy landscape. A system of 
accumulation of capital is manifested within the MEC, where consolidation of power in 
the hands of a few players has resulted in the creation of authoritative and influential 
actors over energy and economic policy, as well as access to and distribution of 
investment (Takala, 2008). The MEC system had effectively incorporated different parts 
of the economic sectors through various forms of control, ownership and its relations 
with the state (McDonald, 2009).   
The dominance of the mining industry intrinsically gave way to a political-economic 
system yielding to its requirements. This is reflected in energy policies that are geared 
towards promoting the interests of the MEC; these include macroeconomic stability that 
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ensured suitable mineral exports, the creation of state-owned enterprises (such as 
Eskom), which are involved mainly in minerals and energy, and a labour market that was 
used to ensure a steady supply of low-cost labour (Takala, 2008). Thus, the level at which 
the MEC is entrenched and fluid within the economic structure of South Africa pose a 
formidable challenge in finding a potential space for alternative sources of energy (other 
than fossil fuel). 
 Eskom 
In order to consider sustainable energy development in the country, it is necessary to 
take into account the dominant relevance of Eskom. This company has a 95% stake in 
the sector and is vertically integrated into the system (Eskom, 2014). It is responsible for 
the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. The national utility is one of 
the largest electric utilities in the world. It was ranked thirteenth in the world by 
generation capacity in 2008 (Gentle, 2009). The majority of its customers are in mining, 
manufacturing and industry. Eskom had undergone a series of transformations over the 
years, mainly when it was converted into a tax-paying public company under the 
Companies Act of 2001, wholly owned by the state (Gaunt, 2008; Gentle, 2009). Eskom's 
direction changed from that of public interest to that of a corporation. 
Eskom had to ensure the shareholder’s objectives were met, meaning that government 
and Eskom were now closely aligned (Gaunt, 2008). Conversely, the Municipal Electricity 
Undertakings (MEUs) are owned by the municipal councils, which, in their governance, 
are in turn accountable mostly to customers and voters in the local community, giving 
rise to a different set of objectives (Gaunt, 2008). Therefore, competing interests exist, 
particularly on issues surrounding increasing electricity costs. A mindset can then 
develop in which Eskom's central imperative is seen as ensuring profit while MEUs tend 
to address electricity price affordability.  
Given that, Eskom is entrenched, and a significant monopoly in the energy system in the 
country, it will take some time to attain a different balance in the industry. In this regard, 
the Independent Systems Market Operator (ISMO) Bill has been proposed for more than 
a decade. It is a bill that would facilitate the introduction of Independent Power 
Purchasers (IPPs) to the system, providing competition in electricity generation, and 
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result in the unbundling of the current monopoly. However, at present, the bill has 
almost been rejected in its totality because, among others, it would undermine the 
state’s leverage in the energy industry and would cause too much disruption in the 
context of the current generation shortfalls. Therefore, the dominance of Eskom 
remains, although the recent introduction of IPPs may change the balance somewhat. 
The issue of decoupling state-owned energy supply to the mines also arises in this 
context. Furthermore, the issue of privatisation has been debated for over a decade, but 
the preference within the state is to retain the status quo rather than restructuring the 
entire electricity system. With the current challenge of load-shedding, the weak financial 
position of Eskom, lack of progress in new energy builds, and inconsistent leadership at 
Eskom, critical questions are starting to be asked about the proportion of IPPs in the 
system and funding models for Eskom, which may include a sale of part of the company's 
equity.  
 The ISMO bill is an excellent example of how competing interests continue to hamper 
energy reforms. As previously discussed, Eskom has had mutually reinforcing 
relationships between its extensive and intensive users, indicative of its historical ties to 
mining. Eskom depends on a few privately owned coal companies. Furthermore, the 
majority of its customers are represented by 31 large industrial consumers known as the 
EIUG, which accounts for 44% of the electricity consumption11. The five biggest coal 
companies are Anglo-American, Xstrata, BHP Billiton, Sasol mining and Exxaro 
(Eberhard, 2011). Thus, the nucleus of economic growth and electricity infrastructure 
had started from Mpumalanga Province due to abundant coal and mining activities and 
then stretched to the main cities as the economy grew.  
As a result, large industrial users have incurred minimal distribution costs, and this has 
created a two-tier system. Eskom has a first-tier customer base of industrial users and a 
second-tier service to the municipalities (Rustomjee, 2014). Thus, any significant 
structural changes to Eskom would cause instability, price uncertainty and disruption of 
the mutually entrenched relationship with its existing users (Rustomjee, 2014), not to 
 
11 Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), www.eiug.org.za 
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mention the possible economic impact it may have, as the central imperative at present 
is to ensure short-term electricity supply with future grid stability. 
The current electricity crisis in the country is focusing energies on leading short-term 
solutions, and sustainable development may not receive adequate attention and could 
be relegated to the long-term. Thus, managing between these time frames is one of the 
critical issues that will require attention to defining energy projects. Without such a 
balance, the outcome may be to lock the country into business as usual with more fossil 
fuel derived resources such as coal. However, greener options towards more 
renewables are available and need to be pursued. Thus, despite well-informed reports 
such as the IRP update, or LTMS, with parallel uncertainties in future oil prices or global 
commodities demand, it should be appreciated that bold decisions are neither easy nor 
sequential. It is often repeated that vested interests among a few players, mainly 
associated with the MEC, are crucial to energy investment decisions. As long as these 
vested interests continue to dominate, and as long as they do not change their own 
paradigms, deviations from the norm will confront persistent barriers. In the recent 
period, a number of these large corporations have offered to contribute to electricity 
generation using gas (e.g. SASOL) or even the more innovative fuel cell technology, 
which uses a significant level of platinum group metals (PGM). The latter, if it ever takes 
off in earnest, may open up possibilities for a new MEC relationship as it combines 
beneficiation with green technology (in that, the by-product of the fuel cell generation 
process is water).  
 Energy security and coal exports 
Another substantial challenge for Eskom relates to the prospect of increased demand 
for low-grade coal. Traditionally, Eskom has had a reliable source of coal because it was 
of low quality and not suitable for export. South Africa depends on its export revenues 
and coal accounts for the third largest export after gold and platinum (Nkomo, 2009). 
Additionally, export revenues do not only fund the country's import expenses, but they 
are also used for the development of new industrial sectors (NPC, 2012). This is a 
recurrence of the country’s dependence on the MEC. The demand for RB3 low-grade 
coal has increased, particularly in countries such as India and China (Eberhard, 2011). 
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Subsequently, Eskom is lobbying the government to recognise coal as a ‘strategic 
national resource’ ensuring that it takes priority relative to energy security (Creamer, 
2011). Diversifying South Africa’s use of resources away from coal and into renewable 
energy will take time, and so it will remain a critical asset. This reiterates the number of 
competing dynamics to be considered, both in short- and the long-term.  
 Cosatu, climate change and the green economy 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), with approximately 1.8 million 
members (Cosatu, 2015; Politicsweb, 2012), is the largest trade union federation. Until 
recently, the single biggest affiliate was the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) with 
300,000 members. The largest union affiliate is now the National Union of Metalworkers 
South Africa (Numsa), which, at the time of publication, was fighting its expulsion from 
the federation. Cosatu has a structured alliance with the ruling party, namely the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which together 
form the Tripartite Alliance (Webster, 1998; Piper and Matisonn, 2009; McKinley, 2001). 
There are significant policy dialogues that occur within this alliance, and it is an essential 
source of information for the current ruling party, the ANC (Buhlungu, 2008; Mohanty 
et al., 2011; Webster, 1998).   
According to Cherry (2006), Cosatu has a multifaceted interaction with, and influence 
on, the government using the following:   
 Advocacy (for example social security for the poor, job creation and 
privatisation)  
 Negotiations in the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(Nedlac) 
 Working through political processes of the Tripartite Alliance 
 Mass mobilisation (such as action through collective strikes) 
These structures of communication cannot be understated because they can have 
significant implications when it comes to implementing policies that may or may not be 
welcomed by Cosatu. There is a tendency for the majority of the people to support mass 
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action as a complementary strategy for putting pressure upon elected politicians if the 
government fails to deliver promised benefits, most notably demonstrated in ‘service 
delivery protests’ (Mohanty et al., 2011; Buhlungu et al., 2008). Mass and repeated 
strike action over prolonged periods can cripple the economy. Thus, Cosatu is central to 
the ongoing dynamics within government policies and strategies, especially at the 
grassroots level, as well as government, industrial sectors, and civil society. 
  The mixture of business and politics 
The most significant development in this sector has been BEE deals which have resulted 
in black-owned coal companies controlling more than 30% of South African coal 
production. The most massive BEE deal of 2003 illustrates the lack of breadth in the 
empowerment process. The deal was between ARMGold and Avmin for R10.6 billion. 
The emergence of large black operators in an economy that had been solely dominated 
by whites is not a backward step as such. However, the transfer of wealth from one elite 
group to another – without a structural change in the path dependency – mostly 
perpetuates old patterns of social inequality. The system of wealth accumulation and 
the continued privilege of elites need to be confronted in the broader process of 
transformation. This skewed distribution of wealth has also resulted in the creation of 
powerful actors that are influential in determining the energy policies of the country. 
Moreover, this lopsided distribution of wealth may, in fact, keep the division of the ‘two 
world economy'. The two world economy refers to one end of the spectrum where 
South Africa has high living standards and access to infrastructure (which includes the 
basics such as electricity, water and sanitation) that are comparable to those in more 
developed countries (McDonald, 2009; Winkler and Marquard, 2009). However, at the 
other end is the poor population who lack access to basic living standards (housing, 
health, education and energy). This disproportionate situation is primarily due to the 
legacy of apartheid, which has embedded many socio-economic challenges and issues. 
4.7 Way forward 
As a way of understanding this multitude of issues, a framework by Voss and Kemp, 
2005, is discussed. They proposed a reflexive governance approach whereby 
formulating policies should be an exercise of flexibility and adaptability. Since 
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sustainable energy development is a complex issue, knowledge from various sources is 
required. Knowledge production cannot only rely on scientific sources; it also needs to 
take into account the needs of societal actors (Voss and Kemp, 2005). There is a need to 
create ‘integrated knowledge production’ that enables information, not only from 
within the boundaries of science and policy but transcends these towards society in 
general (Voss and Kemp, 2005,  p. 10). In terms of uncertainty, future energy 
development cannot be predicted with precision, nor can it be predicted for its systemic 
effects. Therefore, a level of ‘adaptivity’ and flexibility is needed relative to the 
institutions and technological systems that govern implementation (Voss and Kemp, 
2005,  p. 11). An important factor here is to capacitate the system to respond to changes 
adequately and proactively. Moreover, a continuous system of monitoring and 
evaluation needs to be in place once policy implementation starts.  
Energy investments have a long lifespan and changing trajectories is not easy as prior 
technologies are path dependent or lock in for a specified timeframe. Specific patterns 
are realised and stabilise within social values, institutions and societal systems. An 
example here is coal-derived electricity.  Most people need a consistent and reliable 
electricity supply, and whether the source is carbon-intensive is usually a secondary 
matter. Therefore, an energy technology choice needs to take into consideration the 
long-term systemic effects. South Africa continues to be locked into a carbon-intensive 
energy system, and some may argue that business as usual needs to continue because 
coal is abundant and cheap. However, South Africa needs to ask itself whether current 
efforts to gradually extricate itself from this carbon-intensive system are adequate, and 
how stakeholders within the energy and sustainable development community can work 
together towards optimal solutions.  
Strategy implementation requires meta-coordination, not only within and among 
government departments, but also with various stakeholders. Significant factors to 
consider for implementation are: 1) the project must have a defined champion with 
clear mandates; 2) there should be sufficient institutional capacity where projects are 
aligned to mainstream and existing initiatives at scale; 3) create a conducive and 
supportive context for policy, regulation, and planning, and ensure ownership of the 
integrated process; 4) ensure that projects are aligned to national priorities which 
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should assist in mainstreaming and alignment with broader mandates or enhance 
existing mandates and, lastly; 5) there must be sufficient technical capacity to enable 
the project to be sustainable.  
Among the measures required to reduce the country's dependency on the MEC would 
be to take up in earnest, the opportunities opened up by the knowledge-based 
economy. This will ensure that the country is more resilient to volatile commodity 
markets and is less reliant on primary resources. The experience from the mining 
industry can stand the country in good stead, particularly concerning the knowledge 
base that includes production or process engineering, as well as research and 
development. An important consideration is to focus not only on the continuous output 
of mining resources and seeing the minerals as an end in themselves. Preferably, the 
knowledge underlying the processes of obtaining these minerals should be utilised to 
diversify or enhance other sectors of the economy. Examples could include 
technological innovation in mechanisation process, machineries, parts, tools and 
equipment – all of which could spill over into essential sectors such as transportation, 
information technology, construction and manufacturing. Sound economic policy and 
planning that have evident growth and development objectives should dictate how 
mining investments flow and how revenues or income generated from the mining sector 
are managed for the benefit of society as a whole.   
4.8 Conclusion  
There is no doubt that mining in the country will continue to be a dominant sector in the 
years to come. However, the sector is undergoing significant challenges that cut across 
significant issues which are at the heart of the country’s developmental goals that 
include labour, economic growth and unemployment. The role of the MEC is indicative 
of the entrenched regime that the mining sector plays within the economy. The MEC 
has broadened itself into a system of wealth accumulation and has integrated large 
sectors that include mining, transport, manufacturing and finance. As was discussed, the 
EIUG is also one of the biggest companies in the mining sector, as well as the JSE. Due 
to a system of wealth accumulation, there are a handful of players in this sector and 
thereby also a few powerful actors that are influential in determining key policies and 
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strategies. Thus, the argument in this chapter is that vested interests within the MEC are 
vital in understanding the implementation of energy policies in the country.   
The issue of ideological mismatch between a developmental state and a more neo-
liberal economy is a fundamental obstacle. The influence and the role of trade unions 
cannot be overstated: significant policy dialogues take place within the Tripartite 
Alliance. Unbundling Eskom has been stalled several times and is part of a more 
considerable privatisation debate that encompasses the nationalisation of mines and 
selling off some of Eskom's assets. The ideological mismatch has to be tackled because 
it is a root cause for policy incoherencies and implementation inertia.   
The subject of financialisation is indicative of a need for significant reform in the 
structure of the economy. Investments made by the mining sector that favour profits 
flowing out of the country instead of long-term financial investments are compounding 
developmental challenges. These include uneven wealth distribution mostly skewed 
towards elitism and wealth concentration; thus, inequality persists. The JSE total market 
capitalisation is twice the size of the actual economy. The emphasis on a commodity 
market renders the economy vulnerable to short-term volatile capital flows, and not 
necessarily long-term labour-absorbing economic growth. The current energy crisis 
provides an opportune moment to revisit the country’s mining economic policy. 
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5.1 Abstract 
The sustainability transitions literature considers regimes as sources of inertia, in which 
change is difficult to achieve due to resistance and lock-in. However, regime-resistance 
is an understudied issue, and so it is unclear which parts of the regime create resistance 
and how. In this paper, we contribute such an analysis by developing the concept of a 
multi-dimensional selection environment to explore regime-resistance and the 
maintenance of regime-stability in the face of challenges from a niche. We present a 
case study tracing the efforts of South Africa’s state-owned electricity utility Eskom, 
conceptualised as a dominant regime-incumbent, to resist the addition of renewable 
energy-based electricity generation, conceptualised as part of a niche. We examine 
battles over rule-changes to the regime selection environment, wherein Eskom tried to 
maintain the status quo and niche actors tried to transform it. We find that Eskom had 
an evolving strategy of regime-resistance in response to several gains achieved by the 
renewables niche over time. Our analysis suggests ways to theorise regime-resistance 
by developing a more specific and dimensioned view of the selection environment and 
operationalising the strategies that regime and niche actors might implement in their 
respective attempts to maintain or change that selection environment. By 
understanding how these strategies work, we argue that those seeking to transform an 
unsustainable regime could develop more effective strategies for undermining regime-
resistance and promoting niches. 
Keywords: regime-resistance, incumbency, regime and niche interactions, energy 
transition, institutional theory, drift and layering 
5.2 Introduction 
This paper examines how a regime-incumbent has resisted efforts to achieve socio-
technical change that would benefit a more sustainable niche. The paper’s focus is of 
interest to sustainability transitions research as, although regimes are conceptualised in 
terms of lock-in and resistance to change through inertia (Geels, 2014b), there are claims 
that sustainability transitions theory is unclear which parts of the regime create 
resistance and how (Wieczorek, 2018). A clearer understanding of regime-resistance 
could open up ways to overcome it (Unruh, 2000; Klitkou et al., 2015) and could 
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contribute to accelerating sustainability transitions by, for example, identifying ways to 
destabilise an existing regime (Turnheim and Geels, 2012; Karltorp and Sandén, 2012; 
Kungl and Geels, 2018), while promoting innovative niches (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016; 
Sovacool, 2016). To address this gap, we develop the concept of a multi-dimensional 
regime selection environment and examine the struggles between a regime-incumbent 
and emerging niche over changes to the rules that profoundly shape that selection 
environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Geels and Schot, 2010; Smith and Raven, 2012). 
Moreover, our paper responds to calls to contribute to the nascent literature analysing 
socio-technical energy transitions in developing-country contexts (Hansen et al., 2018). 
The paper provides a case study of a country in the Global South in which a regime has 
tried to resist socio-technical change. As such, in addition to an empirical contribution, 
the paper provides insights for enriching how we can theorise regime-resistance, with 
associated insights for how policy can be used more strategically to accelerate 
sustainability transitions in Global South contexts. 
To examine regime-resistance, we present a case study of South Africa’s electricity 
socio-technical system in which we trace how the state-owned utility Eskom has, over 
the period 1998 to 2018, attempted to resist the growth of renewable energy in the 
electricity supply mix. Eskom is a central actor in South Africa’s powerful Minerals-
Energy Complex (MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996) that, amongst other interests, has 
long tied coal mining together with electricity generation and consumption (Ting, 2015), 
and continues to be a significant force in the country’s economy (StatsSA, 2017; COM, 
2018; Baxter, 2016). However, despite the power of these coal-based interests and 
Eskom’s efforts to resist change, renewable energy-based electricity generation has 
seen impressive growth in South Africa in recent years, reaching 3.6 GW of generation 
capacity as of 2018 (DOE, 2018a). The case provides a useful example of how socio-
technical change can be achieved despite the presence of a powerful incumbent. To 
drive our analysis, we ask the research question: How has Eskom resisted the 
introduction of renewable energy-based electricity generation in South Africa?  
We frame our theoretical approach in terms of the multi-level perspective on 
sustainability transitions (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002a), within which we conceive 
of Eskom as the dominant incumbent within a regime constituted by the MEC, and 
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renewable energy electricity generation technologies and associated actors as 
constituting the niche. To sharpen our focus, we concentrate on contestation over rule-
changes to the regime’s selection environment, a crucial space where strategic actors 
compete to influence and shape outcomes (Kuokkanen et al., 2018). Drawing on the 
notion of a socio-political regime (Swilling et al., 2016), and drift and layering concepts 
from institutional change theory (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; 
Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014), we develop a multi-dimensional selection-
environment concept and postulate strategies for regime-resistance and niche-
challenge. Applying these ideas enables us to analyse the actions employed by both 
regime and niche actors in their battles over rule-changes in the selection-environment. 
We find that Eskom has used an evolving resistance strategy in response to various gains 
achieved by the renewables niche, and this finding further reveals the specifics of 
regime-resistance and niche-challenges in their interdependent dynamics as played out 
in South Africa’s case. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.3-5.5 provides the paper’s conceptual basis, 
discussing socio-technical regimes, institutional change and the two strategies regime-
resistance and niche-challenge. Section 5.6 explains the methodology and includes a 
discussion of how the resistance and challenge strategies are operationalised in terms 
of the regime selection environment. Section 5.7 discusses the socio-technical context 
of the case study, where the case study itself is presented in Section 5.8. In Section 5.9, 
we reflect on the case study and discuss what the implications for theorising regime-
resistance are, along with thoughts on what this means for accelerating sustainability 
transitions. Section 5.10 concludes briefly, summarising the main points of the paper. 
5.3 Conceptual discussion 
 Socio-technical transitions 
In the socio-technical transitions literature, the dominant way of realising any societal 
function – such as electricity production and consumption – is called a socio-technical 
regime, sitting at the meso level in a multi-level perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2004a; Grin 
et al., 2010; Bosman et al., 2014). At the micro-level are socio-technical niches, where 
novel (more sustainable) technologies and practices are the focus of experimentation 
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(Geels, 2002b). The context of both regimes and niches is called the landscape (the 
macro-level), where heterogeneous factors that are difficult to affect directly play out 
(e.g. environmental change, natural events, demographic trends, etc.) (Geels, 2004a). 
Although this literature mainly focusses on how landscape pressures (e.g. climate 
change) create conditions that niches (e.g. based on renewable energy technologies) 
can exploit as they strengthen and stabilise, eventually replacing old regimes, there is 
increasing attention to how old regimes weaken or destabilise – the so-called ‘flipside’ 
of transitions (Turnheim and Geels, 2012). Associated with regime-destabilisation is 
resistance to change, an understudied issue in transitions literature where there is 
uncertainty over which parts of the regime enable resistance (Wieczorek, 2018). 
Examining regime-resistance can inform specific ways to weaken or destabilise regimes 
and so accelerate sustainability transitions. To examine regime-resistance, we build on 
the concept of the selection environment – a foundational regime concept – that tends 
to favour regime reproduction (Smith and Raven, 2012; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016; Raven, 
2005; Geels, 2011) and so changes to it could help achieve such acceleration. 
By focussing the analysis of regime-resistance on changes to the selection environment, 
we can see how the selection environment is actively shaped by strategic actors, both 
within and beyond the regime (Kuokkanen et al., 2018,  p. 1513). We anticipate that 
attempts to change the selection environment will likely stimulate regime-resistance, so 
our analyses must attend to the dynamics of power, politics and agency in struggles over 
regime-change (Avelino, 2011; Meadowcroft, 2011; Geels, 2014b). Using this logic, and 
to help us understand more systematically how regime-resistance and niche-challenges 
co-evolve, our aim in this section is to develop a multi-dimensional concept of the 
selection environment. To do this, we need to take several steps (see Figure 5.1 for a 
summary of these steps and associated concepts). For a summary of these steps and 
associated concepts). After reflecting in Section 5.3.2 on the importance of rules 
(another foundational regime concept) and how these relate to institutional theory, in 
our first step, we draw on the institutional change modes of drift and layering (explained 
in 5.4) to characterise how regimes might defend – and niches might challenge – the 
status quo. Second, in 5.5, we develop our multi-dimensional selection environment 
concept. And, third, we translate the drift and layering change modes into resistance 
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and challenge strategies (respectively), relating these to the multi-dimensional selection 
environment (see Sections 5.5.1and 5.5.2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Summary of the conceptual discussion steps and the main ideas   
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 Socio-technical regime and rules 
Rules are at the heart of the socio-technical regime concept, forming the overall guiding 
normative, regulative and cognitive framework that provides the functional relationship 
between material resources, actors and the socio-technical regime’s organisational 
networks (Genus and Coles, 2008; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016). Rules (such as normative 
values, technical regulations or planning heuristics) can change, affecting social 
legitimacy (impacting political and public support), the flow of economic resources 
(increasing or reducing market power), and the commitment of actors (thus shaping the 
organisational networks of regime-incumbents or niche-challengers). Taken together, 
changes unfavourable to a regime could lead to its destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels, 
2012) and so create opportunities for niche-expansion. Public policies, and associated 
regulations and standards, etc., are formal rules and have a profound effect on the 
selection environment. Attempts to change rules, therefore, will likely stimulate battles 
between regime and niche actors as they seek to either maintain the selection 
environment (regime actors) or open it up to transformation (niche actors). Thus, we 
argue that examining battles over rule-changes that could change the selection 
environment will help us reveal the dynamics of both regime-resistance and niche-
challenges. 
With this brief rationale for focussing on rule-changes, we note that the socio-technical 
regime concept draws heavily from neo-institutional theory, whereby rules are 
embedded in structures that are both context and outcome of actions (Geels, 2004a; 
Geels, 2011). Moreover, Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2014) use insights from institutional 
theory to develop a systematic characterisation of regime structuration that enables 
analysis of, amongst other things, the degree of regime stability. While these 
contributions are useful for understanding regime stabilisation and reproduction, we 
are interested in this paper in how regimes respond to niche challenges and so draw on 
the theory of incremental and endogenous institutional change (e.g. Streeck and Thelen, 
2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) to examine regime-niche dynamics during attempts 
to change a selection environment’s rules. 
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5.4 Rule-changes and institutional theory  
Turning to the institutional theory literature, we first note that, according to Streeck and 
Thelen (2005), institutional theory usually emphasises institutional reproduction and 
the maintenance of stability, where the change results from exogenous shocks that 
stimulate radical institutional reconfigurations and a new stability in the process of 
punctuated equilibrium. However, they argue this emphasis overlooks the incremental 
institutional changes occurring endogenously. As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) reason, 
there could be internal institutional reconfigurations during times of apparent stasis or 
stability. Thus, we draw on concepts of endogenous institutional change for analysing 
internal regime processes rather than exogenously derived punctuated equilibrium. 
We develop our conceptual framework starting with the two institutional change modes 
drift and layering, drawing on the work of Streeck and Thelen (2005) and their 
characterisation of how institutional change occurs. Drift is a mode in which formal rules 
are held constant in the face of contextual change, and layering is a mode in which new 
rules are added alongside old ones. We now discuss these two modes of institutional 
change more fully and justify why they are appropriate for helping us understand the 
dynamics of regime-resistance and niche-challenges in the recent evolution of South 
Africa’s electricity system. 
 Drift: holding on to rules 
Drift is defined as a mode of change in which a powerful incumbent tries to maintain the 
stability of existing institutions that serve its interests despite essential changes to its 
context, described as contextual discontinuity (Hacker et al., 2015). Contextual 
discontinuity could mean new institutions are needed, but the incumbent resists them 
when it believes they will be detrimental to its interests. Hacker et al. (2015) argue that 
drift enables institutional change to be resisted away from public scrutiny. Contestation 
in the public domain can spark initiatives that may lead to the mobilisation of competing 
interests. In contrast, a hidden resistance strategy can allow the more politically-versed 
and better-resourced incumbent actors time to mobilise their shared interests, shape 
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and influence outcomes, and disable the voices of those with divergent interests 
(Lockwood et al., 2017; Andrews-Speed, 2016). 
In South Africa, electricity-production has been dependent on coal for more than ninety 
years, and coal-fired electricity constitutes 90% of the generation fleet (Eskom, 2016b). 
Consequently, Eskom is responsible for about 43% of South Africa’s carbon emissions 
(Eskom, 2016a) and so is under pressure to adapt to a lower-carbon trajectory. Climate 
change, therefore, constitutes a contextual discontinuity and the need to act on it 
requires new institutions that promote, for example, renewable energies.  
 Layering: adding new rules alongside the old 
Layering is defined as the addition of new rules alongside existing ones where the new 
rules do not ‘attack’ existing institutions but rather solve problems caused by them 
(Hacker et al., 2015; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). We might see problems arise, for 
example, when an incumbent is employing a resistance strategy whereby the 
incumbent’s failure to respond to a contextual discontinuity causes the regime to fall 
into crisis. This can open a window of opportunity for a niche to exploit. Layering, in this 
sense, can be described as an incremental adjustment, or what Geels et al. (2016) call 
‘fit-and-conform’, where a niche-innovation develops within the existing selection 
environment. Layering allows new and old institutions to co-exist over time, but the new 
layered institutions could outlive the old leading eventually to more substantial change. 
5.5 Strategies in a multi-dimensional selection environment 
The selection environment helps explain socio-technical change through the quasi-
evolutionary approach of variation, selection and retention (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
As various technologies are introduced into society (variation), their adoption and 
diffusion (selection) are filtered through a selection environment that contains material, 
political, cultural and sociological dimensions. In other words, socio-technical change is 
‘selected’ not only by markets but also by social fitness such as values, beliefs, 
expectations and visions amongst actors (Geels and Schot, 2010). Moreover, once 
technologies are adopted in society, there is a process of ‘retention’ and ‘reproduction’ 
– or ‘lock-in’ – that occurs through establishing regulations (e.g. government subsidies), 
legally binding contracts, market parameters such as scale and sunk investments, as well 
115 
 
as sociological structures that include cognitive routines, and power and politics, making 
changes away from the retained technologies difficult (Geels, 2014b; Smith and Raven, 
2012; Meadowcroft, 2011; Geels and Schot, 2010).   
We can now make our second step, elaborating the dimensions of our selection 
environment concept before proposing, in a final step, how regime-resistance and 
niche-challenges could play out on those dimensions. For the selection environment 
dimensions, we consider calls that attention is needed in transitions research to power, 
politics and agency (Kuzemko et al., 2016; Swilling et al., 2016; Johnstone et al., 2017; 
Geels, 2014b). Attempted regime changes are likely to encounter resistance and are 
therefore deeply political because of vested interests and power relations, which tend 
to favour the status quo (Kuzemko et al., 2016; Geels, 2014b). Thus, we draw on 
concepts related to socio-political regimes (Swilling et al., 2016) and hegemonic social 
structures (Levy and Egan, 2003). Specifically, Levy and Egan (2003) argue that dominant 
socio-economic structures, which constitute alliances amongst particular groups, can 
assert supremacy through the persuasive and bureaucratic authority of the state, the 
dominance and favoured market position within an economical configuration, 
ideologies that perpetuate mutual interests, and the consensual legitimacy of civil 
society. In Swilling et al. (2016), the ways in which power relations are created, 
disseminated and maintained, influence prevailing beliefs, particularly in framing and 
shaping the terms of debate and adoption of policies. Using these ideas, we derive the 
dimensions of organisational networks and capacity (organisation capital reflects how 
power relations are exercised), discursive structures (power of ideologies), and the 
market (dominance of specific economic configurations). Further dimensions relate to 
material elements of the socio-technical regime: e.g., formal rules such as policies, 
legislation and standards enable the continued dominance of incumbents and 
associated technological preferences, and large technical systems tend to create sunk 
investments (Geels and Schot, 2010). From these, we derive the two further dimensions 
of public policies and technology and infrastructure.   
Bringing these ideas together, we can now describe the dimensions of our reconceived 
selection environment: (1) markets, (2) organisational networks and capacity, (3) 
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discursive structures, (4) public policies, and (5) technology and infrastructure. We 
elaborate on these below (and see Figure 5.2). 
Markets: A regime-incumbent tends to have established market relationships with 
industries and government and enjoy widespread social legitimacy. Embedded 
institutions – those institutions that are deep-seated and in widespread operation – 
tend to reflect these relationships, providing the incumbent with a dominant market 
position (Kuzemko et al., 2016). The market selection environment is stabilised through 
price instruments, and customer preferences and practices, each of which has co-
evolved with the regime, thereby favouring its reproduction (Smith and Raven, 2012). 
Organisational networks and capacity: A regime will likely include at least one industrial 
association, as well as broader networks involving strong relationships between users 
and firms. There is also the prevailing knowledge base, with dedicated research 
programmes, groups, and actors’ similar search routines. The current knowledge base, 
practices, search routines, and so on, favour reproduction of the regime and the 
incumbent’s organisational networks as well as the maintenance of existing power 
relations. The ways in which organisational networks are constituted, maintained and 
operated reflect existing power relations (Swilling et al., 2016; Levy and Egan, 2003).  
Discursive structures: Incumbents hold a privileged position over prevailing ideologies 
and beliefs amongst powerful elites, maintaining those ideas as accepted norms that 
structure relevant discourses. For example, regime actors might have preconceived 
ideas about the compatibility of new technologies with an existing technical system 
(Unruh, 2000) and use their position to persuade others of their preconceived ideas. This 
discursive dimension of the selection environment favours the reproduction of the 
regime by constraining debate over technology and policy choices to those that maintain 
regime and incumbent interests. 
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Figure 5.2: Quasi-evolutionary approach to socio-technical change and a multi-dimensional selection environment 
Source: Authors’ construction 
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Public policies: These translate normative societal views into formal rules such as 
legislation and regulation that profoundly condition the institutional selection 
environment (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016). Existing institutions, or formal rules, have co-
evolved with the regime and so favour its reproduction. 
Technology and infrastructure: Technical standards and infrastructure requirements 
constitute a technical dimension of the selection environment, and existing standards 
and requirements are usually favourable to a regime-incumbent (Smith and Raven, 
2012). 
 Regime resistance strategy 
With this brief description of selection environment dimensions, we can consider what 
drift might look like as a strategy for maintaining a regime-favourable selection 
environment. Drawing on Hacker et al. (2015), we note that delayed action or non-
responsiveness enables regime actors to resist rule-changes by conducting a debate on 
technology and policy choices away from public scrutiny. In our selection environment 
terms, by confining the debate to hidden spaces amongst its organisational networks, a 
regime-incumbent would be better able to control the terms of the debate, thus 
maintaining the prevailing regime-favourable discursive structure. Moreover, those 
outside the regime and its organisational networks – uninformed about the hidden 
debate – would be less able to develop an alternative discursive structure, and so would 
be less likely to influence the debate. In turn, rule-changes – to policies, market 
institutions, technology standards, etc. – will rest on addressing a narrow regime-
favourable agenda and so will tend to maintain the existing selection environment. 
 Niche challenges strategy 
If a regime-resistance strategy is about the maintenance of the status quo, niche-
challenges are about achieving change to the selection environment. Where regime-
resistance would be employed by a regime-incumbent, layering would be sought by 
niche actors. They would look for opportunities to get a foothold in the regime on any 
dimension of the selection environment. For example, contextual discontinuity might 
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demand a policy-response, and so niche actors could try to influence public debate in 
favour of their preferred choices in a bid to secure niche-promoting rule-changes. 
However, if the debate is being conducted in hidden spaces, niche actors will face 
challenges to achieve influence. Faced with such challenges, niche actors would have to 
frame their preferred solutions in terms that do not appear to ‘attack’ the core rules of 
the regime – the fit-and-conform strategy described by Geels et al. (2016) – so as not to 
explicitly threaten disruption of the selection environment. This challenge will be 
exacerbated if niche actors are unable to provide facts and other ideas that may dislodge 
or destabilise those already structuring the prevailing discourse. To achieve influence, 
niche actors must be able to seize an opportunity when it arises but do so when in 
possession of persuasive facts and other discursive elements or, as Geels and Schot 
(2007) argue, when a niche is sufficiently well-developed to be able to exploit the 
opportunity effectively. 
5.6 Methodology 
South Africa's electricity system is an example of a socio-technical system that is path-
dependent, with strong vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Given the nature 
of the vertical integration of Eskom and its position within South Africa’s MEC, 
renewable energy developers must contend not only with the challenges of relatively 
new technologies but also with the powerful governing interests that seek to maintain 
the regime. 
In our case study, we conceptualise the electricity socio-technical system as embedded 
within a regime constituted by the MEC (see Section 5.7 for a fuller explanation of the 
MEC), within which Eskom is the dominant incumbent, and we conceptualise renewable 
energy and associated actors as a niche. From 1998 to 2018, South Africa’s electricity 
system experienced a series of changes and a crisis of supply, as well as a growing 
renewable energy programme. During this period, we argue, Eskom has responded to 
change by employing a resistance strategy that contributed to the electricity-supply 
crisis. This, in turn, created a window of opportunity for renewables through which the 
layering of new institutions for their promotion was possible. As such, the South African 
case offers a useful example with which to examine the interdependent dynamics of 
regime-resistance and niche-challenges. To reveal these interdependent dynamics, we 
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ask the research question: How has Eskom resisted the introduction of renewable 
energy-based electricity generation in South Africa? 
We confine our set of core rules for the incumbent to (1) Eskom provides and maintains 
cheap electricity and (2) Eskom is a supplier of last resort. Eskom’s mandate as a supplier 
of last resort means that the government has tasked the utility by all means necessary 
to maintain reliable electricity supply. We derive these rules from the fact that Eskom 
has been South Africa’s central electricity supplier for more than ninety years, and that 
electricity-supply has developmental objectives tied to affordability, accessibility, and 
reliability. However, we caution that these rules form a subset of those that make up 
the socio-technical system and do not include, for example, coal and its associated 
industries. 
We consider displays by the incumbent such as resistance, delay, inertia, inaction and 
indecision to be instances of drift. To elaborate, drift is evident when the incumbent 
delays market reforms, which can be an effort to maintain market dominance and avoids 
compliance with new rules, disrupting the functioning of the socio-technical system and 
placing organisational networks in limbo. Information asymmetry can be used by the 
incumbent to skew discussions in their favour and confine deliberations within their 
organisational networks such that contestation is shifted out of public sight, limiting the 
capacity of oppositional groups to mobilise social movements against the incumbent. 
Moreover, the incumbent can stall infrastructure reforms, preventing new entrants 
from competing effectively. Table 5.1 overlaps these instances with the selection-
environment dimensions discussed in Section 5.3.  
Table 5.1 also summarises layering operationalised under each of the selection-
environment dimensions. We consider layering to mean, for example, widening the 
participation of formerly excluded actors, such as the inclusion of the private sector into 
the otherwise monopolised electricity market, resulting in new user-producer relations. 
For organisational capacity and discursive structures, we consider conditions for layering 
to include trust, learning and transparency to develop nascent networks. Similarly, 
control policies require legislative certainty, which means introducing new rules 
formalised by the government and enabling the selection environment for new entrants. 
In terms of infrastructure, layering means attaching new kinds of infrastructure to an 
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existing setup. In general, we consider layering to be a fluid process of blending different 
kinds of actors, networks and material resources over time. 
Table 5.1: Operationalised concepts of regime-resistance and niche-challenge 
strategies in the selection environment 
Regime selection 
environment 
dimensions 
Regime-resistance 
strategy 
Niche-challenge strategy 
Markets Delay market reforms Forge new user-producer 
relations 
Organisation capacity 
and networks 
Enlist powerful existing 
network 
Engender trust and learning 
Discursive structures Exploit information 
asymmetry 
Seek information 
transparency 
Public policies Employ indecision and 
inaction 
Lobby for certainty over new 
rules 
Infrastructure Stall reforms to 
infrastructural rules 
Add new infrastructure to 
old 
 
We used a range of data sources including qualitative in-depth semi-structured 
interviews supplemented with field notes, documenting remarks from interviewees, 
reflections and views throughout the fieldwork (See Appendices A and B). We then 
complemented these with secondary data by reviewing documents from government 
policies and strategies, scientific articles, books, doctoral theses and reports published 
in grey and academic literature (reviewing prominent analysts of South Africa’s 
electricity system, e.g. Steyn, 2006; Steyn, 2012; Marquard, 2006; Eberhard and 
Gratwick, 2011; Baker, 2014; Baker et al., 2014). We also examined transcripts from 
parliamentary hearings of the Energy, Public Enterprises and Environmental Affairs 
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Portfolio Committee (See Appendix C). These were important for determining what was, 
and was not, articulated by high-ranking government officials and Eskom employees. 
These parliamentary hearings include representation by Ministers, Eskom board 
members, expert actors (prominent academics, policymakers, think tanks) and private 
sector companies. For triangulation, it was important that evidence derived from these 
data sources corresponded to determine the validity of claims. If some information had 
inconsistencies, these were evaluated against multiple sources of evidence such as 
interviews from different actors, and various public documents (See Chapter 1, Section 
1, on triangulation issues). Lastly, prior to conducting the fieldwork, an ethical review 
was completed, which outlined that interviewees consented to provide information on 
a voluntary basis, and data could not be traced back to an individual participant. 
Most of the primary research was conducted during fieldwork that took place from June 
to August 2015, and March to July 2016. In this paper, we draw and cite from 12 
interviewees who provide a broad representation of views and knowledge about the 
South African case. The interviews took place in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town, 
and included actors from government, NGOs, the private sector, academia and think 
tanks. We analysed the transcriptions of the interviews according to the operationalised 
strategies of regime-resistance and niche-challenges, as indicated in Table 5.2. Each 
respondent was provided with questions that pertain to these strategies, dependent on 
their expertise (see Table 5.2). For analysis, we grouped the outputs from the interviews 
according to the selection-environment dimensions and triangulated these as far as 
possible with information from document analyses. Because of the sensitive nature of 
the topic, interviewees were informed at the beginning of interviews that they would 
remain anonymous, which also raised the potential to elicit more honest responses. 
Table 5.2: Anonymised summary of interviewees and relevant concepts 
Respondent Description Focus 
A Former Eskom Group Executive Regime-resistance 
B Senior Government official served at 
the DOE 
Regime-resistance and 
niche-challenge 
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C Programme manager for a South 
African Think and Tank and former 
senior Government official  
Regime-resistance  
D Senior Economist for a South African 
Think Tank 
Regime-resistance and 
niche-challenge 
E The chief economist at a South African 
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) 
Regime-resistance 
F Director of a South African Think Tank Regime-resistance and 
niche-challenge 
G EIUG member, and Manager in a 
Petrochemical company 
Regime-resistance  
H Pricing Manager at an SOE Regime-resistance 
I Senior Manager for a mining company 
and member of the EIUG 
Regime-resistance 
J Independent contractor for RE I4P12 and 
member of South African Photovoltaic 
Industry Association (SAPVIA) 
Regime-resistance and 
niche-challenge 
K Senior Academic on energy and 
infrastructure at a South African 
university 
Regime-resistance and 
niche-challenge 
L Independent consultant on the industry, 
trade, energy, and infrastructure policy 
Regime-resistance 
 
 
12 The RE I4P is the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme – see 
Section 5.8.3. 
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5.7 Description of the socio-technical regime 
Before presenting our case study, we briefly explain the socio-technical context of the 
incumbent. As mentioned, we conceptualise South Africa’s electricity regime is 
embedded within the MEC and the state-owned electricity utility Eskom as its dominant 
incumbent.  Here, we elaborate on the various elements of the MEC and then describe 
the position of Eskom within this and within the South African context, focussing mainly 
on the selection-environment dimensions discussed in Section 5.3. The MEC describes 
the reciprocal relationship of several industries that includes mining, the energy sector, 
supportive infrastructure and other related industries (Ting, 2015). Several scholars have 
noted shifts in the MEC in post-apartheid South Africa, particularly as existing coal mines 
are ageing and coal deposits are rapidly depleting (Burton and Winkler, 2014; Jeffrey, 
2005). This has consequences on mining new geological sources, logistics, and market 
structure, all of which have an impact on the MEC (Trollip et al., 2014; Burton and 
Winkler, 2014). 
Nevertheless, there are still mining and associated industries that rely on Eskom for their 
electricity, as the utility remains largely a monopoly. Thus, as long as Eskom remains a 
dominant incumbent, the utility has a crucial role in enacting the established rules and 
resources that have enabled the stability of a socio-technical regime related to mining 
and energy. Moreover, the country continues to rely on mining and the mineral sector, 
with mining contributing to around 7% of GDP, 25% of exports and accounting for more 
than 1 million jobs (Baxter, 2016). The biggest mining companies belong to an Energy 
Intensive Users Group13 (EIUG), which together account for more than 40% of electricity 
demand (Ting, 2015). 
Central to the MEC was the establishment of Eskom in 1923, and it continues to form a 
vital component for support of the mining industry (Marquard, 2006). Eskom has 
remained a vertical monopoly responsible for electricity generation (>90%), 
transmission (95%) and distribution (>50%) (Eskom, 2016b; Eskom, 2016a), deriving 
most of its revenue from three primary customers: redistributors through 
municipalities, industry, and large mining companies. Together, these three consumer-
 
13 Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), www.eiug.org.za 
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categories account for approximately 80% of electricity consumption and revenues (see 
Figure 5.3), making them powerful sources of pressure to maintain the incumbent core 
rule for affordable electricity. 
 
Figure 5.3: Eskom’s main consumers by consumption and revenues 
Source: NERSA (2015a; 2015b) 
At present, Eskom is a state-owned utility, mandated to deliver affordable and 
accessible electricity, a critical developmental objective mainly due to an industrial 
policy of enabling mining activities and to provide for low-income households (Eskom, 
2012). To ensure affordable electricity, the state has been providing significant financial 
subsidies to Eskom. Up to 2008, South Africa’s electricity prices had been amongst the 
lowest in the world, but customers were paying below the cost of electricity production. 
Due to the state’s strong support for developmental objectives, Eskom is managed as a 
"quasi-government department" subject to politicians’ influence over what objectives 
are prioritised and how resources are allocated (Steyn, 2012,  p. 33). Moreover, 
according to interviewees14, Eskom’s precise accountability is unclear, rendering it 
subject to makeshift governance. It has been such a vital instrument in the state’s policy 
directives that it has been described as the "vanguard of economic development” and a 
highly “successful technocratic enterprise” (Marquard, 2006,  p. 161). These ideas form 
the current discursive structure that underpins the pressure to maintain Eskom’s core 
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rule as a reliable supplier of affordable electricity. However, it is also clear that the 
vagaries of political leadership and ideology significantly influence the operation of the 
electricity system, shaping many aspects of regime-incumbent’s selection environment. 
The institutional environment within which Eskom operates is not only conditioned by 
the state’s ideology but is also subject to intense lobbying, with significant political 
pressure coming from interest groups. Besides, the current regulatory framework is 
weak with insufficient capacity to hold Eskom accountable, and the formal institutional 
structure around Eskom is, according to one interviewee15, “a constant source of 
inefficiency due to its “multiple parents arrangement”. Specifically, the institutional 
governance structure includes the Department of Public Enterprise (DPE) as the 
shareholder ministry, the Department of Energy (DOE) where energy policies are 
formulated, the National Treasury (NT) whose role is to provide sovereign guarantees 
and to ensure compliance to the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), and the 
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA). Figure 5.4 depicts this institutional 
structure, showing Eskom’s “multiple parents”. In this sense, Eskom has a dual role in 
adhering to developmental objectives in keeping the electricity prices as affordable as 
possible (NERSA’s mandate), while also conforming to the commercial discipline 
required by DPE and NT (dti, 2013). 
As can also be seen in Figure 5.4, there are major interest groups and these include 
organised local government (South African Local Government Association, SALGA, and 
the Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings, AMEU), and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (Cosatu) who are concerned with continued affordable electricity. 
There are also the vested interests of large industrial consumers, particularly the EIUG. 
The EIUG is a tight configuration of actors from Eskom, mining and associated industries. 
Electricity supply for mining consumers must be reliable and predictable, which 
necessitates close cooperation and coordination between the state and the energy 
intensive users. This close relationship between mining and the state has concentrated 
power in a small elite group. 
 
15 Respondent A 
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Figure 5.4: Institutional governance structure of South Africa’s electricity system 
Source: Eskom (Eskom, 2018; Eskom, 2016b)  
Note: Eskom’s shareholder Ministry (to which it is formally accountable) is the 
Department of Public Enterprise. This formal relationship is represented by a solid line. 
The dotted lines represent influences on Eskom. The darker dotted lines depict formal 
government structures (DOE, National Treasury, and NERSA), and the fainter dotted 
lines depict the influence of interests’ groups. 
Lastly, the country’s electricity regulatory framework is weak. An independent electricity 
regulator has not yet been adequately established in South Africa because government 
officials do not entirely separate power and roles accordingly. Briefly, the National 
Energy Regulator (NER) regulated the electricity industry from 1995 to 2006. During this 
time, NER was meant to be independent of Eskom but was initially staffed with ex-Eskom 
personnel (dti, 2013,  p. 25; Eberhard, 2007). In 2006, NERSA replaced NER but was 
mostly reliant on cost calculations presented by Eskom and, according to interviewees, 
has lacked the necessary capabilities or capacity to challenge Eskom’s dominance16 or 
interrogate its data17. This creates a huge information asymmetry between Eskom and 
NERSA. As another interviewee18 commented, “Eskom can bury their information in 
 
16 Respondent C 
17 Respondent D  
18 Respondent E  
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reams and reams of data, and it is very difficult for the regulator to pull things out”. 
Moreover, yet other interviewees observed that “NERSA is politically weak”19 and “there 
was this sense that Eskom had regulatory capture for some time”20. 
Moreover, the DOE determines the generation capacity that is to be procured, and this 
is often subject to political decisions, and Cabinet approval, without due scrutiny from 
the regulator. According to one interviewee21, “there are cases that Eskom investment 
plans, planning methodology, and assumptions are developed confidentially without 
evaluation by NERSA but are approved by Cabinet”, and that “decisions [by NERSA] are 
made on an ‘ad hoc’ basis that is mindful of tensions between political and economic 
pressure, as opposed to a transparent and predictable methodology” (Steyn, 2012,  p. 
33). 
It should be clear from the preceding that NERSA is a weak and ineffective regulator, 
and this will tend to favour Eskom because there are insufficient mechanisms in place 
to control its actions. Overall, as an interviewee22 observed, it is difficult to prioritise 
between the numerous directives Eskom receives, especially under conditions with 
many competing variables. In general, the primary interest groups provide strong 
motivation for keeping the status quo, and for Eskom to maintain its status as a 
monopoly utility and the core set rules of cheap electricity. 
5.8 Case study analysis 
Having described the MEC and Eskom’s place within it, we now present the case study. 
Each sub-section begins with a paragraph summarising the main events or features of 
the period covered, followed by a more detailed historical account of these events and 
features. At times, we reflect the various developments back to the elements presented 
in our conceptual framework. 
 
19 Respondent D  
20 Respondent G  
21 Respondent F  
22 Respondent A.  
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 1998-2006: Energy sector reforms  
We begin our case study by discussing the period 1998 to 2006, during which the 
country’s electricity sector was the focus of significant reform efforts. A key turning 
point was the proposed introduction of private sector participation in 1998, creating a 
fundamental threat to Eskom’s monopoly status. In 2006, two new coal plants were 
commissioned, and a change in pricing methodology resulted in significant electricity 
tariff increases. These changes are essential to review because they provide contextual 
discontinuity for Eskom, making it increasingly difficult to maintain its core rules. 
Eskom’s responses to these changes – delay of market reforms and initiating debates 
away from public scrutiny – demonstrate its initial resistance strategy. 
The 1998 Energy White Paper proposed unbundling Eskom, indicating new electricity 
generation would be produced by the private sector, thereby threatening a fundamental 
shift in its monopoly status. There were indications that South Africa’s electricity system 
would adopt a competitive wholesale market as part of its market reforms (dti, 2013,  p. 
29), and the policy transferred the power of securing investment for new generation 
capacity from Eskom to the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) (Trollip et al., 
2014). Concurrently, the Energy White Paper and subsequent Integrated Energy Plans 
indicated that the country was heading towards an electricity deficit by 2008 (DME, 
1998).23 
From 1998 to 2004, the tight supply was due to major policy uncertainty at the time, as 
well as Eskom’s inability to fully comprehend the impending electricity deficit. The policy 
debate centred on uncertainty regarding the electricity market reform, due to undefined 
market rules, an immature regulator and an ideologically-based belief in parts of the 
government that private sector involvement would raise electricity prices beyond the 
affordability of most South Africans (dti, 2013). Eskom contributed to the policy 
uncertainties and confounded decision making as it downplayed fears of the impending 
generation deficit by returning-to-service previously mothballed plants (dti, 2013). 
 
23 The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) was split in 2009 to form two Ministries: the 
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Minerals and Resources (DMR). 
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As a consequence, Eskom’s proposed solutions were highly inaccurate planning 
assumptions such as inadequate maintenance plans, and low estimation of the costs of 
unserved energy (Newberry and Eberhard, 2008,  p. 61). Eskom’s responses are 
instances of ‘cognitive lock-in’ (as in cognitive rules guiding actor’s behaviour, as 
mentioned in the opening of 5.3.2), where this influences the discursive structure such 
that an incumbent typically persuades decision makers to maintain the status quo. 
Cognitive lock-in includes taken-for-granted beliefs, where an incumbent tends to 
search for incremental solutions, insensitive to new development outside their own 
focus (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
As Eskom contributed to the lack of clarity that was required for the system to adapt to 
the changes, the government reversed its decision to implement private sector 
generation. By 2005, with the electricity deficit in sight, Eskom’s resistance strategy – 
inaction and lack of compliance – had seen it successfully maintain its market 
dominance. Moreover, by this time, attempts to implement a competitive wholesale 
market were abandoned, ensuring Eskom remained a monopoly in the form of a 
compromised Single Buyer Model (SBM), tasking Eskom as the buyer of subsequent 
future generation capacity (dti, 2013). The SBM forms a crucial component for ensuring 
the continuance of Eskom’s core rules. Subsequently, from 2005, Eskom was tasked to 
build two new coal plants – Medupi and Kusile – with a combined capacity of 9.5 GW 
(Trollip et al., 2014). 
To finance the new coal plants, from 2006, the DOE changed Eskom’s pricing 
methodology in an effort to head towards cost reflectivity, changing Eskom’s core rule 
of providing cheap electricity. Eskom required NERSA’s approval of electricity price 
increases through the Multi-Year Price Determination (MYPD), a strategic phased-in 
approach that would lessen the impact of short-term electricity price increases against 
the country’s long-term economic and social goals. The MYPD covered 3-5-year cycles 
from 2006 up to 2018 (Eskom, 2012) (see Figure 5.5 for details).24 
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Figure 5.5: Eskom’s Multi-Year Price Determination (MYPD) 
Source: DOE (2013b) and NERSA (2015b) 
Note: MYPD 1= 2006-2009, MYPD 2= 2009-2012, MYPD 3=2013-2018  
 2007-2009: Major electricity crisis 
From 2007, there was a continued delay in responding to the impending electricity 
deficit, resulting in a major electricity crisis in 2008. This opened a window of 
opportunity for renewables and, by 2009, NERSA introduced a renewable energy feed-
in tariff (Refit). However, because of institutional conflicts, implementation of the Refit 
failed soon after and attempted to redress the electricity shortfall through private sector 
participation also failed. Once again, Eskom’s resistance strategy enabled its continued 
market dominance, and we see the difficulties of implementing coherent generation 
policy because of the complicated but weak institutional structure. 
Due to long lead times, commissioning the new coal plants in time was not achieved, 
nor were the return-to-service mothballed plants sufficient to ward off the electricity 
shortfall. By 2008, a major electricity crisis occurred, causing regular blackouts. Eskom, 
in this period, had contributed to a complex set of inaccurate planning assumptions that 
included inadequate maintenance plans and underestimation of the costs of unserved 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
‘06/’07 ‘07/’08 ‘08/’09 ‘09/’10 ‘10/’11 ‘11/’12 ‘12/’13 ‘13/’14 14/'15 15/'16 16/'17 17/'18
Re
al
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 p
ric
es
 (U
S 
ce
nt
s/
kW
h)
MYPD 1
MPYD 2
MYPD 3
132 
 
energy25 (Newberry and Eberhard, 2008,  p. 61). Hence, the crisis was an internal 
accumulating pressure over time, worsened by Eskom’s persistent defiance and 
indifference.  
As the electricity crisis deepened, Eskom’s core rule of ‘supplier of last resort’ was under 
threat and indicators of its operational performance were worsening.26 Two indicators, 
in particular, are indicative of plant performance: Energy Availability Factor (EAF) and 
Unplanned Capability Loss Factor27 (UCLF). The EAF was already in decline, falling from 
92% in 2001 to 85% in 2008 and, as Figure 5.6 shows, continued to decline to 70% in 
2015. Meanwhile, the energy lost due to unplanned interruptions, as measured by the 
UCLF, was also worsening. In 2001, the UCLF was 2%, but this had risen above 5% by 
2008 and continued to increase after that, reaching 15% in 2015. Therefore, Eskom had 
an internal accumulating operational challenge over time. The weakness in performance 
parameters and the steep tariff increases were together an indication that Eskom was 
losing its ability to provide both reliable and cheap electricity. Along with the electricity 
crisis, this prompted a search for alternative solutions, opening a window of opportunity 
for niches such as renewables to provide solutions to the electricity deficit. 
 
 
25 Cost of unserved energy (COUE) is an important measure of the detrimental impact to the economy of 
energy that is not reliably supplied. By estimation, the COUE in 2013 was calculated around 6 USD per 
kWh. For more see NERSA NERSA 2015a. Consultation paper on Eskom Cost of Unserved Energy (COUE). 
Pretoria: National Energy Regulator of South Africa.. 
26 Respondent L 
27 EAF measures plant availability, plus energy losses not under the control of plant management 
(external). UCLF measures the lost energy due to unplanned production interruptions. For comparison, 
an acceptable EAF would be above 80%, and an acceptable UCLF would be below 5%. 
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Figure 5.6: Eskom plant performance indicators EAF and UCLF, 2001 to 2015  
Source: Eskom (2008; 2015a) 
From 2008, as the electricity crisis intensified, the DOE continued to initiate calls for 
independent power producer (IPP) bids. However, Eskom – responsible for concluding 
the bids – repeatedly delayed decisions that would conclude preferred IPP bidders for 
co-generation, baseload projects and the medium-term power purchase programme 
(Eberhard, 2014a). Examples include failed opportunities to contract additional IPPs for 
an 800 MW Kudu gas-to-power plant in Namibia and, in 2009, a Mmamabula 1200 MW 
coal contract from Botswana (Eberhard, 2014a). Within South Africa, 125 qualifying bids 
totalling 4900 MW failed to obtain contracts from Eskom (Eberhard, 2014a). This 
demonstrates that Eskom was determined to persist with its resistance strategy, holding 
on as much as possible to its core rules by delaying market reforms and playing-down 
the need to close the generation deficit. Eskom used its dominant position in the 
electricity sector to effectively hold-off the participation of IPPs, successfully stifling 
private sector participation and retaining its market dominance. 
In 2009, in light of the electricity crisis, the DOE amended the Electricity Regulation Act 
(ERA) in order to prepare for a large-scale renewable energy project with private sector 
developers (more in Section 5.8.3).  Around the same time, NERSA initiated the 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (Refit), which it had been developing since 2007. 
However, NERSA overstepped its mandate as it initiated upfront legally-binding tariffs 
ahead of the DOE, and there was also uncertainty in the process of procurement and 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
U
CL
F 
(%
)
EA
F 
(%
)
Year
EAF UCLF
134 
 
licensing, and financial assumptions (Eberhard and Kåberger, 2016; Baker, 2014). 
Consequently, from 2009-2011, the DOE and National Treasury took the lead with a 
series of informal consultations from the private sector, and lawyers and financial 
institutions dealing with renewable energy. Through these consultations, a crucial 
feedback and learning process transpired, with the design, legal and regulatory 
framework and technological details being discussed (Eberhard and Kåberger, 2016). 
Subsequently, a competitive bidding process called the Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producers Procurement Programme (RE I4P) was launched by DOE from August 
2011, while NERSA ceased the Refit (Eberhard and Kåberger, 2016). Despite the 
withdrawal of Refit, its development process had the effect of widening participation, 
interests and learning in the electricity sector. A similar process unfolded in the 
development of the RE I4P, and the two processes combined formed an essential 
platform on which the RE I4P could later build, as we discuss in the next section. 
 2009-2015: Layering of the RE I4P 
From 2009 onwards, the new pricing methodology (discussed in Section 5.8.1) resulted 
in significant tariff increases. This had the effect of challenging Eskom’s ability to 
maintain its core rule of providing affordable electricity. This period marked a significant 
window of opportunity, with the successful layering of a new institution – the RE I4P – 
that promoted renewables. We describe this layering process here, examining the 
conditions that could explain why it was successful. The success was due, we argue, to 
a combination of a sufficiently developed niche and a transparent RE I4P bidding process 
that entailed greater involvement of actors external to the regime-incumbent (e.g. 
private sector, and greater public participation). This led to the rapid implementation of 
the RE I4P, followed by significant deployment of renewables and in turn steep 
reductions in their bid prices. During this period, it seemed, Eskom’s resistance strategy 
was failing, and the renewables niche was becoming a threat to its dominance. 
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Figure 5.7: Eskom’s average approved tariff increases relative to the consumer price 
index (CPI) 
Source: Eskom (2015b; 2015a,  p. 2) 
As the pricing methodology changed, the average tariff-increase from 2009 to 2012 was 
consistently above the inflation rate. From 2009 to 2015, cumulative tariff increases 
were over 100% causing major price shocks, and extensive criticism from residential and 
industrial customers not accustomed to such changes (Figure 5.7). Indications were that 
Eskom could no longer provide cheap electricity and, therefore, its core rules became 
increasingly challenging to maintain. Therefore, Eskom was experiencing a period of 
instability, resulting in regime tensions. 
As the MYPD was implemented, NERSA subjected Eskom to public hearings, exposing it 
to open and visible scrutiny of its operations. Thousands of responses were received 
from the public after NERSA invited comments on Eskom’s proposed MYPD328 , and 
these were crucial in securing gradual tariff increases (dti, 2013,  p. 153). However, 
whilst open discussions were taking place between the public and NERSA, another 
 
28 See “Invitation for stakeholders to submit written comments on Eskom’s third Multi-Year Price 
Determination (MYPD 3) application”, available at [accessed 1 August 2018] 
http://www.nersa.org.za/Admin/Document/Editor/file/Notices/Invitations/Invitation%20to%20comme
nt%20on%20Eskom%27s%20Third%20Multi-
Year%20Price%20Determination%20%28MYPD3%29%20application.pdf  
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debate was taking place out of sight between the EIUG and Eskom, as an EIUG member29 
explained: 
“The EIUG made sure to decline [NERSA] public hearings, as we do not want to 
be seen as a lobby group. Instead, we make it clear that we are a technical, fact-
based group. As a group that has skin in the game, we do not want to strain 
Eskom relationship unnecessarily. We recognise that Eskom is our main 
electricity supplier, and maintaining relationships is important. This strategy of 
providing technical reports to Eskom and sharing it without public scrutiny has 
worked for us.” 
Respondent I 
 
Here, we observe that the close relations between Eskom and EIUG enabled information 
asymmetry between them and the public. Eskom was able to make use of the regime’s 
organisational networks and capacity to engage in the regime-internal debate using 
privileged information and resources, further allowing it to realise its resistance 
strategy.  
As the electricity crisis continued to grow, the window of opportunity for renewables 
widened. In 2009, in a layering process, the DOE ratified an amendment to the Electricity 
Regulation Act to introduce the New Generation Capacity (Trollip et al., 2014). Then, in 
2011, this layering process continued with the introduction of the RE I4P, which 
allocated 17.8 GW of new renewable energy generating capacity by 2025 (DOE, 2015b). 
We can describe the RE I4P as layered because it co-exists alongside Eskom’s single 
buyer model, but does not attack Eskom’s position directly nor replace it: Eskom 
retained its dominant position because it maintained control over what electricity it was 
buying. 
The RE I4P was able to build on the failed previous efforts such as the Refit, as those 
who had been part of Refit were still present. Geels and Schot (2007) argue that a niche 
must be sufficiently developed before it can exploit a window of opportunity opening in 
a regime. In this sense, the renewables niche might have been sufficiently developed to 
take advantage of the RE I4P in contrast to what it was able to achieve under Refit. 
 
29 Respondent I 
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However, beyond the readiness of the renewables niche, other conditions might have 
helped the RE I4P to succeed in comparison with the Refit. RE I4P’s layering entailed 
transparent bidding windows, with the public being informed about the successful 
bidders and what the criteria were (Eberhard et al., 2014; Eberhard, 2016). Moreover, 
the IPP office within the DOE was decisive in gaining supportive partnership and 
cooperation between the DOE and National Treasury, mitigating Eskom’s dominance by 
exploiting the IPP office’s ambiguous institutional status (Eberhard et al., 2014). The IPP 
office is an ad hoc entity within the DOE, staffed by more than one hundred private 
consultants with less than a handful of permanent staff from the government (Eberhard, 
2016). However, the staff in the IPP office have, according to an interviewee30, respected 
experience in public-private partnerships. This enabled mutual trust and relative ease of 
information flow between the IPP office and private sector to test the bidding process 
before its implementation.31  
Moreover, the somewhat successful introduction of the RE I4P did not require, nor did 
it result in, a complete destabilisation of the regime incumbent. Instead, the RE I4P and 
the burgeoning renewables niche co-existed alongside the dominance of Eskom. 
Explaining the success of renewables in this period compared with prior efforts includes 
recognition of the readiness of the niche, developed in part under Refit, and the fact 
that the RE I4P was implemented in a highly transparent manner. This had the effect of 
undermining Eskom’s resistance strategy by shifting some of the debate into the public 
domain, resonating with the Hacker et al. (2015) notion that shifting contestation into 
the public arena enables the development of dissenting or alternative narratives. In 
other words, the electricity crisis and the RE I4P layering did precisely what regime 
actors were trying to avoid: contestation was now out in the open, resulting in the 
scrutiny of the incumbent’s actions, along with increased availability of information 
through the transparent bidding process.   
It can be argued that, in the context of a persistent electricity-supply crisis, the 
combination of institutional capacity in the IPP office and the rapid deployment of 
renewables led to steep reductions in their bid prices (Eberhard, 2014; Steyn et al., 2017; 
 
30 Respondent K 
31 Respondent K 
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DOE, 2015b). Up to 2015, South Africa had procured approximately 5 GW in four bidding 
windows across 77 renewable energy generation projects (Sovacool et al., 2018; DOE, 
2015a). Further, as Figure 5.8 shows, the bid prices reduced significantly in this period, 
especially for solar PV, becoming competitive with the new coal plants Medupi and 
Kusile. 
 
Figure 5.8: Average tariffs of PV and wind over time, compared with Medupi and Kusile 
Source: DOE (2015a) and Steyn et al. (2017) 
 2015-2018: Evolution of Eskom’s resistance strategy 
By 2015, the RE I4P had gained enough traction that Eskom began to accept the 
renewables niche as an inevitable reality. However, as we discuss in this sub-section, 
Eskom continued to pursue its resistance strategy and even to evolve it. It delayed the 
progress of the RE I4P by blocking power purchase agreements (PPAs), changing its grid-
connection rules, and stimulating the support of influential trade unions to provoke 
sentiments around job losses from decommissioning coal plants. Moreover, there are 
claims that Eskom has become a tool for graft, in which procurement allocations are 
being redirected to benefit powerful elites (PP, 2016; Budlender, 2017; Bhorat et al., 
2017). This demonstrates the significance of Eskom amongst its organisational networks 
and prevailing discursive structures, which may have reasons to maintain the state-
owned utility’s dominant position. 
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Eskom, in 2015, used its monopoly status to block the signing of PPAs with RE I4P 
developers (Eskom, 2015a). It did so by preventing the developers from getting budget 
quotes, which had the effect of stalling the finalisation of PPAs. Without these further 
PPAs, the RE I4P was incomplete and, as an interviewee32 explained, this had created 
uncertainty around the programme. Here, we see Eskom’s resistance strategy effected 
through delaying tactics and through information asymmetry, whereby others within 
the electricity system are prevented from scrutinising its data (Makgetla, 2016). In 
addition, from July 2016 onwards, Eskom discontinued detailed weekly operational 
efficiency reports that included demand and capacity forecasts. Publishing these 
updates annually seems to have an effect of decreasing public transparency.33 
Later, Eskom’s resistance strategy continued to advance, creating another barrier to the 
RE I4P by imposing additional grid-connection costs on RE developers. Essentially, the 
RE I4P developers are supposed to pay for ‘shallow’ costs of getting power to the 
substations, while Eskom is responsible for ‘deep connections’ that relate to the 
reinforcements needed to integrate new capacity into the existing grid (Eskom, 2013a). 
As an interviewee34 explained, an unfortunate design of the RE I4P is that the bidding 
system prioritises the allocation of RE I4P by price and not by substation capacity or 
location. The transmission grid originated from the coalfields in the Mpumalanga in 
South Africa’s North East and expanded according to where the cities grew. However, 
the Northern Cape has the best solar radiation, located on the North-Western side, 
where the population is sparse, and thus grid transmission is lacking. As the RE I4P was 
implemented, the project developers had to bid within an available substation capacity. 
The policy objective was to obtain the cheapest megawatt possible, without long-term 
consideration for grid strengthening. After several years of the RE I4P, the substation 
availability for connection was quickly depleted. It can be argued that the DOE and 
NERSA had probably failed to anticipate the rapid implementation of the RE I4P, and 
therefore neglected the costs needed for Eskom to strengthen the grid. Eskom exploited 
 
32 Respondent H.  
33 Respondent E 
34 Respondent J 
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this flaw by imposing additional costs on RE I4P developers, which had the effect of 
further complicating the progress of the renewables programme.35 
Consequently, Eskom created unfavourable (to the niche) selection-environment 
conditions along with the technology and infrastructure dimension, impeding the RE I4P 
from further development.36 Altogether, as Eberhard (2016) observes, “Eskom 
frustrates the entry of IPPs and private investment through the disingenuous use of 
facts, the political brinkmanship and what lawyers term malicious compliance, through 
the quiet subversion of government policy by actions such as delayed access or inflated 
grid-connection costs for IPPs.” 
Eskom continued to impede the progress of the RE I4P with a further evolution of its 
resistance strategy, this time by provoking opposition to renewables from the country’s 
major trade unions – the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (NUMSA) and the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Eskom stated that to continue with the RE I4P, 
it needed to hasten the decommissioning of five older coal stations.37 Consequently, the 
NUM countered with rolling mass action (such as nationwide strikes) to reverse the RE 
I4P because of the threat to coal jobs. As of January 2018, the RE I4P was at an impasse, 
with Eskom repeatedly stating that the programme was unaffordable. In response, RE 
I4P developers initiated lawsuits forcing Eskom to conclude PPAs.38 
Eventually, after almost three years where the RE I4P remained stuck, in April 2018, the 
remaining bids were signed by a new DOE Minister, partly due to a broader change in 
national political leadership. This is evidence of the ‘makeshift’ governance we noted in 
Section 5.7, which is highly sensitive to the political weather and contributes to 
uncertain conditions in the electricity system. Consequently, with these erratic 
conditions, Eskom can respond to decisions that do not suit its interests either passively 
or more offensively using powerful allies. Moreover, with this ad hoc governance, it is 
 
35 Respondent D, J. 
36 Respondent K 
37 van Rensburg, D., ‘New twist in IPP battle as Eskom may close stations early’, fin24, 9 April 2017, 
http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/new-twist-in-ipp-battle-as-eskom-may-close-stations-early-
20170407 Accessed 15 February 2019 
38 Coen, M. and Bruckhardt, P., ‘Eskom threatens fastest renewable expansion’, Mail & Guardian, 6 
December 2016, https://mg.co.za/article/2016-12-06-eskom-threatens-fastest-renewable-expansion 
Accessed 1 February 2018 
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unclear how the RE I4P proceeds, as progress is subject to ongoing decisions by 
government on Eskom’s future. For now, it is too early to ascertain if Eskom’s resistance 
strategy will continue to undermine the RE I4P or if there could be long-lasting changes 
through which Eskom’s dominance is eventually eroded. 
5.9 Discussion  
By examining struggles over rule-changes to a multi-dimensional selection environment, 
we were able to reveal the dynamic nature of regime-resistance and regime-niche 
interactions. Furthermore, in agreement with Streeck and Thelen (2005), examining 
endogenous institutional change was useful for exposing the regime tensions that, in 
the case of South African electricity-supply, ultimately contributed to the crisis. In this 
way, we were able to discern the internal regime-resistance strategy, which would 
otherwise be overlooked from a traditional punctuated (exogenous) equilibrium point 
of view. 
In our case study, Eskom sought to maintain its long-standing dominance primarily by 
using a strategy of resistance to rule-changes, attempting to achieve what endogenous 
institutional change theory calls drift. In this theory, drift – as ‘holding on to rules’ – is 
enabled when powerful actors can confine debate over rule-changes to hidden spaces, 
disabling public scrutiny and, in effect, disarticulating contesting narratives. Our 
adaptation of the drift concept involved translating it to the notion of a socio-political 
regime, which theorises debate to be conditioned by discursive structures comprised of 
prevailing ideologies and beliefs. In our rendering of the drift concept, we posited that 
a regime-incumbent is more likely to maintain existing discursive structures and so can 
set the terms of the debate. 
The period up to 2009 in our case study supports the proposition that a resistance 
strategy is enabled when a powerful actor can confine debate over rule-changes to 
hidden spaces and has a dominating influence over the terms of the debate. During this 
period, Eskom kept the deliberation about electricity-market reforms out of the public 
gaze, aided by those users closely connected to it within its organisational networks, 
especially those aligned with the MEC, such as the EIUG. As for setting the terms of 
debate, Eskom employed several tactics to maintain dominance over discursive 
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structures including downplaying fears about the anticipated electricity-supply deficit 
and exploiting both information asymmetry and the ‘multiple parents’ arrangement of 
the governance institutions. We also see the resistance strategy having material 
consequences in Eskom's inaction over PPAs and the eventual suspension of market 
reforms. However, our theoretical propositions were not so clearly supported in the 
case from 2009. Here, we see Eskom was still able to affect a resistance strategy even 
though the debate shifted into public contestation, as the renewables niche made 
significant material gains. 
Reconciling the apparent anomaly between our theoretical propositions for drift and the 
observed outcomes requires considering what is revealed by the attempts to layer-on 
renewables-supportive institutions. We conceived layering to mean the addition of an 
institution that does not challenge, at first, the core rules of the regime. The first attempt 
at market reforms could be seen as a challenge to the regime incumbent’s core rules, 
and therefore not a layering process, as the intention was to unbundle Eskom and 
stipulate the private sector produce 30% of electricity generation. What followed was a 
single buyer model, where Eskom retained its monopoly status, ensuring its continued 
dominance in the electricity market. Thus, the attempted introduction of Refit conforms 
more closely to a layering process in that it was not a direct and significant challenge to 
Eskom's core rules. 
Nevertheless, it was unclear whether Eskom would fully support Refit or continue with 
its resistance strategy of delaying any PPAs needed for Refit's implementation. In the 
end, Refit's failure had less to do with Eskom than with battles between the electricity 
governance institutions – DOE, National Treasury and NERSA – and Refit’s uncertain 
legality. However, the Refit episode did stimulate some important development of the 
renewables niche. It linked new actors – renewable energy project developers, lawyers 
and financial institutions – with the electricity regime’s governance institutions. The 
consultations amongst these new actors and the governance institutions began the 
process of building trust and creating learning around what policy and regulatory 
frameworks would be needed to support renewables deployment. By engaging new 
actors who could now exert some influence over the regime's discursive structure, Refit 
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began a process of changing the selection environment, even if only partially and 
incrementally, opening a space that the RE I4P was able to expand and exploit. 
The eventual layering of the RE I4P was preceded by a process that included further 
consultations between the electricity governance institutions and actors in the 
renewables niche, which enabled the building of mutual trust and learning about the 
design, legal and technology issues relevant to the proposed bidding process, along with 
testing of the bidding process prior to its implementation. All this occurred in the context 
of a widening window of opportunity created by the electricity-supply crisis and steeply 
increasing electricity tariffs. Both these aspects of the window of opportunity were in 
effect attacks on Eskom's core rules – in some ways, self-inflicted attacks, considering 
Eskom’s resistance strategy and its intention to finance new coal plants through raised 
electricity tariffs. We see, then, new actors strengthening their relations with the 
regime's governance institutions and growing influence over its discursive structures 
resulting in the successful addition of a new rule that would enable significant gains for 
the renewables niche (for more see [Parliamentary Monitoring Group] PMG (2011; 
2012; 2018). However, because of the prior gains under the failed Refit effort, the 
renewables niche was sufficiently developed to exploit the window of opportunity more 
effectively. 
Although the RE I4P managed to stimulate the addition of significant renewables 
capacity to the electricity supply, Eskom returned to its resistance strategy of delaying 
the finalisation of PPAs, this time by exploiting its monopoly position when it withheld 
budget quotes. However, Eskom also evolved its resistance strategy by attempting to 
influence beliefs within the dominant discursive structure when it threatened the loss 
of jobs for coal workers because decreasing the contribution of coal-fired electricity 
generation would mean the closure of coal mines. Here, we see Eskom itself had moved 
contestation into the public arena, making use of its powerful position on four 
dimensions of the regime selection environment: organisational networks (mobilising 
key trades unions), discursive structures (information asymmetry, the job-losses 
narrative), markets, and public policies (delayed finalisation of PPAs). Moreover, the 
other element of its resistance strategy involved making use of the uncertainty over 
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infrastructural rules, such as who is responsible for the costs of new substation capacity, 
to impose extra costs on RE I4P developers. 
Taken together, we have revealed the dynamics of regime-resistance to niche-
challenges as played out between the incumbent Eskom and renewables actors in the 
battle over rule-changes to South Africa's electricity supply system (see Table 5.3 for a 
summary). Not only does this help us understand how Eskom has sought to maintain its 
dominance and how renewables have been able to make some inroads to the regime, 
but it also provides potential implications for policies aimed at sustainability transitions. 
 
Table 5.3 A summary of the case study and the types of regime resistance and niche 
challenges over time 
Case study period Regime-resistance Niche-challenges 
1998-2006 
Energy sector reforms 
Eskom used its power over 
the regime’s discursive 
structure to persuade 
decision makers to maintain 
the status quo. 
There was no appreciable 
niche at the time as this was 
only the early stage of 
renewables development. 
Consequently, we see no 
discernible niche challenges. 
2007-2009 
Major electricity crisis 
Eskom blocked market 
reforms through delayed 
decisions in contracting IPP 
bidders.  
Refit was initiated, 
catalysing learning processes 
associated with the design, 
technical, legal and 
regulatory framework 
needed for promoting 
renewable energy in South 
Africa. 
2009-2015 
Layering of the RE I4P 
Eskom tried to keep 
electricity-sector debates 
hidden from public scrutiny 
by making use of its 
organisational networks and 
capacity.   
The RE I4P was implemented 
in a transparent manner, 
shifting debate into the 
public domain. This 
influenced the regime’s 
discursive structure, 
changing the terms of 
debate by introducing new 
facts and gaining public 
support. 
2015-2018 
Evolution of Eskom’s 
resistance strategy 
Eskom moved debate into 
the public domain, 
provoking key trades unions 
in its organisational 
Niche actors engaged in 
policy debates, 
strengthening their relations 
with the regime's 
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networks to engage in 
industrial action by 
promoting a job-losses 
narrative. It also delayed 
finalisation of PPAs and 
changed the grid rules to 
impose extra costs on niche 
actors.   
governance institutions, 
resulting in growing 
influence over the regime’s 
discursive structure.  
 
Policymakers could, for example, use the approach to characterise the power of specific 
incumbents to resist transitions and then use this characterisation to construct 
strategies for eroding this power in favour of more sustainable regimes. With reference 
to the selection environment dimensions, an effective destabilisation process could 
entail the following: (1) in the market, reducing the support for the incumbent 
technology (e.g. a final clarity on Eskom’s unbundling as it may remove monopolist 
interest that is hostile to IPPs); (2) disrupting organisational networks and capacity by 
promoting more inclusive participation of niche actors in policy debates, and 
establishing organisations that favour new entrants with systemic linkages into formal 
governance structures; (3) developing alternative discursive structures by creating 
conditions that interrogate dominant narratives, working in spaces that are transparent 
(e.g. opening up debates to more public scrutiny and divergent interests); (4) ensuring 
public policies create regulatory pressure to, for example, reduce greenhouse gases; and 
(5) adapting technology and infrastructure rules to favour modular generation with 
flexible demand and distributed energy networks. Working across all these dimensions 
together would then be a systematic and targeted process towards regime 
destabilisation along with the promotion of more sustainable niches. 
5.10 Conclusion  
In this paper, we have analysed how the dominant incumbent in South Africa’s electricity 
system, Eskom, tried to resist changes to the system’s institutional arrangements that 
would promote the renewable energy-based generation and therefore be detrimental 
to its coal-based interests. Drawing on the modes drift and layering from institutional 
change theory, we operationalised the concept of the socio-technical regime selection 
environment in specific ways that could be analysed as a battleground over rule-
changes. 
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We found that, over the period 1998 to 2018, Eskom evolved its resistance strategy in 
response to variously successful challenges employed by actors in the renewables niche. 
Eskom’s resistance strategy began simply with a refusal to implement electricity market 
reforms that would have eroded its market dominance. However, as renewables began 
to achieve incremental gains from layering-on rule-additions to the existing institutions, 
Eskom evolved its resistance strategy by acting across more of the selection 
environment’s dimensions. Eventually, Eskom’s strategy involved attempts to publicly-
contest the rise of renewables, which included exploiting information asymmetries to 
influence public discourse and provoking mining unions to engage in industrial action. 
However, the move to publicly-contest renewables opened Eskom to closer scrutiny, 
with opportunities for the renewables niche to influence the discursive structure of the 
selection environment and the eventual addition of the Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producer’s Procurement Programme, which has enabled an increase in 
renewables generating capacity of 3.6 GW (DOE, 2018a). 
The case study shows that regime-resistance can be characterised as the incumbent 
actively maintaining the selection environment in response to attempts on the part of 
the niche-challenger to transform it. These findings have potential policy implications 
where specific dimensions of the selection environment that enable or enhance regime-
resistance can be identified. In doing so, counter-strategies can be developed that 
achieve some degree of regime destabilisation and thereby open a window of 
opportunity for a more sustainable niche to exploit. We note, in particular, the 
significance of influencing the selection environment’s discursive structure where, in the 
case study, we saw how the niche was able to change the terms of debate, exacerbate 
regime tensions and gain public support. These insights emerge from only a single case 
study and so further research, making use of the multi-dimensional selection 
environment concept and analysing regime-resistance and niche-challenges, would be 
helpful for seeing the extent to which similar dynamics play out elsewhere and in other 
kinds of regimes. Such research could take a systematic approach to examine battles 
over rule-changes, building case studies that compare different types of institutional 
change that hollow out the regime, with the potential to lead to a genuine sustainability 
transition. 
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6.1 Abstract  
Increasingly it is recognised that regimes in transitions can promote niches rather than 
resist them.   Using a combination of the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) and institutional 
theory, this paper contributes to the transitions literature on multiple regime 
interactions, by providing a more nuanced understanding of why and how regimes 
interact over time. Using semi-structured interviews, the case study explored South 
Africa's development of its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) for power generation and 
industrial use together, considered as the niche.  The two regimes were coal-based 
electricity and liquid fuels. This case study revealed the co-evolutionary nature of 
multiple regime interactions through repurposing existing institutions in response to 
increasing landscape pressures and regime tension over time. However, the repurposing 
of existing rules was neither spontaneous nor automatic but required a series of 
cohesive efforts for linkages between the two regimes. These efforts involved the 
ongoing interface between a broad base community with interests in the LNG niche, 
which over time provided a supportive environment in which to complement shared 
resources. Understanding multiple regime interactions has potential implications on the 
‘acceleration’ of niche development whereby new institutions are not necessarily 
created but rather repurpose existing ones to serve new goals or interests. The paper 
also reflects on temporal policy overlaps aimed at sustainability transitions where a 
policy instrument initially used for renewables could be co-opted by more powerful 
actors in a direction that may strengthen a fossil fuel-based system. Thus, special 
attention needs to be paid to the relationship between the flexibility of some policy 
instruments and the dominant groups which may leverage them for its own interests.   
6.2 Introduction  
This paper examines how multiple regime interactions enable the development of a 
niche through a series of cohesive efforts in repurposing existing regime rules.  
Understanding multiple regime interactions is essential in transitions research because 
it can counter the bias of bottom-up niche development (Geels, 2011), as well as 
standalone regime transformations (Papachristos et al., 2013; Raven, 2007; Sutherland 
et al., 2015; Konrad et al., 2008).  Moreover, there is limited deliberation on the role of 
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landscape pressures, and regime tensions on multiple regime interactions, which are 
indeed central to sustainability transitions research (Sutherland et al., 2015).   
To examine multiple regime interactions, this research presents a case study on South 
Africa’s development of gas-fired generation in the electricity system and industrial use. 
In 2015, South Africa introduced an independent gas power producers’ procurement 
programme (Gas I4P)39, to procure 3.7 GW of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to power (DOE, 
2016).  At present, gas contributes around 3% of the country’s primary energy mix, but 
there are indications that gas will feature more strongly in the future (DOE, 2018b).  
Although gas is not carbon neutral, it is considered cleaner than coal, and it could enable 
reduced dependence on coal while other sources of renewables are being developed 
(Moniz et al., 2011).  However, as this thesis will show, closing a ‘gas bridge’ may not be 
easy at it will mean having to deal with the vested interests and path dependencies by 
any gas-related socio-technical system.  
Moreover, there are a diversity of drivers pursuing gas which are; energy diversification, 
as a means to reduce GHG emissions from electricity generation; as a potential to 
provide flexibility for the introduction of renewable generation into the electricity grid; 
and as an opportunity for regional trade within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (DOE, 2016).   
The research question is:  What explains a regime’s interactions in the course of 
developing South Africa’s LNG for power and industrial use?   
To answer this question, the case study uses the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP), whereby 
the two regimes are electricity and liquid fuels, and LNG for power and industrial use 
was considered a niche.  As this paper aims to advance the concept of multiple regime 
interactions, the analytical work is based on analysing rule changes which are expected 
to reveal different types of regime interactions.  It is well known in transitions research 
that regime actors are not passive rule followers but are ‘knowledgeable agents’  that 
can reflect and engage in ways other than their taken for granted social rules (Geels and 
Schot, 2010,  p. 34). Given that rules are informed by institutional theory, this research 
 
39 For consistency Gas I4P is used throughout the paper. 
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draws on the concepts of conversion which observe the efforts employed by both 
regimes to develop a niche.  The conversion was developed by institutional scholars and 
is defined as the repurposing or redirection of existing rules for new ends (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005).  
As discussed later, existing rules between the two regimes were repurposed over time, 
as a response to pressures from landscape changes and regime tensions.  As such, 
viewed from a multi-level perspective, increasing pressures from the landscape and the 
electricity regime influenced the search heuristics from a local to distant search (Geels, 
2014a,  p. 271). In this way, it gradually integrated more radical alternatives and 
explorations of new knowledge bases. The South African case study demonstrated that 
to develop the LNG niche, several cohesive efforts of alignment between the electricity 
and liquid fuels regime became necessary.  At first, the efforts involved repurposing an 
existing policy instrument which was initially used for renewable energy from an 
independent power producers’ procurement programme (RE I4P)40 but later procured 
gas and coal also from independent power producers (IPPs). Then, as the required 
technical and operational parameters needed for the LNG niche matured, so did the 
level of interaction between the two regimes.  A series of activities followed which were 
premised on importing LNG for power generation and industrial use.  Therefore, a broad 
base of actors became part of the LNG development, which included national and local 
governments, societal groups, finance, industry stakeholders, the environment and the 
research community. These served as a supportive and collaborative community on 
which the repurposing of rules became conceivable.   
This paper argues that the repurposing of existing rules between regimes can provide 
insights for advancing the literature on multiple regime interactions which in turn has 
implications on niche development. The paper concludes with some reflections on the 
implications that policy instruments may be vulnerable to co-option by dominant groups 
that could re-direct them away from sustainable transitions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 6.3 sets out the conceptual framework and gives 
due consideration to the critical concepts of the conceptual framework, which is a 
 
40 For consistency the RE I4P, is used throughout the paper. 
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combination of the MLP with an institutional lens of conversion. Section 6.4 discusses 
the methodology used for the research; Section 6.5 provides an overview of South 
Africa’s liquid fuels history, and electricity as regimes, describing how the multiple 
regimes emerged to create a favourable environment for the development of Gas I4P.  
Section 6.6 draws together the main findings in the paper and concludes in Section 6.7 
with suggested contributions to the empirical and theoretical research.   
6.3 Conceptual framework  
  Conceptualising multiple regimes in transitions research  
The notion of transitions is regarded as co-evolutionary changes between socio-
technical systems, actors and social networks, and socio-technical regimes (Foxon, 2011; 
Geels and Schot, 2010). One of the most common frameworks used in transitions 
research is the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP). The MLP defines transitions which 
interface changes at three levels: innovative practices (niche experiments), structure 
(the regime), and long-term, exogenous trends (the landscape) (Geels and Schot, 2010). 
The MLP considers the interaction between all three levels in a given time as part of the 
process of transitions (Raven and Verbong, 2007). These three levels are regarded as 
functional relationships between actors, structures, and practices that are closely 
interlinked.  Furthermore, the higher the scale level, the more aggregated the 
components and the relationships, and the slower the dynamics are between these 
actors, structures and working practices (Grin et al., 2010). 
The regime tends to lock in processes because of mutual interdependencies and 
alignment over time, such that path dependency and incremental change are likely 
(Smith and Raven, 2012). Where radical innovation does take place is in the form of 
protected spaces, so-called niches. Landscape changes, such as global trends or climate 
change concerns, may exert pressure onto the regime resulting in destabilising effects 
and for niches to develop.  Transitions within the MLP frame start in socio-technical 
niches, and diffuse and breakthrough due to the linkages between developments at 
multiple levels (Geels and Schot, 2010). The assumption is that as a niche matures, it 
scales up and diffuses, resulting in overthrowing the incumbent regime, eventually 
leading to either transformation or replacement of the dominant regime. However, 
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there are other scholars who recognised that regimes also drive innovation at the niche 
level, depending on the economic opportunity (Berggren et al., 2015). For instance, in 
analysing hybrid electric powertrains, Berggren et al. (2015) noted that an incumbent, 
which drove innovation in a systemic, integrated approach, had good potential in scaling 
up niches such that technological applications had vertical integration and broader 
market adoption.  To elaborate, incumbents used existing knowledge resources to 
leverage the development of new technologies and applied innovation across a variety 
of market segments, as well as providing insights into performance requirements such 
as efficiency, functionality and costs. In this way, the incumbent took advantage of 
existing resources to support and develop the technological niche.  
Moreover, standalone regime transformations have been criticised given the 
interrelatedness of complex sociotechnical systems (Papachristos et al., 2013). As such, 
a few researchers have revealed various ways in which multiple regimes can interact, 
and these include: (1) competing with each other in order to fulfil similar societal 
functions; (2) complementary relations, e.g. a natural gas regime providing a steady 
source of supply to the electricity regime; (3) shared structural similarities, as a result of 
which, separate regimes merge into one; and (4) through spillover effects as a result of 
the transfer of rules to another (Raven and Verbong, 2007; Raven, 2007). Multiple 
regimes can also interact via ‘functional coupling’ such as input-output relationships 
(Konrad et al., 2008), or ‘structural coupling’ between infrastructures, for instance, 
telecommunications using electricity cables (Schot and Kanger, 2018). Konrad et al. 
(2008) asserted that multiple regime dynamics require consideration because socio-
technical transformations often entail overlaps or shared boundaries across regimes 
such that producers and consumers have closer linkages.  For example, Konrad et al. 
(2008) indicated that from 1920 to the 1990s, closer multiple regime interactions with 
electricity, gas, water, sanitation and telecommunications developed due to their 
structural (actors, infrastructures and institutions) similarities.  Likewise, Geels (2011), 
argued that as niches mature, there is a need to interact between two or more regimes, 
for instance, biofuels link to agriculture and transport, or battery powered vehicles links 
to transport and electricity. 
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The research on multiple regime interactions highlights the potential of ‘accelerating’ 
niche development through the efforts encouraged by regimes. This then offers an 
opportunity in understanding transitions as less bottom up and could conceivably be 
realised through multiple regime interactions.  One of the possible means to analyse 
multiple regime interactions is through the concept of rules, given that it forms a central 
coordinating and guiding features of regimes (Geels and Schot, 2010).  Rules in the form 
of normative, regulative and cognitive, provide the functional relationship between 
material resources, actors and organisational networks within the socio-technical 
regime (Genus and Coles, 2008; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016). This research expects that a 
focus on rule changes are likely to reveal the types of interactions between regimes.  The 
next section discusses in further detail, the linkages between rules and the regime.   
 Socio-technical regime and rules 
It is well recognised in transitions research that the socio-technical regime is informed 
by institutional theory, whereby rules are embedded in structures that are both the 
context and outcome of actions (Geels, 2004a; Geels, 2011).  These structures are 
established through a semi-coherent alignment of normative (values, behavioural 
norms), cognitive (belief systems, perceptions, search heuristics) and regulatory rules 
(regulations and standards) (Geels and Schot, 2007).  According to Geels (2014a), regime 
actors could draw on their structures through deliberate strategy, intentionality, and the 
interpretation of rules. Therefore, the recognition is that regime actors are not ‘cultural 
dopes’, but are instead ‘knowledgeable agents’, that go beyond routine base actions, 
whereby learning, anticipation and deviating from existing norms are conceived (Geels 
and Schot, 2010).  
More recently, Schot and Kanger (2018) have indicated that rules are exchangeable in a 
way that variations exist in scope (rules in single or multi-systems) and whether there 
are single rules or rule-sets in multi-systems. This then allows for the possibility of 
understanding rules as transferable or negotiable by regime actors, in such a way that it 
could be redirected or repurposed for new goals. However, there is a lack of research 
which operationalises the concepts of repurposing rules in regimes, which may provide 
useful insights into multiple regime interactions.  Repurposing rules may also shed some 
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light in accelerating transitions, as new institutions are not necessarily created but 
instead redirected towards new goals. It is for these reasons that the current paper sets 
its aims, in which repurposing rules are tested in South Africa’s LNG development.   
 
  Rule-changes and institutional theory  
Building on the ideas of rules, which are derived from institutional theory, a group of 
scholars have developed concepts to delineate four different types of rules changes and 
these refer to drift, layering, conversion and displacement applied in political science 
research (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  To elaborate: drift is 
when formal rules are deliberately held constant in the face of significant shifts causing 
their outcomes to change; layering when new rules are added alongside old ones; 
conversion is a redirection or repurposing existing rules for new purposes, and 
displacement is the replacement of old rules with entirely new ones.  I focus specifically 
on adapting conversion as it translates into a broader set of repurposed regime rules, 
which could reveal how shared resources are effectively used.   
  Conversion: Repurposing existing rules 
Conversion defines institutions as ‘multipurpose tools’ (Hacker, 2015), and refers to the 
transformation of existing rules through redirection, reinterpretation and re-
appropriation depending on which political or economic force is powerful enough to 
control them in their favour (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Hacker, 2015). Institutions are 
therefore subject to mediation and contestation over which functions and purposes 
they should serve. Moreover, the actors that were responsible for the creation of rules 
may be different from those who were in charge of shaping and operating them over 
time. Thus, it is likely that given enough time, the interpretation of rules becomes a 
variable, as various actors enact them in different ways.  According to Hacker (2015), 
dismantling and creating new institutions is often challenging because there are 
significant hurdles and barriers in the collective action to do so. Therefore, conversion 
is a way of sidestepping these efforts by repurposing existing institutions into new 
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directions or goals.  The next section defines the rules, as they are understood in 
transition research, using these as a basis for the analytical framework. 
 Defining the rules 
For this paper, I follow Geels (Geels, 2014a,  p. 267) description of ‘industrial regime’, 
which focuses on industry-specific institutions that guide the responses of firms in 
industries. The ‘industrial regime’ was used because of the ways in which a regime could 
respond to specific interests, shared mindsets, cognitive frames and industrial identity 
and mission (Geels, 2014).   
For this paper, the following regime rules are considered, 1) cognitive 2) normative and 
3) regulative rules.  To elaborate on these rules, a description is further described below.   
Cognitive rules refer to industrial mindsets and cognitive frames, which influence 
interpretations, strategic choices and decisions (Geels, 2014a,  p. 267). Strategic 
responses can include mutual expectations in a way that legitimises choices in specific 
configurations over others, as well as the inclusion or exclusion of artefacts (Berkhout, 
2006). Taken together, responses and choices form shared mind-sets in industries which 
contribute to cognitive inertia because actors tend to search for solutions within their 
own sphere of activity.   
Normative rules refer to industry identity, values and mission. Here, the normative 
institutions blind industries towards appropriate behaviour regarding social obligation 
or pressures to conform (Geels, 2014a). The normative elements signal a societal 
purpose and expectations which enable legitimacy and validity.  An example of 
normative rules can include values placed on societal problems such as climate change 
or the phasing out of coal.    
 Regulative rules refer to regulations, laws and standards, which are imposed on 
industries through governance mechanisms that facilitate actions in specific directions 
(Geels, 2014a). Here the basis of legitimacy is through formal rules such as legislation 
and sanctions.   
In the next section, the repurposing of rules according to a conversion lens is 
operationalised, guiding the analytical research. 
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6.4 Data and Methodology  
In this case study, the analysis is on evolving interaction between the two regimes which 
led to the development of the LNG for power generation (Gas I4P) and LNG for industrial 
use, which established the Gas Industrialisation Unit (GIU).  The two regimes are South 
Africa’s liquid fuels and electricity. The LNG for power and industrial use is regarded as 
a niche. The period from 1998 to 2018 was considered, demonstrating how two regimes 
evolve into a closer relationship. The analytical period started in 1998 because South 
Africa’s White Paper on Energy was implemented at this time, marking significant post-
apartheid changes. Significant to this study was the recognition that energy 
diversification away from coal (e.g. renewable energy, and gas) was needed.  I argue 
that there is evidence to suggest the two regimes grew closer in interaction over time, 
due to landscape changes, as well as regime tensions.  Therefore, the South African case 
study provides a useful example whereby multiple regimes could be examined using the 
regime concept of the MLP in combination with institutional changes.   
The fieldwork for this research was carried out between June and August 2015, and from 
March to July 2016.  It included 20 semi-structured interviews, 13 of which are drawn 
upon in this paper, and were conducted in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town, and 
the United Kingdom (UK) with representatives from governments, NGOs, the private 
sector, academia and think tanks (Table 6.1). Moreover, in February 2018, to 
supplement ongoing updates, a few follow up questions were posed to some 
interviewees.  Furthermore, South Africa's integrated resources plan (IRP), a significant 
strategic directive from the DOE, was updated in August 2018. The updated IRP had 
proposed a significant role of Gas I4P in the electricity sector up to 2030.  Therefore, the 
analysis period covers gas developments up to August 2018, and as such, a timely case 
study. The interview material was then triangulated through a systematic analysis of 
publicly available documents from South Africa’s energy, and the environment portfolio 
committee hearings, academic publications, and articles in the national press.  
 
Table 6.1: List of interviewees for this research outlining their respective positions  
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Respondent  Position Interviews (date and location) 
A Director of oil and gas in a law firm  15 April 2016, Cape Town, South 
Africa 
B Vice President of South African 
Petrochemical company 
4 May 2016, Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
C Chief Advisor of Power System 
Economics in a State-Owned Entity 
(SOE) 
5 July 2016, Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
D Development Manager for an 
Engineering Procurement, 
Construction (EPC) and Project 
Development Firm 
15 March 2016, Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
E Independent consultant that is part of 
the Gas Industrialisation Unit (GIU) 
task team   
14 April 2016, Cape Town, South 
Africa 
F A senior manager in an oil and gas 
alliance organisation 
19 April 2016, Cape Town, South 
Africa 
G Consultant for the independent 
power producers (IPP) office 
10 March 2016, Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
H Senior academic on energy and 
infrastructure at a South African 
university 
16 April 2016, Cape Town, South 
Africa 
I Representative of the IPP office 4 March 2016, Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
J Representative of the IPP office 30 October 2015, Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
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K Member of Business Unity South 
Africa (BUSA) energy task team 
7 March 2016, Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
L Senior oil and gas government 
representative 
31 March 2016, Pretoria, South 
Africa 
M Researcher based in a UK think tank 9 
 February 2018, U.K.  
 
To operationalise the concepts of conversion, I first grouped the overarching regime 
rules according to the selection pressures of cognitive, normative and regulative rules 
(Table 6.2).  I then constructed the analytical framework based on the regime rules into 
conversion by maintaining the definitions of repurposing existing rules. These 
operationalised concepts of conversion were the type of questions posed to 
interviewees. For the conversion, examining the displays of repurposing and the 
redirection of existing rules from the two regimes, which enabled the development of 
the niche, was necessary. For instance, repurposing existing infrastructure or the 
redirection of an existing set of skills or technical knowledge such that it caters to the 
niche, could be considered conversion. 
Furthermore, along with cognitive rules, I examined the ways in which the industrial 
mindsets and strategic choices between regimes are re-interpreted or re-appropriated.  
Similarly, in the normative rules, it was necessary to look for evidence of redirection in 
missions and identity to gain social legitimacy or support that could lead to the basis of 
change in social obligation or appropriation. Lastly, the two regimes could interact due 
to a repurposing of an existing regulative rule, which favours a niche through legislative 
means.  In my analysis of semi-structured interviews, I did some manual coding to 
highlight the regular themes outlined. 
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Table 6.2: Outlining the main regime rules used and relating to the concepts of 
conversion. 
Regime rules  Cognitive  Normative  Regulative  
Conversion  Reinterpretation of 
Industrial mind-sets 
New missions’ 
identity, values 
Repurpose existing 
policy instruments 
or goals 
 
In summary, the analytical framework in this case study uses a combination of the MLP 
with an institutional lens of conversion (Figure 6.1).  
 
LANDSCAPE
REGIME
NICHE
ELECTRICITYLIQUID FUELS
GAS  
 
Figure 6.1: Depicting the analytical framework used in this study adapted from 
Sutherland et al. (2015) 
6.5 Multiple regime interactions between liquid fuels and electricity regimes  
The analysis of the multi-regime interactions is divided into four periods.  The discussion 
begins by describing the historical background of the two regimes, as a prelude to 
subsequent events. This was followed by three sub-periods from 1998-2018, where the 
regimes started with minor interactions. However, due to landscape changes, regime 
Analytical framework 
Multiple regime interactions 
Two regimes: Liquid fuels and 
electricity 
Using the lens of conversion to 
analyse an emerging closer 
relationship between the two 
regimes  
The arrows between regimes 
and the niche represents 
conversion 
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tensions, and a few processes repurposing existing rules, a closer interaction between 
multiple regimes emerged, resulting in the development of Gas I4P. 
 Empirical background of the two regimes 
At present, the country's primary energy mix consists of coal (60 %), crude oil (16%), 
biomass and waste (20%), gas (3 %), and nuclear energy (2 %) (DOE, 2018b).  
 Liquid fuels regime  
South Africa has more than forty years’ experience of exploration for oil and gas, but 
this is somewhat overshadowed considering the dominance of coal. Nevertheless, the 
country has an existing well-established liquid fuels regime, primarily through a 
dominant incumbent called Sasol, an energy and petrochemicals company that was 
state-owned but is now corporatised, and the state-owned national oil company, 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (PetroSA). Together these two 
companies use Fischer Tropsch technology to convert gas to liquid fuels (GTL) as well as 
gas for industrial use.  Sasol has an existing natural gas pipeline from Mozambique’s 
Pande and Temane gas fields to South Africa (158 million GJ/year) and a 140 MW gas to 
power plant used entirely for its purposes (later elaborated in Section 6.5.3).  Since the 
1980s, Sasol has provided a methane-rich gas (CH4) as a feedstock to the country’s 
various energy-intensive industries (DOE, 2016,  p. 16). In essence, South Africa’s 
existing gas market follows Sasol’s historical development.  What needs to be 
appreciated is that in South Africa, Sasol uses gas mostly for its purpose, with an excess 
supply catering to a peripheral market.  Similarly, while Sasol is among the country’s 
largest coal producers, the bulk of this production is to supply its coal-to-liquids (CTL).  
 PetroSA has extensive oil and gas exploration in the Bredasdorp basin located off 
Mossel Bay in the Western Cape Province (Figure 6.2) and in 1987 established a GTL 
plant called Mossgas (Burden, 1992; PASA, 2012). Currently, the Mossgas GTL plant 
consumes 42 million GJ/year (DOE, 2016). PetroSA provides 5% of the country’s liquid 
fuel needs (DOE, 2015). However, the basin is in decline, and the government has 
incentives to look for alternative gas supplies to ensure the continued viability of the 
GTL plant.  
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Figure 6.2: Map indicating Mossel Bay, Port Ngqura, Richards Bay in South Africa, with 
the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique 
The main actors in South Africa’s liquid fuels regime can be delineated according to 
upstream and downstream activities (Figure 6.3). 
Upstream deals with exploration, which mostly falls under the legislative framework of 
the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) that is administered 
by the Department of Minerals and Resources (DMR). The Department of Energy (DOE) 
has substantial organisations under its responsibility, with the Central Energy Fund 
(CEF); a state-owned energy utility that has broad remits to ensure energy security. The 
CEF controls PetroSA (state-owned GTL refinery), the Strategic Fuel Fund (SSF), iGas 
(Mozambique to SA gas pipeline shareholder), and PASA (licensing agreements) 
(Transnet, 2016).  
The Gas Act, 2001 administered by the DOE, and regulated under the National Energy 
Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), covers the downstream regulatory framework.   
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As will be discussed later, Eskom, the state-owned utility for electricity generation, uses 
diesel for its peak load but has incentives to shift to gas as a cheaper alternative.  
Regarding gas pipelines, NERSA regulates these through state-owned entities, namely 
Transnet, as well as ports’ infrastructures through the Transnet Ports Authority (TNPA) 
(Transnet, 2016).  For gas to industry, a newly formed Gas Industrialisation Unit (GIU), 
which deals with gas non-power use, is an initiative by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (the DTI) which works closely with key players across the sector. In summary, 
the LNG socio-technical niche has an existing network which is amenable to co-opt for 
its development. For this research, the gas community which is actively pursuing the 
LNG is the South African Oil and Gas Alliance (SAOGA), Sasol, DOE and the DTI through 
the GIU. PetroSA and Transnet are essential but less active (Interview with a senior oil 
and gas government representative, Respondent L). Thus, it would seem that the key 
actors are mainly the DOE and the DTI with Sasol and are present in the electricity and 
liquid fuels regime respectively to achieve a gas economy in the country.   
 
Figure 6.3: The main players of gas activities in South Africa  
 Electricity regime 
South Africa’s electricity system was primarily established to support mining and its 
associated energy-intensive industry in the early 1900s (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996; Ting, 
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2015).  In 1923, South Africa established Eskom, a state-owned utility, which continues 
to function as a monopoly in 2018.  As part of the state-led industrial policy to support 
the mining sector, it is considered vital for the country’s economic development. South 
Africa’s government ensured cheap coal, cheap electricity, government incentives, tax 
subsidies and import substitution to foster the mining and energy-intensive industries 
(Makhaya and Roberts, 2013; Roberts and Black, 2009). Consequently, an energy-
intensive user group (EIUG), mostly from mining and associated industries, are 
responsible for approximately 44% of electricity demand in the country (EIUG, 2015).  
The current state of the electricity sector is that Eskom holds a vertical monopoly 
responsible for a generation (>90%), transmission (95%) and distribution (>50%) (Eskom, 
2015b). Eskom’s main consumers are municipalities and industry and mining, accounting 
for around 80% consumption (Figure 6.4).  Eskom has an installed capacity of 37 GW 
(coal), 1.9 GW (nuclear), 1.4 GW (pumped storage), 0.6 GW (hydro), 2.4 GW (peaking 
stations with diesel) (Eskom, 2015b).  
 
 Figure 6.4: Eskom electricity consumption (GWh) relative to consumer use in 
percentages (NERSA, 2015b) 
There are three peaking generation Open Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT) located in various 
ports in the country.  These existing OCGTs use diesel during peak demand, which is 
usually considered between 07:00 and 10:00 in the morning and 18:00 and 20:00 in the 
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evening41. The DOE has articulated that more economical use of gas instead of diesel is 
planned, to support Gas I4P (as elaborated later in Section 6.5.5).   
The OCGTs are currently located within an existing, well-established port hub along the 
country's coastline (Figure 6.2).  For instance, in a town called Richards Bay located in 
the Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) province, there are established industries of an aluminium 
smelter, two titanium smelters, a paper mill and chromium smelter, as well as existing 
industrial demand for gas due to the Lilly Pipeline (DOE, 2016). In this port, there is a 
diesel-fired power plant called Avon, of which the DOE plans to convert into gas, with 
an installed capacity of 670 MW (Figure 6.5).   
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Kwa-Zulu Natal’s (KZN) potential LNG infrastructure development, adapted 
from Transnet (2015) 
In a nearby port is Ngqura, located in the Eastern Cape Province of the country. It is 
adjacent to a well-established Coega Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) (Figure 6.6). 
 
3Eskom,http://www.eskom.co.za/CustomerCare/TariffsAndCharges/Documents/Eskom%20Bo
oklet.pdf 
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Coega is also home to considerable investment in renewable energy developments, 
especially wind farms (DOE, 2016). In this location, there is an operational OCGT plant 
called Dedisa with a capacity of 335 MW, and a further 350 km away is Gourikwa (746 
MW) in Mossel Bay (Figure 6.6). The plans here are to convert Dedisa’s peaking plant 
from diesel to gas firing, and in the longer-term, to establish either a GTL or a minerals’ 
beneficiation plant (DOE, 2016,  p. 21).   
Together these two ports have been selected by the DOE as the initial steps for Gas I4P. 
The indication is that implementing Gas I4P could be complemented by existing 
industrial activities to build a business case in importing the LNG.  Essentially, the 
infrastructure needed for LNG imports has fundamental geographical requirements.  
Preferably it needs to be close to existing facilities that are amenable to gas and areas 
where the government could catalyse and sustain industrial activities.   
 
Figure 6.6: Coega potential LNG infrastructure development, adapted from Transnet 
(2015) 
To sum up, South Africa’s gas development is planning for electricity generation, 
industrial use, and export envisioned up to 2040 (DOE, 2016,  p. 15). In the short-term, 
the DOE plans to import LNG to provide an ‘anchor demand’ for electricity generation 
as the best way of catalysing the gas economy in the country (DOE, 2016). In the mid to 
longer-term, the South African government wants to establish a gas market by importing 
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and stimulating regional trade within the South African Development Community 
(SADC) and domestic gas utilisation for industrial, commercial, transportation and 
residential use (DOE, 2016; Transnet, 2015).  Ultimately, the longer-term vision is to 
provide an incentive for upstream players to invest in exploration and production for 
shale gas in the Karoo region.  In this way, South Africa could successfully monetise its 
indigenous energy reserves, mainly because the resources have similarities to an already 
existing established extractives based economy (DOE, 2016) (See Appendix E).  
In the next section, an emerging closer relationship between the two regimes is 
discussed, starting from 1998 to 2005.   
  1998-2005: Energy sector reforms 
In this section, the discussion is focussed on the significant reforms in the country’s 
energy sector from 1998 to 2005. These include a landmark policy which signalled the 
recognition of natural gas as an option to diversify the country’s energy mix, the 
introduction of private sector participation in electricity generation, the establishment 
of gas pipelines between Mozambique and South Africa, and several institutional 
changes. During this period, the liquid fuels’ regime expanded by establishing key 
infrastructure developments, while the electricity regime initiated two new coal plants. 
The two regimes had minor interaction at this point, but this period provided a 
contextual preamble to gas initiatives that subsequently took place.   
In 1998, South Africa’s White Paper on Energy provided a milestone policy which 
signalled significant changes for both the liquid fuels and the electricity regime. In 
particular, there was the need to introduce independent power production against the 
country’s monopoly system as discussed below, and the recognition of gas due to 
essential discoveries in neighbouring countries Mozambique and Namibia (DME, 1998).  
Subsequently, in 2001, the Gas Act was implemented, which established the 
development of the gas infrastructure in the country through pipelines and the 
regulatory framework. This Act, as later discussed, has since been amended to adapt to 
gas developments over time. In 2002, the Mineral Petroleum Resources and 
Development Act (MPRDA) became operational, which provided remits for oil and gas 
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exploration and production. At the same time, PetroSA was established consolidating 
previously separate entities of Soekor and Mossgas.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Key gas infrastructure in South Africa.42  (DOE, 2016,  p. 19)  
 
In 2004, a gas pipeline between Mozambique and South Africa was established. Sasol, 
as the dominant incumbent within a liquid fuels’ regime, established an 865-km gas 
pipeline from Temane, Mozambique to Secunda in South Africa (Transnet, 2015). The 
Republic of Mozambique Pipeline Investments Company (ROMPCO) is mostly owned by 
Sasol (50%), the Mozambique government (25%) and the South African state-owned 
Central Energy Fund (CEF) (25%) (Transnet, 2016). However, it has been argued that the 
Rompco pipeline does not create a real market in the country.43  This is because the gas 
pipeline within South Africa (transmission and distribution) is owned and mostly used 
by Sasol for its plants in Secunda and Sasolburg (Figure 6.7). In 2017, Sasol imported 158 
million gigajoules (MGJ) of natural gas, (DOE, 2016,  p. 17; Sasol, 2018) used for its 
 
42  Ch4 refers to a methane-rich pipeline.  
43 Respondent A  
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chemical plants and to generate power at an operational capacity of 140 MW (Sasol, 
2018).  The rest of the gas is routed to the province of KZN, through the Transnet Lilly 
Pipeline (See Figure 6.7).  
While over 90% of the gas transported via the ROMPCO pipeline goes to Sasol, the 
establishment of the pipeline has, nonetheless, created demand of around 370 
industrial and commercial customers via 530 offtake points (DOE, 2016,  p. 17).  
Furthermore, the pipeline has prompted the DOE and the Department of Industry (DTI), 
to encourage existing industries that use LPG and diesel to switch to natural gas as soon 
as it becomes feasible to do so.  These government departments had started to envision 
the gas industry in the country.    
For the electricity regime in 1998, the Energy White Paper predicted that demand would 
exceed supply by 2007 (DME, 1998).  The DME44 noted the following:   
“Although growth in electricity demand is only projected to exceed generation 
capacity around 2007, long capacity-expansion lead times require strategies to 
be in place in the mid-term, to meet the needs of the growing economy.”  
(DME, 1998)   
What followed from 1998 was a series of significant changes in the electricity regime and 
including a move towards cost-reflective tariffs, the corporatisation and 
commercialisation of the utility in 2001 (which started to pay dividends and taxes), a 
higher cost of capital (due to higher debt levels and weaker credit metrics) and a small 
potential role for gas for peak load in its Open Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT) (dti, 2013).  As 
the electricity regime came under pressure to meet the electricity deficit, two new coal 
plants, namely Medupi and Kusile with a combined capacity of 9.5 GW were 
commissioned in 2005.   
By 2004, the DME ratified the National Energy Regulatory Act which was responsible for 
the national electricity regulatory framework. (dti, 2013,  p. 49).  
Despite the 1998 White Paper on Energy Intention for Energy Diversification, coal 
remained the dominant choice for electricity generation up to 2005.  At this stage, the 
 
44 The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) split in 2009, forming separate Ministries. 
From 2009, the Department of Energy (DOE) became the primary energy policy Ministry.   
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liquid fuels’ and electricity regimes had minor links due to Sasol’s own use of gas from 
Mozambique for power generation located in one of its operations at Sasolburg. 
Therefore, other than these links, the two regimes of interaction could be considered 
relatively minor. However, given that Sasol has demonstrated the use of gas for liquid 
fuels’ production and power generation, the potential for a closer relationship was 
evident.   
 2006-2012- Landscape pressure and regime tensions 
During this period from 2006 to 2012, gas started to feature more strongly in South 
Africa’s energy system.  A few turning points had occurred; one was the substantial shale 
gas potential reported by the United States Energy Information Agency (EIA), 
encouraging policymakers to include gas in the energy mix. Second, there were natural 
gas discoveries in neighbouring Mozambique and Tanzania, prompting potential 
regional trade. Thirdly, an electricity crisis in South Africa resulted in blackouts and load-
shedding in 2008, pressuring the electricity regime to seek solutions. These three events 
were significant because both the landscape changes and electricity regime tensions 
started to escalate. 
Consequently, the electricity regime was forced to seek solutions externally to its own 
coal fleets. In this timeframe, the two regimes started to interact, driven by the need to 
solve problems derived from regime tension and landscape trends.  These are discussed 
accordingly.   
In 2008, South Africa was cited for having one of the top ten technically recoverable 
shale gas resources in the world, with estimates at 390 trillion cubic feet (tcf) (EIA, 2013). 
The location for this potential shale gas is in a semi-desert region called the Karoo, 
spanning approximately two-thirds of the country. (EIA, 2013). Although shale gas 
development has a long way to go, the report by the EIA catalysed significant interest, 
particularly with the government, often articulating it as a game changer (DOE, 2016b,  
p. 24). From 2008, onwards gas started to feature more strongly, and this was reflected 
in the DOE integrated resources plan in 2011.   
Around the same time, from 2009 onwards, regional discoveries of gas near South Africa 
were raising interest amongst the national gas community. The most promising natural 
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gas discoveries were discovered off the coast of Mozambique and Tanzania.  The area 
called the Rovuma basin in Mozambique garnered enormous interest in the Southern 
African gas community region (Ledesma, 2013; Symons, 2016). The Rovuma basin has 
potential natural gas reserves estimated at 100 tcf, with two main areas for exploration 
operated by the US-based Anadarko and the Italian company, ENI (Ledesma, 2013). The 
Rovuma basin is a significant gas play, dwarfing regional gas discoveries elsewhere 
including Namibia, Tanzania and Angola.45  
 Anadarko is planning to build two 5 MTPA (million tonnes per annum) liquefaction 
trains with an expected operational date by 2021 (DEDT, 2013,  p. 34).   As later 
described, neighbouring countries gas discoveries are part of the South African 
government’s means to initiate a regional industrial trade.   
By 2012, major national stakeholders in the South African gas industry were established, 
and these included the Southern African Qualification and Certification Committee for 
Gas, South African Oil and Gas Alliance (SAOGA) and Gas User Group (GUG), which 
represents 13 large domestic manufacturers (Ethekwini, 2015,  p. 105). Based on a 
growing number of gas associated stakeholders, there is an indication that an expansion 
of the gas community could contribute to shaping the ideas, opinions and practicalities 
needed to achieve a gas economy in the country.   
For the electricity regime, in 2008, a major electricity crisis occurred through blackouts 
and load shedding (Ting and Byrne, 2020). The electricity regime tension had a 
destabilising effect, which prompted a search for solutions to the problem. During the 
electricity crisis, Eskom used (amongst other measures) costly diesel OCGTs to mitigate 
the shortfall in supply (Figure 6.8). Eskom reportedly operated the OCGT’s at a load 
factor from 0.3% in 2009/10 to 19% in 2013/14, instead of a typical peak load of up to 
5% (Eskom, 2015b). Subsequently, Eskom spent substantial operating costs to mitigate 
the electricity deficit (DEDT, 2013). A study indicated that, at a load factor of 20%, 
running a peaker gas-fired Closed Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) on imported LNG had less 
impact on the country’s trade balance than running the same CCGT on diesel (DEDT, 
2013,  p. 50). The study also showed that the higher the load factor of a peaker plant, 
 
45 For comparison, technical gas reserves in Angola are around ten tcf, Namibia less than one tcf and 
South Africa’s offshore basin is less than one tcf. 
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the stronger the imperative to replace diesel with LNG. Therefore, there is potential in 
mitigating the trade deficit associated with imported diesel, by using gas as an 
alternative feedstock.   
Using diesel during the time of crisis, it became apparent to the DOE that this measure 
was a costly solution. At this point, gas for power generation became an option because 
of the electricity crisis and the potential regional natural and domestic shale gas. As 
often articulated during interviews, gas provided benefits over diesel such as 
affordability and the probable use between electricity and industry.46   
 
 
Figure 6.8: Eskom’s use of diesel relative to its Energy Availability Factor (EAF) 47 
(Eskom, 2015b) 
Eventually, in 2011, as a response to the electricity crisis, the DOE ratified legislation 
called the New Generation Capacity, under the Electricity Regulation Act (DOE, 2018b). 
The New Generation Capacity introduced the Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers Procurement Programme (RE I4P).  This provided a much-needed private 
sector investment into the country’s electricity generation. Despite significant delays 
and challenges to its implementation, the RE I4P was, in the first instance, very 
successful, as a result of which the DOE decided to adapt the model in order to procure 
 
46 Respondent A, C, H.  
47 EAF measures plant availability, plus energy losses not under the control of plant management 
(external). 
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gas and coal from IPPs. From here, the policy instrument of introducing independent 
power producers became an essential policy tool for Gas I4P.   
 2013-2018 Emergence of multiple-regime interactions 
From 2013 to 2018, gas development started to gain momentum driven by significant 
landscape trends that included increasing sophistication in LNG liquefaction, favourable 
gas prices that were conducive for imports, and changes in LNG trade patterns favouring 
countries that wanted to import LNG.  Moreover, in this period significant conversion 
changes were evident, particularly the repurposing of the RE I4P policy instrument used 
initially for renewable energy, later used for Gas I4P.   
Furthermore, the plans for potential gas trade with Mozambique became formalised 
through the DTI critical industrial policy action plan (IPAP). Lastly, technological 
development of the gas niche became more specific, mainly outlining procurement 
under a bundled case, with a floating storage re-gasification gas unit (FSRUs) as the 
preferred model (DOE, 2016,  p. 23). Gas I4P was often articulated to provide flexibility 
to the electricity grid, a suitable load follower to renewable energy intermittency and 
provided less risk of stranded assets. Overall, the development of gas to power started 
to stabilise, resulting in liquid fuels’ and electricity regimes to interact much closer 
compared to previous periods.  
In this period, at the landscape level, three significant trends regarding LNG technologies 
raised interest in the gas community.  These were the increasing trends towards the 
liquefaction of gas and bypassing the need for pipelines. For a long time, gas was unable 
to match the strength of the oil trade through marine transportation (Kumar et al., 2011,  
p. 4098). However, the relative advancement in liquefaction technology has enabled the 
possibilities to commoditise gas that bypasses sunk investments such as pipelines.  
Moreover, gas distribution through pipelines suffers from what is called maximum site-
specificity (Dorigoni et al., 2010). The higher the switching costs for alternative use of a 
fixed asset, the higher the degree of specificity.  This makes pipelines an inflexible asset, 
with a high emphasis on ties between buyer and producer (Dorigoni et al., 2010). In this 
regard, there is an expected growth of 46% in global liquefaction capacity by 2021, and 
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these are mostly attributed to the United States (US) and Australia,  as well as Russia, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Cameroon (IGU, 2016,  p. 17). 
 Secondly, gas prices are changing from long-term to short-term contracts which opens 
up to a competitive, spot market and attracts new buyers to the sector. It was reported 
that short-term (less than five years) LNG trade grew from 8% in 2005 to 29% in 2015 
(IGU, 2016,  p. 13). A South African study has shown that importing LNG at a gas price of 
$7 per MMBTU or less can compete with coal (Eberhard, 2015). Given the changing 
dynamics of global gas prices, it was articulated during interviews that South Africa could 
negotiate at this favourable price, depending on aggregated demand.  48 
According to one interviewee who represents government and industry:  
past gas volumes were based on oil indexations, but there are structural changes 
with producers.  It is a good time [for SA] to be a buyer because there is a chance 
to capture good terms in the contract. Time frames are flexible; we are now 
looking at 5-year contracts. Because of these short-term contracts, countries 
planning to import LNG are in a better position to negotiate gas prices at 
favourable rates. 
Respondent A 
From these sentiments, the implications for short-term trade and lower gas prices mean 
that the South African gas community believes they are in an excellent position to 
negotiate favourable contracts.  
Thirdly, there are changes in LNG trade patterns, which means new market dynamics 
between traditional exporters and importers. According to the IGU (2014), “the 
emergence of new areas with tremendous [LNG] supply potential has been one of the 
most striking changes in the LNG industry in the last three years.”  
Overall, the impact of these factors means a re-direction of LNG volumes to markets 
without an established liquid gas trade (IGU, 2016,  p. 14).  Interviews with a 
representative from the private sector and government articulate that due to global 
changes in LNG trade, mainly in the shift of traditional exporters and importers, 
oversupply in the short term, and advances in liquefaction capacities, SA could take 
 
48 Respondent A, D, E, L  
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advantage of these changes.49  The three trends were consistently iterated during 
interviews and used to justify gas developments in the country.  
By 2015, due to the success of the renewable energy programme, the DOE repurposed 
the IPP policy instrument in what can be described as conversion, to procure various 
other technologies including coal, gas and cogeneration.  As one interviewee noted:  
The idea is that the IPP will handle the bidding process and try to replicate the 
renewable energy process and success. 
Respondent F 
Thus, by 2015, the DOE announced Gas I4P with the procurement of 3.7 GW electricity 
generation (DOE, 2016). Gas I4P was effectively formalised into the electricity sector, 
given the strong signal that the policy instrument had provided. According to the 
interviewees, before 2013, scaling gas into a nationwide market stalled in the past, 
primarily due to lack of (1) sufficient infrastructure, (2) industrial demand, (3) indigenous 
gas reserves, (4) clarity in government policies, and competing for the dominance of 
liquid fuels and coal.50  
Moreover, one of the potential concerns for importing LNG is the case of dollar-based 
indexation of LNG prices. This could be problematic because imported LNG is priced in 
US dollars, but revenues from a power purchase agreement are likely to be in domestic 
currency.  This will have a direct impact on electricity tariffs, bearing in mind that South 
Africa is already facing huge public resistance to electricity increases and its domestic 
currency is weakening against the US dollar.  
Nevertheless, gas has been in the background in the overall energy sector. Furthermore, 
with Gas I4P, the DOE made clear indications that development would be close to an 
existing diesel-based electricity generation, as well as existing industrial development 
zones. Likewise, during this period, the electricity regime had persistent problems, as 
the new coal plants were not commissioned in time, blackouts were continuous, and 
electricity tariffs increased (Ting and Byrne, 2020). Consequently, the electricity regime 
 
49 Respondent A, F, J 
50 Respondent A, D, E, F, G, I, J, M 
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grew with tensions over time and increasingly became a visible focal point for public 
discontent over their rights to civic services and delivery.   
As was earlier outlined in Section 6.5.3, two sites selected for Gas I4P were the Port of 
Ngqura (Eastern Cape Province) and Richards Bay (KZN). Both locations have gone 
through significant environmental impact assessments and techno-economic feasibility 
studies to determine the best LNG terminals (DOE, 2016). Thus, there is an indication 
that Gas I4P is taking advantage alongside an existing infrastructure development. Both 
Ports of Ngqura and Richards Bay have dedicated special economic zones with incentives 
from the local government to stimulate industrial development. In this way, the plans 
by the DOE to repurpose the diesel base OCGT for gas use, as well as stimulating 
industrial demand, was already in place.   
The plans for Gas I4P implementation and the site selection made the technological 
requirement more specific, particularly as questions were being asked about the type of 
LNG plant to be established, provincial support, funding models, meteorological 
conditions and port configuration needed (Transnet, 2016). Likewise, there was a 
precise alignment that renewable energy and gas are complementary and compatible 
power generation sources.51  Related to this, an interviewee from the electricity regime 
stated that gas is the best option as a load follower to renewable energy intermittency, 
as it can be ramped up or down as needed.52 Thus, there is an increasing awareness that 
to meet uncertain electricity demand, a modular, flexible generation and fewer chances 
of stranded assets are needed of which gas provides such an option. 53   
These sentiments seem to indicate that technical specification and choices were 
becoming explicit, with a more precise direction for the implementation of Gas I4P.  
Consequently, the DOE planned to convert existing OCGTs into dual fuel services that 
will enable it to use diesel and gas.  This suggests that the DOE has started to re-purpose 
at least part of Eskom’s fleet and the system requirements which could favour Gas I4P.   
As Gas I4P gained traction, the implementation of gas widened as a potential feedstock 
for the industrial process, commercial and residential cooking and heating applications 
 
51 Respondent A, C, F, K.  
52 Respondent C 
53 Respondent H, L 
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(DOE, 2016,  p. 15).  The typical alignment of expectations considering gas development 
is that it provides socio-economic benefits and can contribute to lowering greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions (Eberhard, 2015). Here, aspects of normative elements are evident 
given that Gas I4P is embedded in the national development plans (electricity and 
industrialisation) which is argued to form a part of the increasing social awareness and 
expectations that in turn could ultimately lead to legitimacy.   
Moreover, related to cultural-cognitive elements, a prominent interviewee in the liquid 
fuels’ regime articulated and noted the following:   
 gas, in essence, covers two things, commodity and energy security 
Respondent B 
From this sentiment, an indication is that shared industrial mindsets have started to 
widen as ideas and interpretations for gas applications were considered both in 
electricity and liquid fuels (DTI, 2018,  p. 169).  In a way, there was a belief that gas had 
a role in the electricity sector as well as in industries.  
There are two opportunities from importing LNG into the country that could benefit 
from the development of the industrial sector.  First, are the costs saved by switching 
fuel away from diesel, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and heavy fuel oil (HFO), which are 
deemed more expensive than LNG imported at $10/MMbtu (Deloitte, 2015).  The 
second opportunity is to use gas for ammonia processing to produce fertilisers, as well 
as methanol production, and direct reduced iron (DRI) (an alternative source to produce 
steel) (DMR, 2005; Steenkamp and du Preez, 2015).   
Both of these opportunities have spurred ideas for using gas beyond electricity 
generation. This was evident with the country’s annual Industrial Action Plan (IPAP) – an 
essential national industrial strategy document – mentioning the importance of gas, 
followed by the establishment in 2017 of a Gas Industrialisation Unit (GIU) within the 
dti.   
The GIU includes members from Sasol, various government departments and others.  
These are indications that existing normative elements between electricity and liquid 
fuels’ regimes have grown in interaction.   
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According to Garth Strachan, the Deputy Director-General on Industrial Development at 
the DTI stated that54:  
The vision of the GIU is to build on the momentum of gas to power development, 
using gas for scale-up-and downstream industrialisation, and as one of the 
pathways to regional industrialisation 
 
Thus, beyond national plans for gas were intentions for intra-trade between the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), particularly with the proximity of 
Mozambique (DTI, 2018,  p. 168). 
“We are proposing the establishment of an Inter-State Natural Gas Committee 
to share learning for regional gas development and to prepare for the 
development of the wider gas economy.”  
        (2017).  
Additionally, the DTI has identified industries that could align with gas developments. 
These are iron and steel, mining and quarrying, petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, 
non-metallic minerals, cement industry, power generation, fertilisers and GTL (Mavuso, 
2015).  Thus, the South African strategic imperative is to re-direct ‘close at hand’ 
capabilities into using gas as a long-term objective (Mavuso, 2015). Close at hand implies 
that existing capabilities such as those found in liquid fuels and associated industries 
could benefit from the expansion of economic activities using gas. The strategy is to 
stimulate the multiplier effects of linkages in the gas value chain to build sufficient gas 
industrialisation.  
As indicated in most interviews, the re-industrialisation of the country’s economy could 
be achieved through the initial catalytic start with Gas I4P and later with industries. The 
belief is that gas could be the country’s next commodity resource, as the country’s 
mining future was uncertain and is on a decline. 55  Related to this, some actors in the 
oil and gas community are pushing for a pivot of mining skills towards the upstream gas 
sector as potential new ventures for the extractives industries. 56 The indications were 
that the skills required for drilling and exploring gas fields are deemed similar to those 
 
54 DTI launches Gas Industrialisation Unit, https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/dti-launches-gas-
industrialisation-unit-2016-05-16  
55 Respondent A 
56 Respondent F 
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found in mining. These views are considered as examples of re-interpretation for the 
industrial mind-sets as there is an interrogation of the continued relevance of mining in 
the extractives industry given the massive potential of shale gas in the country. 
By August 2018, gas was articulated by the latest country’s integrated resources plan, 
to play a significant role in the future electricity generation. The indications were that 
gas would contribute as much as 15% of the installed capacity mix by 2030 (DOE, 2018a). 
This seems to suggest, at least to some degree to the energy policymakers, that gas to 
power has the necessary fit, form and compatibility with the electricity system.  Thus, 
with the considerable future role of gas in the electricity regime, and the inclusion of gas 
in the country’s industrial plans, these are instances of new missions and beliefs, and 
would, therefore, illustrate a broader institutional change of conversion.  
6.6 Discussion 
Using a conversion lens, this case study revealed the co-evolutionary nature of multiple 
regime interactions, through repurposing existing institutions over time. Moreover, it 
was demonstrated that repurposing existing rules between the regimes was in response 
to cumulative landscape pressures and electricity regime tension over time. This section 
discusses the main findings, which integrates each of the three periods outlined, 
followed by suggested contributions to empirical and theoretical research (Figure 6.9). 
Reflecting on the case study, the two regimes of electricity and liquid fuels grew in 
interaction through the repurposing of the cognitive, normative and regulative rules. 
The interaction between the two regimes was preceded by changes at the landscape 
and regime level. Thus, the period from 1998 to 2012, provided a preamble as to why 
the regime interaction had occurred later.  From 2012 onwards, the emergence of 
regime interactions featured more strongly.  
For instance, in 2004, Sasol, the dominant incumbent in the liquid fuels regime, 
implemented a pipeline to import gas from Mozambique, catalysing a significant change 
in its operations, using gas as a feedstock for the GTL process and electricity generation. 
Although Sasol used the imported gas mostly for its own purposes, nevertheless the 
demonstration of the large-scale project encouraged and planted ideas for the potential 
feasibility of a gas economy in the country, at least amongst the actors involved in both 
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regimes.  Around the same time, the electricity regime endured a series of changes, 
leading up to the commissioning of two new coal plants. Viewed from an MLP 
perspective, in the first period analysed, from 1998 to 2005, no significant landscape 
changes were observed, and both regimes had expanded. Therefore, without any 
evidence of ‘cracks’ or a window of opportunity at the landscape or regime level, at this 
stage, the two regimes had minor interactions.   
In the second period (2006-2012), the first signs of changes started to appear with 
potential shale gas in the Karoo region, further gas discoveries in Mozambique and a 
significant electricity crisis. Also, in this period, there was evidence of an increasing 
number of gas-related stakeholders in the form of industrial alliances, users’ group, and 
associated policymakers.  This community would provide a critical point of reference 
whereby ideas, perceptions and interests were deliberated and served as feedback 
loops. Overall, these developments prompted the search heuristics of the electricity 
regime to widen. At first, the solution was the introduction of a policy instrument that 
enabled the development of renewable energy in the country (Ting, 2019; Sovacool et 
al., 2018a). This could be described as a ‘local search,’ as the adjustment was 
incremental, and it maintained the structure of the regime (Geels, 2014a). However, 
with sustained pressure on the electricity regime, together with prior elements of 
infrastructure development by Sasol in the liquid fuels’ regime, conditions for gas 
development were apparent.  In time, the constant blackouts by Eskom are what could 
be considered as a structural performance problem (Geels, 2014a). This meant the 
electricity regime actors were prompted to question the foundational elements of the 
regime, and this, in turn, stimulated actions beyond structural constraints.  Here, the 
electricity regime had eventually engaged in a ‘distant search’ (Geels, 2014a,  p. 271) 
because options for radical alternatives and new knowledge bases were explored.  Given 
the need to seek meaningful solutions, by the third period (2013-2018), a closer 
interaction between the two regimes became evident.   
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Figure 6.9: Regime interactions and niche development from 1998-2005 (adapted from Sutherland et al. (2015) 
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By 2015, the policy instrument for IPP that initially catered to RE I4P was repurposed to 
procure other technologies, including gas.  In time to implement Gas I4P, the level of 
activities in technological choices became specific and robust, as was demonstrated by 
decisions in the type of LNG to be imported, the selection of port sites, and the 
conversion of existing OCGT plants to dual services, as well the indication that gas would 
provide flexibility as a load follower to renewables. Therefore, as cognitive elements 
such as technical knowledge, operational processes, and funding mechanisms 
increasingly matured, so did the involvement of a community of a variety of actors.  
These included national and local governments, societal groups, finance, industry 
stakeholders, environment, infrastructure requirements and the research community.  
This suggests that an infrastructure intensive project such as the LNG for power and 
industrial use, required the interaction of a broad base of actors, and these were found 
in both regimes. Moreover, the complementary characteristics between coal-fired 
electricity and the liquid regime enabled the corresponding shared mindset with similar 
networks and interests mainly related to the extractives industry. 
Related to this, the technological specificity of the LNG was amenable to modular and 
flexible implementation, provided fewer risks of stranded assets, which are likely to 
contribute to more accessible linkages between regimes, and portability amongst 
applications. There was also an indication that the LNG for power could offset the 
intermittency of renewables in the electricity grid and provide prospects to develop a 
gas industry.  Thus, another critical aspect that enabled interaction was the perceived 
opportunities for both regimes. For instance, Gas I4P was reliant on LNG importation, 
the selection of ports meant that the associated local government with the nearby 
special economic zones had incentives to pursue the initiative. The ports that were 
selected had existing diesel OCGT plants which were amenable to be repurposed into 
dual fuel services. Significantly, the proximity of existing established industries 
stimulated the national and local government to catalyse a gas value chain. This was 
demonstrated by the inclusion of gas in the national industrial plans governed by the 
DTI, which resulted in the establishment of a dedicated GIU. 
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 The GIU established a task force, including Sasol, various government departments and 
other gas stakeholders. The perceived opportunities for gas industrialisation in 
conjunction with energy security resulted in shared interests amongst actors in both 
regimes and thus facilitated ongoing interaction.  The gas industrialisation industry also 
motivated interests in regional trade with Mozambique, which is increasingly in line with 
an overarching industrialisation strategy with SADC. This means that the plans for 
achieving a gas economy in South Africa suggest an extensive development from a 
national, local and regional scale. As such, the outreach was broad with prospects for 
interfacing with a diverse community. Moreover, the opportunities provided by a gas 
economy prompted support from the government and the private sector, particularly 
from the extractives industry, and would thus, likely be responsive to repurposing or 
complementing shared resources. 
Furthermore, as there was a gradual expansion of shared industrial mindsets, maturity 
in technical knowledge, and societal expectations for the development of the LNG niche 
over time, these changes, in turn, gave credibility and legitimacy in support of the LNG 
niche, which led to the alignment of interests and formation of actor-networks between 
the two regimes.  What followed was that some actors started to articulate a change in 
beliefs in the extractive industries whereby the country should be exploiting gas as the 
new commodity due in part to the precarious condition of the mining industry.  For 
instance, there was a suggestion that the established mining skills in the country could 
be re-directed towards exploring shale gas fields as those found in the Karoo region.  
Thus, together with changes in the industrial mindsets at least in the extractives 
industry, and the inclusion of gas in the country’s national development plans, this 
suggests that gas is increasingly embedded within normative goals in both regimes. 
Changes in core-beliefs, mission and identity, are considered deeper forms of 
institutional change (Geels, 2014a). This means that the emergence of linkages between 
the two regimes could possibly lead to enduring connections and greater configurational 
transformation (scope and depth) over time.  
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Lastly, the multiple regime interaction observed in this case study has implications for 
policies with the intention for sustainability transitions.  It would seem that the 
prevailing actors in both regimes are centred on extractive base industries. Thus, the 
hopeful change for sustainability transitions, through the renewable IPP policy 
instrument, was vulnerable to co-option by powerful actors that already subsists within 
the system, and in this case, seems to strengthen the fossil fuel-based system. 
Therefore, the underlying institutional settings in both regimes predicated on 
extractives based industries were likely to favour repurposing rules in order to pursue 
each other’s interests. In line with Hacker (2015), who emphasised that rules are subject 
to re-interpretation depending on groups that may have the necessary resources to re-
direct them according to their benefit. In this way, the policy intent needs to pay 
attention to dominant groups that can navigate the direction under which transitions 
can unfold.   
In conclusion, a close interaction between the electricity and liquid fuels regime was 
necessary for nurturing the LNG niche. After sustained structural performance problem 
experienced by electricity regime, it was later forced to seek a ‘distant search’ for 
solutions.  Given that South Africa’s has a well-established liquid fuels regime, with 
experience and infrastructure for importing gas from Mozambique and with Sasol a 
world leader in converting gas to liquid fuels, the prospect of LNG for power became an 
option.  
6.7 Conclusion  
The current MLP literature suggests that windows of opportunity either from the 
landscape or regime level provide spaces for niches to develop, eventually resulting in 
overthrow or displacement of a regime.  However, this regular pattern of scale-up from 
a niche to a regime could likewise develop through the support of multiple regime 
interactions. The literature on multiple regimes suggests that the process can be 
illustrated as complementary, symbiotic, or even competitive.  These theoretical 
concepts, while helpful in some context, are limited and require a better explanation of 
why and how regimes interact over time. The evidence found in this research potentially 
reflects the limitations of engaging with the concepts of niche, regime and landscape in 
isolation, showing that at any point in time, multiple layers of interactions are at play. 
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There is, therefore, an interconnected co-evolutionary process that was enabled 
through repurposing existing institutions.  The case study shows that multiple regime 
interactions can be characterised as repurposing existing rules as part of the efforts to 
drive innovation at a niche level.  
Through a conversion lens, the regime interactions had enabled the repurposing of 
existing cognitive, normative and regulative rules. However, it is not evident in the 
literature what the enabling conditions were for conversion to proceed. The empirical 
case demonstrated that repurposing rules were not automatic nor spontaneous, but 
instead cultivated over time, due to shared similar interests and perceived opportunities 
derived from the LNG niche. Moreover, a growing shared community provided a 
reference for reflecting on ideas, concepts and feedback loops, enabled the linkages 
between the two regimes. These, in turn, led to a supportive environment both from 
government and from the private sector, particularly the well-resourced extractives 
industry. Lastly, an increasing alignment towards normative goals in both regimes has 
provided a supportive setting for sustained interaction. 
Finally, the current study is cognisant that the findings are drawn from a single case.  
However, the aim was to contribute to transitions literature on multiple regime 
interactions and thus open up for comparative research between similar types of 
infrastructure intensive initiatives. Moreover, transitions researchers need to pay 
attention to the potential of shared boundaries and similarities between various 
regimes, such that multiple regimes are increasingly recognised and analysed.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction to the chapter  
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesise the principal findings of the thesis and 
outline its contributions. I begin by the outlining the motivation of the research, the 
main findings, and how these relate to the extant literature. Subsequently, the research 
questions are revisited, outlining the findings of each paper, followed by the overall 
relevance to the overall thesis. Issues discussed include incumbent obduracy, regime 
resistance, the duality of the regime relative to structure and agency, and the dynamism 
of regime and niche actions that emerged in the case studies in relation to various 
institutional changes. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations and 
recommendations for future research. 
 Motivation and main findings 
In the South African case study, the motivation was to understand the processes by 
which incumbent actors embedded in the MEC, with Eskom as a dominant regime 
incumbent, and how they responded to the introduction of renewables and gas for 
power. The electricity regime was characterised as resistant to changes due to 
entrenched, vested interests derived from actors embedded within the MEC. Therefore, 
there was an opportunity to generate empirical insights and understand how 
sustainability transitions are being achieved in the South African context. In doing so, 
the findings aimed to contribute to the ST literature on regime stability and change and 
finding ways in which processes and mechanisms can realise accelerated sustainability 
transitions.  
I built on the notion of the regime as a highly institutionalised structure, which describes 
regime stability as levels of structuration and degrees of institutionalisation 
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(Fuenfschilling, 2014). This thesis mobilised concepts related to institutional theory and 
the MLP, revealing nuances in the relationship between structure and agency or what is 
generally called the dual nature of the regime. I argued that a punctuated equilibrium 
approach to understanding regime change underestimates the value of analysing 
internal regime responses to shifting core rules as they play out during a transition. 
Instead, I used the four modes of endogenous institutional change (drift, layering, 
conversion and displacement) because they helped focus the analysis on changes in 
rules, which are the main stabilising features of the regime, and internal regime 
responses.  
The research findings show the South African electricity regime evolving from high to 
low stability into what is now a fractured regime with features of partial displacement 
(Table 7.1). In the early stage of the case study period, the electricity regime had a highly 
institutionalised structure. Through the drift mode of endogenous institutional change, 
the case study showed that the regime tried to maintain stability in the face of pressures 
from the recently introduced renewables and gas niches. We observed that given the 
structure of the regime in this early stage remained intact, the maintenance of rules was 
feasible because of the resources amenable to the dominant regime incumbent. 
However, as the existing rules became less coherent, and the regime resources were in 
decline, regime stability slipped from high to limited, and its structure became 
moderate. Then, through the layering mode of change, another regime actor, the DOE, 
was forced to reform existing institutions in order to repair the crisis in the electricity 
regime leading to the development of the renewable energy niche. Here, layering was 
useful in delineating a co-existence between the niche alongside the dominant 
incumbent. Following other changes, regime stability slipped from limited to low, and 
the regime structure became weak. In response, regime actors (electricity and liquid 
fuels) supported the LNG niche by reinterpreting existing rules.  Through this conversion 
mode of change, the case study showed that repurposing existing institutions was 
possible because the weak regime structure provided space for electricity regime actors 
to interpret the set of existing rules and resources differently. 
The cumulative effect of the above changes suggests there are now features of early 
displacement of the regime: it became fractured as its core rules became increasingly 
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untenable. In this regard, a weakened regime structure has led to features of defection 
from the core rules because regime stability is low and open to a variety of unpredictable 
changes. All things considered, using a combination of modes of endogenous 
institutional change with a more nuanced concept of regime structuration enabled the 
examination of the dual nature of the regime more fully, which in turn demonstrated 
the dynamism of regime stability and change. We saw that as the regime structure 
changed different kinds of regime responses emerged. Using endogenous institutional 
change, therefore, proved valuable because it helped to explain the kinds of agency 
expressed in relation to structural change.   
Table 7.1 A summary of the main findings of the research in relation to regime 
stability and institutional changes.   
Structure Agency Stability of the 
regime 
Institutional status 
Strong Maintenance High Institutional reproduction (Chapter 4) 
Moderate Reform  
Limited 
Co-existence of a niche alongside a 
dominant incumbent (Chapter 5) 
Reinterpretation Repurposed existing institutions 
(Chapter 6) 
Weak  Defection  Low Early features of partial displacement  
(Chapter 7) 
 
In sum, this thesis has provided a more nuanced understanding of the regime as a less 
passive, rigid and monolithic bloc or a single regime transformation, instead of being 
dynamic and actively resourceful. These perspectives of regime transformation are part 
of engaging the ontological assumptions of the MLP as they have played out in the South 
African context. The implications this has regarding ST literature is that more research 
is needed, which attends to niche strategies that evolve according to regime stability. 
Thus, instead of assuming the regime to be a monolithic bloc, niches could use different 
processes such as learning, expectations, actor–network formation and 
experimentation against various stages of regime stability (high, limited and low). 
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Moreover, destabilising the regime should be aligned to nurturing niches, such that the 
directions of both decline and rise, respectively, are explored for a systemic change. 
Therefore, this research contributes to the broader literature on directionality (Stirling, 
2008) and transformative innovation (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018), which are research 
agendas that aim for new ways of thinking that radically transforms socio-technical 
systems. In terms of the policy, if both regime destabilisation and niche development 
are chosen, different policy mixes could be formulated. For example, with each stage of 
regime stability, a temporally sensitive displacement policy could be developed. 
Similarly, niches cannot be nurtured in isolation but in parallel with regime 
destabilisation. Finally, this research contributes to South Africa’s deliberation on just 
transitions (Swilling and Annecke, 2012), which looks at sustainability issues on the 
continued use of coal, while at the same time promoting low-carbon resilient economic 
growth. The findings of this research are thus timely and recommend that, for just 
transitions, both the direction in the decline of coal use, which attends to resistance by 
incumbents and nurturing low-carbon niches as viable options, are addressed 
simultaneously.  
The next section proceeds with a summary of each chapter, outlining the main findings, 
followed by the relevance to the overall thesis.  
7.2  Summary of all three papers 
7.2.1 Summary of Chapter 4 (Paper 1) 
The first paper (Chapter 4) addressed the following research question: 
How and why did South Africa’s MEC become a powerful, entrenched regime?  
Chapter 4 is an in-depth case study on the role of mining in the development of the 
energy sector in South Africa. Specifically, for almost one hundred years, the electricity 
sector was maintained to support the mining industry and later domestic needs, using 
coal as the dominant resource. This configuration amongst mining, energy and 
associated industries formed the MEC. Using a discursive institutionalist approach, 
Chapter 4 showed that the MEC became a robust system through co-evolution of 
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ideologies, regulative rules and the accumulation of powerful elites with vested interests 
in maintaining the status quo. 
Insights relevant to the overall thesis  
Stability of the regime: high  
Some conclusions drawn from this case study have relevance to the overall objective of 
the thesis in examining regime stability and change. The following sections describe that 
the establishment of the MEC, which generated a highly stable regime with a dominant 
incumbent, and the characteristics of ‘isomorphic stability’. These are discussed in the 
next paragraphs, using a format described in the conceptual meta-framework (explained 
in Chapter 3), which delineated stability into structure and agency, followed by the type 
of institutional mechanisms observed. 
Structure: strong  
The structure became established over a period of almost 100 years after which time 
we could consider it to be strong with a set of core rules and various resources in place 
to maintain its dominance. Hence, with a strong structure, the reproduction of the core 
rules has been maintained, given the coherent alignment amongst the regime actors.  
Agency: maintenance  
As there is a high certainty of field conditions, as well as clear and shared expectations 
amongst regime actors, this means the state of the regime can be characterised as 
mature.  
Although there were problems, such as commissioning new coal plants or the proposed 
addition of independent power producers, the regime was able to maintain the normal 
state of conditions.  
The institutional arrangements were homogenous considering the tight configuration 
and cohesive alignment amongst the actors in the electricity regime, embedded within 
the MEC.  
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Given the precise conditions of the organisational field and the limited disturbances 
within the actor–network composition, regime actors were able to maintain the 
reproduction of the core rules of the regime, leading to high regime stability.  
Institutional reproduction 
This chapter has shown that discursive structures, which included ideology, beliefs and 
interests held by MEC actors, were powerful forces that had substantial influence over 
the regime’s core rules (e.g. routines, policies, laws, societal expectations and values). 
The electricity regime could be described as having isomorphic stability that exhibits an 
agreement over regulations, norms and practices amongst the actors in the field. The 
chapter has discussed the establishment of the country’s electricity regime, closely tied 
to the industrial policy on mining and the developmental objectives of energy access 
and affordability. Thus, for almost 100 years, at least up until 2008, the status quo was 
Eskom being the sole supplier of cheap electricity in the country.  
7.2.2 Summary of Chapter 5 (Paper 2)  
Combining these insights, the next paper in Chapter 5, asked the following: 
How has Eskom responded to the introduction of renewable energy electricity 
generation in South Africa? 
Chapter 5 presented a case study of South Africa’s electricity regime in which the state-
owned utility Eskom attempted to resist the growth of renewable energies in the 
electricity supply mix. Eskom is a central actor in South Africa’s powerful MEC (Chapter 
4) (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996) that, amongst other interests, has long-established ties 
to coal mining together with electricity generation and consumption (Ting, 2015), and it 
continues to be a significant force in the country’s economy (StatsSA, 2017; COM, 2018; 
Baxter, 2016). However, despite the power of these coal-based interests and Eskom’s 
efforts to resist change over the period from 1998 to 2018, renewable energy-based 
electricity generation, namely the RE I4P, saw impressive growth, reaching 3.6 GWs of 
generation capacity as of 2018 (DOE, 2018b). The case study, therefore, provides a 
useful example of how socio-technical change can be achieved despite the presence of 
a powerful incumbent. 
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Insights relevant to the overall thesis  
Stability of the regime: high to limited 
The following sections describe how the stability of the regime changed from high to 
limited, demonstrating this through changes in structure and associated types of agency. 
This paper has shown that as the structure of the regime changed from strong to 
moderate, different types of agency emerged. It would seem that the dominant regime 
incumbent, Eskom, tried to maintain the core rules, but as the structure weakened, 
another regime actor, the DOE, started to reform existing institutions. This 
demonstrates the constraining and enabling aspects of the structure of the regime and 
the dynamism of regime stability. These observations are further discussed.  
Structure: strong to moderate 
In the case study period (1998-2019) that was analysed, it can be argued that the 
electricity regime began to structurally shift from strong to moderate. Before the 2008 
electricity supply crisis, the rules in the electricity regime were intact, as evidenced by 
the expansion of the two new coals plants (Medupi and Kusile in 2005). Thus, Eskom 
retained its control over what electricity it could buy, and the Electricity Regulation Act  
(ERA 2006) remained in place.  
However, after 2008, with the electricity regime in crisis, changes started to appear. This 
was evident in 2011 with the ERA amendment to include a ‘new rule’ as it introduced 
the RE I4P. This had the effect of disentangling some aspects of the electricity regime’s 
institutional arrangements, and as Eskom’s dominant position was threatened, social 
legitimacy changed because the regime could no longer continue providing cheap and 
reliable electricity. The introduction of private sector participation also changed the 
organisational capital amongst the regime actors. All of these factors had the effect of 
making the core rules incoherent, and the resources available to the regime actors 
began to diminish, leading to moderate structure and limited regime stability.  
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Agency: maintenance and reform 
In terms of agency, the field conditions were uncertain due to the electricity crisis, and 
this affected subsequent actors’ preferences, behaviour and responses to 
corresponding changes.  
The addition of the RE I4P resulted in the introduction of new players to the 
organisational field and, therefore, opened up the regime to a plural set of institutional 
arrangements. For instance, the increased number of IPPs represented new types of 
relationships with Eskom. This had consequences, such as opening the regime to new 
ideas and competing discourses, which, in turn, undermined the reproduction of the 
rules in the field. 
Paper 2 describes how Eskom, the dominant regime incumbent, tried to maintain the 
core rules through an evolving regime resistance strategy. However, after the persistent 
electricity crisis, the DOE actively endorsed change through the implementation of the 
RE I4P, in what could be considered reforming an existing institution. Thus, the 
combination of a crisis in the field and an increasingly different type of actor, which 
included private sector developers, indicated the limited regime stability.  
Institutional change: coexistence of a niche alongside a dominant incumbent  
It was observed that disagreement in its core rules begun to appear, which contributed 
to limited stability of the regime. Eskom and the DOE, both considered as regime actors, 
began to be misaligned in their ideas, preferences and interpretations of the core rules, 
in response to the continued electricity crisis. For instance, their responses diverged, as 
Eskom tried to maintain dominance through the resistance to changes in the regime. 
Meanwhile, the DOE was forced to repair the crisis in the electricity regime by 
supporting the renewable energy programme. In effect, there was a dispersion of efforts 
within structures that actors had created, which in turn indicated that some regime 
actors had started to participate in ways other than those prescribed by their taken for 
granted core rules. Overall, this paper shows that there were signals that, as the 
structure of the regime became unstable over time, there was a fragmentation amongst 
the regime actors, as the responses were no longer coherent. The institutional change 
observed was the RE I4P niche, which coexisted alongside the dominant incumbent, 
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Eskom, resulting in path altering dynamics in the regime, thus triggering the gradual 
transformation.  
The next paper discusses how the electricity regime responded to the implementation 
of the Gas I4P programme, which followed closely after the RE I4P.   
7.2.3 Summary of Chapter 6 (Paper 3)  
In Chapter 6, the following was asked:  
What explains regime interactions in the course of developing South Africa’s LNG 
for power and industrial use? 
Chapter 6 examined the multiple regime interactions between South Africa’s liquid fuel 
and electricity sectors, which led to the development of the LNG for power generation 
(Gas I4P) and LNG for industrial use considered as a niche. As has been discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, South Africa’s electricity regime has primarily based on coal for 
generation. However, from 2012 onwards, the electricity regime has seen several 
changes, of which renewable energy sources were the first implemented, followed by 
the procurement of other technologies which included gas. In 2015, it was announced 
that the country would introduce the Gas I4P programme to procure 3.7 GWs of LNG  
power, which was shortly followed by LNG for industrial use (DOE, 2016). Using a 
combination of the MLP and institutional theory of conversion, the case study provides 
an example of how the two regimes, electricity and liquid fuels, actively collaborated in 
a series of cohesive efforts to support the gas niche. 
Insights relevant to the overall thesis  
Stability of the regime: limited to low 
This paper has shown that regime stability changed from limited to low, and as the 
structure became weak, the type of agency which had emerged as a reinterpretation of 
existing rules. This goes to show that the structure of the regime enabled regime actors 
to contribute to change in ways other than those covered by their taken for granted 
rules. Overall, this case study demonstrated that regime instability had positive 
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implications for LNG niche development. This is discussed in detail in the next 
paragraphs.  
Structure: moderate to weak 
Structurally, the electricity regime changed from moderate to weak because, by that 
stage, both renewables and gas had become part of the energy system. This meant the 
regime actors continued to differ over the core rules. In terms of resources, there was a 
loss in social legitimacy and trust in Eskom’s ability to provide reliable electricity.  
Moreover, currently, as the gas programme is being implemented, it will likely alter the 
electricity regime dimensions of network relations, technology and infrastructure, 
market rules and search heuristics. This will have consequences on the flow of economic, 
social and political resources of the coal-based regime. Thus, the structure of the regime 
will change from moderate to weak, contributing to low regime stability.  
Agency: reinterpretation  
This case study showed that, in 2015, the field conditions were more uncertain due to 
the persistent electricity crisis, and the introduction of both renewables and gas could 
be viewed as technological disruption against the dominant coal-based electricity 
regime.  
The actor–network composition has become progressively more complex due to IPPs 
from renewables and gas in the system. Arguably, in this complex set of actors, there 
are different sources of competing interests, perceptions and motivations in the regime 
selection environment. Thus, with the experience and learning gained from the RE I4P, 
some regime actors, such as the DOE, have begun to change their ideas, the rationale of 
their interests’ preferences or even their identity, such that reinterpretation of existing 
rules has become evident. The evidence for this was articulated in IRP of 2013, which 
clearly stated that, due to new development in gas (Mozambique gas reserves, as well 
as the United States potentially exporting gas) from 2010 onwards, the gas would be 
preferred over diesel because of the rising coal costs for electricity generation (DOE, 
2013).  
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Chapter 6 has shown that repurposing existing institutions was necessary to develop the 
LNG niche. Moreover, repurposing was no easy task but required an ongoing interface 
between a broad-based community that has interests in the LNG niche, which includes 
various government departments and the private sector, which over time have provided 
a supportive environment in which to complement shared resources. Examples of these 
include technical knowledge, operational processes and funding mechanisms shared 
between the two regimes.  
Likewise, in terms of actor coalition, the DOE has started to align its electricity plans to 
a much broader set of community members, as made clear by the gas-to-power and gas 
for industry plans of the DTI. Again, this goes to show that the DOE has become 
consciously diverse in their plans to end the electricity crisis in the country. With an 
uncertain field condition and an increasing set of heterogeneous actors, the regime has 
opened up to various interests, perceptions and ideas, leading to limited stability.  
Institutional changes: repurposed existing institutions 
This paper demonstrated that a further deterioration of the regime, as evidenced by its 
moderate to weak structure, can be exploited by strategic actors in ways other than 
those dictated by their taken for granted rules. Consequently, repurposing existing 
institutions between the two regimes necessitated the development of a niche. In other 
words, a weakened regime has opened up in a way that was previously constrained by 
structural features, has thus enabled the regime actors to reinterpret existing rules by 
supporting the LNG niche. Reinterpretation means that the regime actors strategically 
enacted existing rules differently, as was apparent by the DOE repurposing the IPP policy 
instrument, followed by redirection of cognitive and normative rules. Moreover, 
Chapter 6 has shown that repurposing existing rules was by no means a straightforward 
process but entailed a series of alignment of efforts, which enabled a multi-regime 
interaction between electricity and liquid fuels. In sum, as the regime opened itself to 
more diverse set actors and institutional arrangements, different sources of competing 
interests, perceptions and motivations developed. Thus, when the regime has low 
stability, and conditions are uncertain, it is conceivable that powerful actors could seize 
the opportunity by influencing transitions towards their interests. Therefore, by opening 
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up the regime to the extent that its structure became weak, the types of changes would 
be dependent on the actors present in the regime’s organisational field.  
Likewise, ST research suggests that regime instability can increase opportunities for a 
niche, or as Raven (2005) argued, too much regime instability leads to diminished niche 
development. In this research, regime instability was found to lead to niche 
development because, arguably, the DOE was a powerful actor, and the continued 
electricity crisis demanded solutions that no longer adhered to the norm. In this way, 
the features of breaking away from cognitive lock-in had begun the process of searching 
for solutions other than coal, or even ‘fit and conform’, such as renewables. However, 
the gas would require alignment with an industrial strategy in the country (with varying 
implications of scale – regional, national and local – and sectors – petrochemicals, steel 
and fertilisers – amongst others). Given this, using an endogenous institutional theory 
was essential to reveal how the regime responded to shifting internal and external 
pressures, and could, therefore, be useful in developing strategies that favour niche 
breakthroughs. Thus, as there was a weak regime structure, there became a space for 
electricity regime actors to interpret the set of existing rules and resources differently. 
In this state, opportunities emerged for a niche, but this was dependent on the 
alignment of perceived interests amongst existing regime actors. Therefore, strategies 
for niche development need to consider regime interests or enable regime decline, such 
that niches become viable options that regime actors can support. 
6.2.4 Summary of the three papers 
In sum, there has been an evolution of regime stability, from high in the first paper, 
limited in the second, towards low stability in the third. The institutional change 
identified in the second paper showed disagreement on the rules of the regime, as both 
resistance by Eskom and coexistence of a new rule supported by DOE were noticeable. 
ST literature would suggest that divergence or misalignment in rules is a source of 
tension in a regime which can lead to regime change. Thus, the second paper, which 
described the regime in a state of crisis, uncertain field conditions, the addition of new 
actors and limited regime stability, would imply that a fragmentation amongst the 
regime actors has begun to appear. The third paper indicates that, with the addition of 
the gas programme, there has been further technological disruption and an increasingly 
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complex set of institutional arrangements leading to low regime stability. The 
implication is that, as the regime opens up, there are then more actors in the 
organisation field, which are sources of various interests, levels of awareness and 
intentions. Furthermore, opening up the regime can lead to the emergence of different 
types of institutional changes, as was shown in Papers 2 and 3.  
The results of this research suggest that the cumulative regime instability (from limited 
to low regime stability) has led to a process of disintegration, as there are signs that the 
regime’s core rules are incoherent. For instance, it is still not clear what the various 
shares will be for coal, gas, renewables and other technologies in the country’s future 
energy generation mix. With this uncertainty, the field conditions are becoming 
complex, and evaluating the risks associated with the continued use of the coal-based 
electricity regime remains uncertain. There could also be diverse technology-based 
scenarios, in which an adjusted or new regulatory framework is needed. Overall, early 
features of a destabilised electricity regime point towards an institutional change called 
displacement. In the next section, I will discuss displacement using literature that is 
derived from the latest government updates and news articles.  
7.3  Displacement 
Displacement represents the ultimate form of institutional change, in which new rules 
replace old ones. In STs, this can mean the complete destabilisation of an existing regime 
and replacement by a niche. Taking into consideration the cumulative changes observed 
in Chapters 4-6, a discussion on displacement is necessary to provide a fuller and more 
nuanced implication of what effect this may have on regime stability and change.  
In addition to the inclusion of renewables and gas, there are empirical indications from 
the updated IRP of August 2018 that there will be a decommissioning of Eskom’s existing 
coal fleets. However, by no means is this a determinate direction whereby displacement 
of coal by sustainable energy technologies is guaranteed in the South African case. It has 
been stated that the average age of Eskom’s generation fleet is around 37 years, and 
hence reasonably mature (Eskom, 2013b; DOE, 2018a). The IRP has indicated that 75% 
of Eskom’s current coal fleet is scheduled for decommissioning by 2040 and some older 
plants are due to be closed as early as 2021 (Figure 7.1) (DOE, 2018a,  p. 62). In Figure 
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7.1, each bar that is represented illustrates the amount in GWs of Eskom’s existing coal 
fleets, which are to be decommissioned relative to that year.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: IRP-2018 for Eskom’s coal fleet decommissioning up to 2050 (DOE, 2018a,  
p. 62). 
The main question articulated by the IRP-2018 is what resources will substitute for the 
void. One issue being investigated is the security of supply, which is set against the 
country’s plan to decarbonise the electricity sector (DOE, 2018a,  p. 62). Steyn et al. 
(2017) stated that, given the long lead time in commissioning Medupi and Kusile, there 
is a risk of stranded assets, as well as surplus capacity, due to a decline in the country’s 
overall electricity demand. Hence, a suggestion is that, to meet the uncertain electricity 
demand, modular and flexible generation methods demanding less lead time are 
needed in future builds, which will be best achieved through renewable energy, battery 
storage and open-cycle gas turbines (Steyn et al., 2017). Therefore, it would seem that 
according to scholars such as Steyn et al. (2017), the continuation of using coal is 
increasingly being questioned given the plans for new gas and renewable energy 
sources, amongst others. This research considers that South Africa’s coal-fired electricity 
regime is now heading towards partial displacement since there are features of 
substantial alterations. Examples of these are increasing IPPs, plans for unbundling 
Eskom and decommissioning ageing coal fleets.  
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Insights relevant to the overall thesis  
Regime stability: low 
As of 2019, the electricity regime is still characterised as fractured because South Africa 
has shared energy resources amongst coal, renewables and gas over the period analysed 
to this date. In this regard, the stability of the coal-based electricity regime is considered 
low, with highly uncertain field conditions. These points are elaborated below.  
Structure: weak  
Eskom represents 17% of the total sovereign debt and is close to insolvency, which can 
have a detrimental impact on the country’s credit rating (Eskom, 2019).  Furthermore, 
Eskom is struggling to maintain operational stability,57 its sales volume has decreased,58  
and its business model is outdated. Subsequently, in line with a growing need to respond 
to Eskom’s worsening conditions, on February 2019, the South African President Cyril 
Ramaphosa promoted the unbundling of Eskom into three separate entities of 
generation, transmission and distribution subject to stakeholder engagement (see 
Appendix E).59 Thus, the core rule of Eskom being the supplier of last resort and provider 
of cheap and reliable electricity is becoming increasingly untenable. Hence, a decline in 
economic resources and a gradual loss of political and public support are examples of 
how the regime structure is weak.  
Agency: defection  
Empirically, there are signs of unbundling Eskom, but for almost one year, the latest IRP-
2018 has remained protracted, and the country has no plans for mitigating the 
intermittent blackouts.60 Thus, the finalisation of the IRP continues to be delayed, partly 
 
57 DONNELLY, L. 2019. DPE issues correction: Eskom not insolvent, but has “liquidity challenges” [Online]. 
Mail and Guardian. Available: https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-13-dpe-issues-correction-eskom-not-
insolvent-but-has-liquidity-challenges/ [Accessed 1 August 2019]. 
58 ESKOM 2017. Eskom 2018/19 Revenue Application Stakeholder Discussion. 
59 PRESIDENCY, T. 2019. State of the Nation Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa   
60 CREAMER, T. 2019a. IRP to be out of date by time of Cabinet approval as a result of 
protracted talks [Online]. Available: https://www.miningweekly.com/article/irp-to-be-out-of-
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due to the powerful National Economic Development and Labour Council’s (NEDLAC, 
see also Chapter 4) concerns about the limited use of coal, particularly as there are job 
losses associated with it.61 In essence, there is disagreement over the shares of 
renewables and coal in the country’s electricity regime between the DOE and business 
versus labour represented by the trade unions.62 In such cases, these are conditions 
which are highly uncertain, such that regime actors are not able to diagnose nor 
anticipate the risks to the system. Therefore, some early features of defection from the 
core rules are evident. In this circumstance, regime stability is low and open to a variety 
of unpredictable changes.  
Institutional changes: early features of partial displacement  
South Africa’s coal-based electricity regime is undergoing early features of 
destabilisation. Displacement represents the ultimate form of transition, and in this 
research, this feature has been found to characterise cumulative changes over time. 
Thus, each of the institutional changes observed, which includes coexistence with an 
incumbent and repurposing existing institutions, has contributed to radical changes. 
Therefore, wholesale change from a niche to a regime, as STs suggests, has in this case 
study emerged as the fractured form of a destabilised regime. Moreover, in this 
fractured state, the transition is ongoing, as there are numerous uncertainties, and as 
yet there is no resolution included in the country’s future electricity plans.  
7.4 Concluding statements  
One of the general concluding insights that have emerged is that changes in the regime 
involved complex endogenous processes. Hence, the traditional view of seeing socio-
 
date-by-time-of-cabinet-approval-as-a-result-of-protracted-talks-2019-07-24/rep_id:3650 
[Accessed 1 August 2019]. 
61 CREAMER, T. 2019b. IRP will serve before Cabinet only in September as Nedlac process drags 
on [Online]. Available: https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/irp-will-serve-before-
cabinet-only-in-september-as-nedlac-process-drags-on-2019-07-11 [Accessed 1 August 2019]. 
62YELLAN, C. & LILEY, R. 2019. Paralysis over South Africa’s IRP for electricity presents massive 
economic risk [Online]. Available: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-17-
paralysis-over-south-africas-irp-for-electricity-presents-massive-economic-risk/ [Accessed 1 
August 2019]. 
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technical change as a punctuated equilibrium, where radical innovation takes place in 
the niche, may miss out on how the regime deliberates and negotiates the shifting 
pressures occurring both internally and externally to the regime. Using an endogenous 
institutional theory, the research was able to comprehensively investigate the regime, 
such that different kinds of changes became evident. The benefit of using this approach 
provided insights into specific parts of the regime which had enabled resistance, such as 
discursive structures, the ways in which the regime became fractured over time and the 
dynamic and emergent nature of the regime–niche interactions. These are discussed in 
the subsequent paragraphs.  
7.4.1 Theoretical contributions  
Fractured regime: a gradual form of disintegration  
This thesis has shown that regime destabilisation emerged as a fractured regime, as 
there is the coexistence of the coal incumbent with the niches of RE I4P and Gas I4P, by 
way of the country’s present and future electricity generation plans (Papers 2-3). There 
is evidence to suggest that the structure of the regime has progressively changed from 
strong to moderate and then to weak. Arguably, the fractured electricity regime is 
indicative of the difficulty in trying to achieve sustainability changes in South Africa. This 
is apparent through the empirical cases of resistance by the incumbent, coexistence 
with renewables, repurposing existing institutions and early features of displacement. 
Thus, in contrast to the assumed punctuated equilibrium change associated with the 
regime, destabilisation in this context was a gradual form of disintegration. The 
maintenance of core rules was possible when the structural conditions of the electricity 
regime were relatively stable. However, where the structure of electricity regime 
became moderate to weak, then regime actors began to reform and reinterpret and 
started to defect from established practices, routines and core assumptions and beliefs. 
This may help to explain why the electricity regime had resisted change but also 
participated in supporting the gas niche, which was dependent on the structural 
conditions over time. The fractured regime observed in this case study contributes to 
broader research on the types of regime which are present in the Global South context 
(Wieczorek, 2018), where conditions are often fluid, messy and unpredictable. In this 
203 
 
instance, the changes observed were highly contested and fraught due to various 
dimensions (markets, organisation networks, discursive structures, public policies and 
infrastructure) along with the regime selection environment.  
Selection environment: discourse and transparency  
The interaction amongst discourse, institutional context and interests, which formed the 
discursive structure in the MEC, was a formidable obstacle to change. The discourse 
around mining and energy, in line with state developmental objectives and in 
combination with an endorsement from industry and trade unions, constituted a 
powerful core regime alliance (Papers 1-2). The empirical cases showed that the 
discursive structures were perpetuated by regime actors present in the MEC who had 
vested interests and associated ideologies and beliefs in maintaining regime stability. 
Nevertheless, as Paper 2 has revealed, there are also strategies which could be 
formulated to counter such parts of regime maintenance and resistance, by opening up 
the regime to more public scrutiny, which can create conditions that exacerbate the 
tensions within the incumbent. Broadening these insights further, discourse and 
transparency could be entry points as the basis for developing counter strategies to 
regime resistance, which may achieve some degree of regime destabilisation. Future 
research is needed on how discursive structures and other dimensions of the regime 
selection environment reveal similar or different dynamics in other kinds of regimes.  
Regime–niche interaction is dynamic and emergent  
Earlier work of the MLP assumes that, as the regime destabilises, there is then an 
opportunity for niches. Thus, the assumption is that there is a proportional relationship, 
which means the more significant the instability of the regime, the greater the 
opportunity for niches. Conversely, Raven (2005) posited that the relationship between 
a regime and niche could be paradoxical, in that too much regime instability causes a 
decrease in niche opportunity. These assertions are helpful, but not explicit in how 
regime instability leads to regime change. This research postulates a more nuanced 
assumption, as the findings reveal that the levels of regime instability resulted in 
different institutional changes, and by implication, niche opportunities (Figure 7.2). For 
instance, in Paper 2, Eskom was found to have tried to defend the cracks in the electricity 
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regime by resisting RE I4P. However, as the electricity regime continued to weaken, 
Eskom’s position diminished, allowing the DOE, another regime actor, space to 
manoeuvre in a way that it became receptive to changes, such as the coexistence of the 
RE I4P alongside Eskom (Paper 2) and later the repurposing of existing rules to develop 
the LNG niche (Paper 3). The suggestion is that transitions develop in many directions, 
of which sustainability is just one such form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   A      B 
Figure 7.2 Relationship between regime stability and niche opportunities defined by 
Raven (2005). A depiction of Raven’s hypothesis (A) versus the findings in the current 
research (B). The dotted lines depend on the ongoing mediation between strategic 
actors  
Moreover, as the type of actors became heterogenous in the organisational field, so did 
an increase in opportunity for strategic negotiation and deliberation amongst the actors. 
This was the case when South Africa introduced renewables and later gas, resulting in 
private sector participation in the electricity regime. The suggestion here is that changes 
in actor network compositions and actor coalitions could lead to different types of 
regime changes. Thus, in this case, study, the regime–niche interactions were emergent 
and dynamic, which could result in niche contraction or expansion. Thus, as the regime 
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opens up over time, there are then more actors (with varying interests, ideas, 
preferences and values) in the organisational field, contributing to various opportunities 
for strategic deliberation. Therefore, the relationship between regime disintegration 
and niche opportunities requires finer nuances because the outcomes are dependent 
on field conditions, types of actors present in the field and temporal sequences that may 
already have unfolded. These kinds of empirical insights from the case study contrast 
with the notion of a regime as monolithic or inert, and instead, show that it is actively 
resistant and resourceful. Hence, more research is needed, which examines evolving 
regime resistance or regime endorsement of a niche in different empirical contexts.  
7.4.2 Empirical contributions  
This study has shown that South Africa’s electricity sector is in a state of considerable 
flux, where numerous developments are occurring at various times. It has, therefore, 
contributed to limited empirical findings on South Africa’s case studies on renewable 
energy and gas against the coal-entrenched regime. 
Moreover, South Africa is now implementing a just transitions pathway, that will enable 
the country to move towards becoming a low-carbon resilient society.63 Related to 
energy, some issues that required addressing were the continuation of fossil fuel-based 
energy systems, increasing electricity tariffs, energy access, and suitability of Eskom as 
a monopoly. Some of the plans proposed were to set deep decarbonisation targets for 
the country, which ultimately will lead to a net zero carbon emission pathway.64 The 
findings of this research thus come at an opportune time because the kinds of issues 
examined, such as incumbent resistance, together with niche opportunities, are in line 
with the country’s ambitions for just transitions. This research suggests that to move the 
country forward towards a low-carbon resilient society, a systemic change in various 
electricity regime dimensions, such as the market, organisational networks, discursive 
structures, policies and infrastructure, is needed. This can include certainty in the 
market rules, disrupting existing organisational networks aligned to mining and energy, 
 
63 National Planning Commission (NPC), Chapter 5, Transitions to a low-carbon economy. 
https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch5_0.pdf 
64Developing models and pathways for a low-carbon economy and resilient society. 
https://www.sustainable.org.za/project.php?id=55 
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developing a discourse on alternative resources for electricity generation other than 
coal, aligning policies, targets or standards that enable sustainable technologies and, 
finally, adopting technologies and infrastructure that cater to flexible, modular, and 
decentralised demand. In effect, a deep transition would require changes in the 
regulative, cognitive and normative lock-in that has pervaded the country’s energy 
landscape for several decades.  
7.4.3 Policy recommendations  
The destabilisation of a regime needs to take into consideration both winners (niches) 
and losers (regime) from the transition. As such, both the decline in the use of coal and 
stimulating alternative green options must be tackled simultaneously. This can then 
move the country in a direction towards sustainable development. Directionality means 
there are deliberate attempts to abandon existing pathways because failing to do so can 
mean existing trajectories may simply be replicated or extended. 
In this regard, this question could be asked: What kind of policies would be needed to 
enhance structural weakness in the regime, and thereby stimulate an agency directed 
towards institutional change? The answer may, in turn, facilitate the decline of the 
regime, and thereby accelerate the desired sustainable transition. Here, a suggestion is 
to consider a temporally sensitive displacement policy mix that could lead to complete 
regime destabilisation. By this, I mean that different types of policies are formulated and 
implemented depending on the relative stability of the regime. If, for example, the 
structural conditions are not conducive for incumbents to defect from or abandon core 
rules, policies can attend to mitigating resistance by regimes or providing incentives for 
incumbents. However, if the regime is more receptive to changes, or there is a period of 
instability, a layered approach could be considered, as a fit and conform strategy. If the 
regime opens up more, or there is limited to low stability, there needs to be a policy that 
can induce persistent destabilisation. This can include a combination of phase-out 
policies (Rogge and Johnstone, 2017), creative destruction (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016) and 
discontinuation governance (Stegmaier et al., 2014), instead of sweeping initiatives that 
lack consideration of regime stability conditions. There are then different types of 
displacement policies that are more effective and appropriate. 
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For those on the losing end of a transition, specific policies are needed that can provide 
viable alternatives. For example, several studies are now addressing the potential 
impact of coal phase-out in various communities (UNEP, 2017). Some proposals include 
unemployment insurance for displaced workers (Louie and Pearce, 2016), coal phase-
out agreements, the establishment of worker transition centres (Wiseman et al., 2017) 
and a coal exit commission that has social protection and economic diversification 
plan,65 amongst others. South Africa would need to address specific regional parts of the 
country that are most vulnerable to coal phase-out, particularly the resistance by the 
powerful trade unions. Perhaps that can include a social contract which involves 
government, business and local communities, which includes a road map for gradual the 
phase-out of coal, with some forms of social protection and a reskilling programme for 
regional diversification.  
7.4.4 Limitations and future research  
Socio-technical systems are, by definition, comprised of material and social elements 
(e.g. technologies, market institutions, user practices, societal values, etc.), each of 
which evolves interdependently with the others over time. Analysis of socio-technical 
systems, therefore, requires attention to all the elements and their interdependent co-
evolution. Still, there is no standard method stipulating what the balance of attention 
across the elements should be. That is, there is no standard method specifying, for 
example, that each element should receive equal treatment in the analysis. Instead, the 
balance of attention is an analytical decision dependent on the focus of any specific 
research enquiry. For this thesis, I focussed on regime stability and change in terms of 
structural dynamics and kinds of agency in the face of regime internal and external 
pressures. The critical co-evolutionary process at the heart of this focus was that 
between the electricity regime’s stability and its core rules, revealed by following the 
strategic efforts of regime actors trying to maintain or shape the selection environment 
that would most likely ensure regime stability. Thus, my analytical decision was to 
provide enough detail on the technical change that the reader could understand these 
 
65 Commission on growth, structural change and employment. 
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/commission-on-growth-structural-change-and-
employment.html 
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dynamics, both in contextual terms and in terms of specific actor efforts, while leaving 
enough space for a thorough examination of the dynamics of regime stability. 
Consequently, my analysis is less ‘technical’ and more ‘social’ than many other socio-
technical analyses, relying instead on broad characteristics of technologies as sufficient 
for the reader to grasp the significance of specific pressures: e.g. the threat of a 
renewables-based electricity niche to the dominance of a mainly coal-fired electricity 
regime, especially in the context of a need for climate change mitigation and, for 
example, the more specific rapid reductions in costs of renewables. A more detailed 
analysis of the micro developments of technologies and technological change would 
have been possible. Still, I would argue that such detail would not be necessary to 
understand the different types of threats (from renewables) or opportunities (with gas) 
facing the coal-based regime. Therefore, I gave the ‘technical’ a minor role in my 
analysis, allowing enough space for a detailed analysis of the relationships between rule 
changes, actor strategies, structural dynamics, and regime stability and change. 
 
In term of limitations, this thesis described the findings from a single country study, and 
could, therefore, be further expanded with cross-country comparisons. Moreover, there 
is a limitation in how other technologies, such as nuclear, biogas and hydropower, relate 
to the overall electricity regime transformation.  
If the fossil fuel-based regime continues as it currently is, it appears that gas could 
outcompete renewables in the future. As it has been shown, South Africa’s electricity 
regime transitions unfolded at first with a hopeful change of introducing the RE I4P. 
However, what followed was that the electricity regime became receptive to other 
resources such as gas, amongst others, as part of diversifying the electricity generation 
mix. This means that changes in the regime are open to fossil fuel interests, whereby 
new or varying permutations of transitions can occur.  
Relatedly, in South Africa, much of what determines electricity reform is closely tied to 
its industrial policy. If it indeed pursues or continues to lock itself into energy-intensive 
primary sector-driven mining activities, it may miss the opportunity to shift the economy 
to address its triple challenge of reducing inequality, addressing job creation and 
reducing poverty. As of August 2019, the country has reached its highest unemployment 
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rate in the last two decades, as it now stands at 29%.66 It seems the country is at a tipping 
point, and its electricity crisis is part of a much broader socio-economic development 
challenge. More research is needed that considers industrial and energy policies 
together, such as low-carbon resilient economic growth. This may enable a shift to 
labour absorptive industries, while simultaneously addressing its climate change goals.  
In terms of expanding on the theoretical insights, I suggest that the strand of research 
on linking agency to different types of institutional work would be useful in 
complementing the empirical and theoretical contributions (Lawrence, 2006; Battilana 
and D'Aunno, 2009). Expansion of the current research could explore the varying levels 
of the structural weakness of the regime, and the types of rule changes observed can be 
linked to the institutional work of creation, maintenance and disruption (Lawrence, 
2006). Hence, there is a potential to develop a typology of regime change, whereby 
specific rules are linked to different types of institutional work, one in which resistance, 
redirecting and nurturing niches are investigated. It seems that, with a highly resistant 
regime, a system could be vulnerable to intermittent crises, and this can lead to opening 
up spaces for niche development. The solution could be through layering if a niche is 
readily available or has had some prior introduction. However, if no such niches are 
available, repurposing could follow, provided there are existing policy instruments, or if 
the infrastructure is amenable for repurposing. This may explain why, in this case, study, 
a layered approach was feasible because the RE I4P was sufficiently developed. Lastly, 
displacement could be conceived as systematic destabilisation of the regime, such that 
resistance and niche development are both addressed. As the case studies have shown, 
these changes are dependent on the underlying institutional settings in which the rules 
are embedded. Moreover, as changes are subject to ongoing mediation amongst actors, 
which tend to favour those who have more significant resources in terms of social, 
political and financial capital, future research on different types of changes would enrich 
the conceptual framework developed in this study.  
 
66 StatsSA, Quarter Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for the second quarter of 2019, 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12376 
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This research could also contribute to a contemporary research agenda of 
transformative innovation policy (TIP).67 Here, TIP examines new innovation policies that 
aim to go beyond the market failure or the national system’s innovation approach. 
Instead, the focus is on social needs at the forefront of formulating policies. Part of this 
research agenda is finding new ways of opening up the regime and unlocking path 
dependencies through various experimental forms in policy engagements that include 
unlearning and being reflexive of existing routines, practices and directionality 
(deliberate attempts to abandon existing pathways) (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). The 
findings of this research show the dynamism of regime actions which have emerged 
associated with different institutional changes as the regime became unstable. These 
types of efforts, such as resistance, layering, repurposing, and defection, can contribute 
to TIP research in opening up the regime.  
Lastly, opening up the regime could benefit by mobilising social movement theory, 
drawing on ‘non-institutionalised’ forms of a coalition, such as strikes, protests and 
petitions (Geels, 2010,  p. 506). As shown in this research, discursive structures were 
essential parts of the regime that enabled resistance but were also parts by which the 
niche could develop counter strategies, such as increased public scrutiny and 
exacerbating regime tension. Thus, social movements can be effective means to frame 
discourses against an incumbent or to nurture niches through public channels (Hess, 
2014). More research is needed which pays attention to non-institutionalised forms of 
action, with an emphasis on civic participation that is effective in contesting dominant 
narratives and ideologies. Perhaps effective strategies for regime destabilisation could 
take note of increasingly organised civil society coalitions, such as extinction rebellion 
and divestment campaigns, as part of the narratives in addressing climate change as an 
emergency.  
7.4.5. Summary 
In conclusion, this thesis has revealed the enormous challenge that a country, such as 
South Africa, must face in trying to achieve a more sustainable electricity regime. Mining 
and energy have been intimately tied to the country’s socio-economic development 
 
67 Transformative Innovation Policy Consortium (TIPC) http://www.tipconsortium.net/ 
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plans for many decades. However, contemporary challenges that place demands on 
countries to move away from fossil fuel-based industries, as part of the broader SDGs is 
fast approaching. The ambition to reach the SDGs by 2030 seems a daunting task, 
particularly for developing countries that need to balance trade-offs and synergies 
amongst multiple priorities, such as inequality, job creation and poverty reduction. This 
research has delineated the kind of changes that unfold when a regime undergoes 
various challenges over time. Given this complexity, it is essential that more research 
attends to inter-disciplinary theoretical frames that include power and politics, as well 
as social, cultural and market dimensions and that appreciate the dynamism in socio-
technical change. Doing so can generate knowledge, practices and experiences that are 
both socially engaged and empirically grounded, which may enable an accelerated socio-
technical transition.  
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Appendix A: Details of the interviews  
 
Sector Organization Main issues Date of interviews Number 
of 
interviews 
Industry/private 
sector 
Former EIUG chair consulted on IRP.  South Africa should be the gravel pit; 
beneficiation does not make sense.  
2 March 2016 
 
15 July 2015 
2 
 Member of the South African Photovoltaic Industrial 
Association (SAPVIA). Part of the Business Unit of 
South Africa (Busa) energy task team 
Eskom is heading towards a utility death 
spiral 
7 March 2016 1 
 Member of the South African Independent Power 
Producers Association (SAIPPA) and former 
chairperson for Parliamentary Portfolio on Energy  
Eskom very resistant to ISMO 7 March 2016 1 
 Business Development Manager at Wartsila 
(gas/industry) 
Cannot say for sure that a volume of LNG is 
used per KWh, its more critical the gas gets 
used (power or not) 
15 March 2016 1 
 Senior Manager for utilities, in petrochemical 
company. A member of the EIUG  
Nersa and Eskom had a broken relationship.  
Sasol has built a gas to power plant in 
Sasolburg. The wheeling agreement was easy 
because it was from Sasol to Sasol plants. 
15 March 2016 1 
 Provincial gas initiative- Green cape Preparing EIAs in Atlantis to get them ready 
for Gas to power bids 
6 April 2016 1 
 
 Senior Manager on oil and gas, a legal firm. Part of the 
task team in finalizing the dti gas industrial unit (GIU).  
South Africa does not have a gas market, 
what Sasol has developed is not a market 
15 April 2016 1 
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 Investment Banking, Barclays Africa, Power Utilities 
and Infrastructure 
Good overview of RE I4P finance 
 
14 June 2016 1 
 Senior Manager of a petrochemical company  Sasol is basing its growth on assumptions that 
it requires gas and not coal 
4 May 2016 1 
 Vice President of Oil and Gas for Barclays in Africa The financial sense for Mozambique 
providing gas to South Africa needs time.   
6 June 2016 1 
 Senior Manager for sustainable development in 
petrochemical company  
See paper on Eskom secure in power 7 June 2016 1 
 Working on Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) for 
industrial use.  
Worked at Sasol on the Mozambique gas 
project 
13 July 2016 1 
 Former Advisor to the Energy Minister. Eskom resistant to renewable energy. Have a 
look at the potential solar corridor on the 
northern cape.  
22 July 2016 1 
 Manager at Anglo Gold Ashanti Mines are load shifting as a response to 
Eskom grid instability. Safety is a crucial issue 
during load shedding 
15 October 2015 1 
 Member of the South African Oil and Gas Association 
(SAGOA)  
Pivot of mining skills to oil and gas (Karin 
Project)  
19 April 2016 1 
 Member of the South African Photovoltaic Industrial 
Association (SAPVIA)  
Eskom changing rules for connection to the 
grid. 
18 April 2016 1 
 Executive Business Development, Saldanha Bay, IDZ The role of SEZs in South Africa’s gas 
industrialization strategy (somewhat 
repurposing existing IDZ into specialized 
zones)  
3 June 2016 1 
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Total     18 
Government   
SOEs Eskom executive  Nuclear was a clear issue at Eskom-
understand the decisions are based on an 
energy mix 
28 September 2015 1 
 Eskom environmental economist  Too much too soon, with CO2 tax, IRP 
determines what to build. 
17 March 2016 
26 June 2015 
2 
 Eskom senior manager on pricing  Industries do subsidize tariffs-take note of 
this issue when it comes to tariff changes in 
the future  
22 March 2016 1 
 Eskom senior manager on power systems  Duck curve does seem a threat in the future  5 July 2016  
Industrial 
Development 
Corporation (IDC) 
IDC Project Development manager Incoherent energy policies need better 
alignment 
1 July 2015 1 
Total     5 
DOE IPP office Gas has many moving parts. The RFQ should 
be out by June 2016 
4 March 2016 1 
 IPP office  The IRP has not been realised yet, paying 
caution to the nuclear issue 
29 October 2015 1 
 Independent energy consultant, also now at IPP office 
(industry) 
Eskom needs a complete overhaul.  Right 
maintenance is not being done 
10 March 2016 1 
 Senior Manager on integrated energy planning Does not agree that IRP was prioritized over 
IEP 
15 September 2015 1 
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 Manager on integrated energy planning Check the industrial sector energy 
consumption- National Cleaner Production 
Centre 
30 October 2015 1 
Gauteng local 
government  
Project manager:  
Gauteng Infrastructure Financing Agency (GIFA) 
Gas to power, in all government hospitals 10 March 2016 1 
Parliamentary 
officials  
Senior African National Congress, Member of 
Parliament (MP), former Minister 
Good insight about the developmental state, 
and how this is still an essential narrative 
within government and how it handles SOEs 
21 April 2016 1 
 Former African National Congress, Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
SOEs are employment agencies 3 March 2016 
17 April 2016 
2 
Nersa Nersa regulatory specialist on Electricity Eskom slipped in rules during times of crisis 12 July 2016 1 
Department of 
Environmental 
Affairs (DEA) 
Senior Manager in climate change transportation  Climate change mitigation is being guided 
towards Desired Emissions Reductions 
(DERO) 
29 September 2015 1 
 Manager in climate change and mitigation  See the national climate change (NCR) 
response to low carbon development in the 
country  
30 September 2015 1 
Department of 
Science and 
Technology (DST) 
Manager in environment and technology  There is a groundswell of activities in climate 
change and renewable energy activities 
21 August 2015 
 
25 May 2016 
2 
The Department 
of Trade and 
Industry (dti) 
Manager on renewable energy at the dti Take note of the importance of localization of 
initiatives around renewables.   
20 July 2015 1 
 A senior manager in dti, oil and gas   Gas industrialization strategy and the unit is 
about to launch and clarified.    
31 March 2016 1 
Total     16 
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Think tanks  Senior economist at a South African think tank  Unbundling of Eskom study is considered, but 
it remains under state ownership.  
10 March 2016 
13 May 2016 
29 October 2015 
3 
 Former Deputy Director General (DDG) at a 
government department, now a researcher at a South 
African think thank 
Eskom eats strategy for breakfast- culture at 
Eskom has a way of protecting its own 
interests at all costs. 
11 May 2016 1 
 Researcher-Mistra  Pay attention to the politics of demand 
forecasting.  
2 March 2016 
 
10 July 2015 
 
2 
Total    6 
Consultants Consultant-infrastructure and regulatory economist Nersa does not have the political will to 
challenge DOE determinations. It is more 
rubber stamping duties. But it is more 
assertive over time.  
13 April 2016 
 
13 August 2015 
2 
 Consultant/academic Part of the working group on Gas 
industrialization strategy (GIU). The non-gas 
to power is very important. Importing LNG 
should be more than electricity use, but also 
industry, transport, and households.  
14 April 2016 
 
1 
 Consultant and knowledgeable expert on the Mineral 
Energy Complex (MEC) 
Understand the floor and ceiling prices of 
Eskom. Check EAF, UCLF, and Eskom 
operation parameters 
12 June 2015 
 12 July 2016 
2 
 Associated researcher at the Energy Research Centre-
University of Cape Town (ERC-UCT) and consultant 
Long term mitigation strategy (LTMS) and its 
alignment to the country’s low carbon 
strategies.   
13 July 2015 1 
 Former Eskom executive in Enterprise development   Financial structure of Eskom is a signal you 
can analyze to see if there are triggers there 
for change.   
17 June 2016 1 
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Total     7 
Academics     
 Researcher at the Energy Research Centre-University 
of Cape Town (ERC-UCT) 
Mixed messages concerning Eskom is also a 
finding 
12 April 2016 2 
 Researcher at the Energy Research Centre-University 
of Cape Town (ERC-UCT) 
Location of new coal sources is a tension to 
the old model. Significant infrastructure 
requirements, questions to cost plus model.   
11 November 2015 
7 April 2016 
 
2 
 Professor-School of Economics, University of 
Johannesburg (UJ) 
Financialisation is also about strategy, 
moving money out of the country.  
16 July 2015 
 
2 
 Professor UCT- Business school  Eskom often employs malicious compliance. 
Part of the Deputy President working team 
on proposed bundling of Eskom.  The 
narrative is now re-arranging state assets as 
opposed to unbundling (more politically 
sensitive). As a way to appease trade union in 
unbundling Eskom could be re-arrangement 
of state-owned assets.   
12 April 2016 1 
 Professor in the School of Economics -UCT Special Economic Zones (SEZs)- corporate tax 
is around 15%. Consider this for Gas I4P 
9 May 2016 1 
 Centre for Competition Regulation and Economic 
Development (CCRED) 
Historical frame is that mining sector remains 
competitive to ensure economic 
development.  There is, therefore, an 
electricity supply bias in this perspective.   
24 March 2016 1 
Total    8 
NGOs Researcher at WWF policy futures IPPs is an eye wash, Eskom is stuck  3 March 2016 2 
 Researcher at WWF policy futures WWF has the convening power, Eskom is 
stuck in a political economy  
15 December 2015 
16 February 2015 
3 
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11 April 2016 
 Researcher at SEA (Sustainable Energy Africa)   15 April 2016 1 
Total    6 
Final Total    67 
 
Appendix B: Interview questions 
 
MEC and Eskom 
 What is the current overall sentiment that Eskom has on the country energy system?  (Underlying thoughts-are we still in danger of more load 
shedding in the future, or are the existing strategies place good enough to steer us in the clear?)   
 Given the historical strategy of Eskom in the 1970s to build plants with a view of oversupply, and that it’s such an integral part of growing the 
economy, is this still valid under the present situation?  There may be a danger that we repeat the 40% reserve margin in the 1990s, which could 
again determine the type of customers that Eskom procurers from.   
 What are Eskom’s thoughts on base load, is this a problem, do future energy supply have to address this?  
 How does energy planning (Eskom supply) match that of the country’s ambition for re-industrialisation and beneficiation? (The implications here are 
that energy intensive beneficiation would require base load options, then how does energy planning match accordingly?) (More questions for DOE, 
but how does Eskom align to policy-if any?) 
o How is DOE planning energy according to demand?  
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 How does Eskom work with industry, given that mining and manufacturing are its biggest customers? (probe for EIUG working group relations) 
 How does Eskom work with Nersa through the MYPD applications (probe for capabilities and knowledge base) (Ask Nersa the same question) 
 For Nersa-how, does the MYPD price application work, and what is the relationship with Eskom through these negotiations?  
 Could you elaborate on how Eskom derives its calculations pertaining to return on assets (Broad), depreciation, operating and primary energy costs, 
and claw back mechanisms? (see SAIPPA- Not allowing for the full cost of generation in the tariff, will result in the Eskom tariff being artificially 
low and IPP’s will not be treated on an equitably basis in the South African electricity market).  
 Is it true that Eskom request for price increase through the MYPDs is becoming unaffordable, if so how does it handle this situation? (Probe 
questions about its relationship with Nersa) 
o Related question-How is Eskom adjusting to cost reflective tariffs?   
o How does Eskom continue under economic conditions which are unaffordable for state funding and intervention? How does it move 
forward in the future, given all these uncertainties?  (probe for privatization narrative)  
 There seems to be growing appreciation for privatisation of Eskom because the state cannot continue to bail out the over stressed SOE? Is this true? 
(probe on discursive narratives about privatization) (ask DOE and Eskom on this)  
 What are Eskom’s thoughts on the successful RE IPPP?  (Probe for conversion here, using IPP for other dirty fuels such as coal)  
 What is the status of the IRP 2?  
 Why is Eskom delaying the connection of renewable energy into the grid? (Questions for infrastructure) (There is a case here where the roll out of the 
RE IPPP could be too fast for Eskom to adjust, how does it manage this situation?) (there could be a mismatch between budget, time and 
implementation) 
 Is it the case that the implementation of the IRP may be too fast for Eskom to adjust? (Did the MYPD 3 budget take into consideration time, budget of 
the IPPs?) 
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 To ask EIUG and chamber of mines- what is the working relationship with Eskom, and how does it communicate its energy-related issues with Eskom 
and government for policies? 
o What are its thoughts on wheeling, and are there plans to wheel electricity directly from renewable energy or gas producers? 
 Chamber of mines- what is the overall sentiment on the energy supply issues in the country? 
o How does it adjust to cost-reflective tariffs?  
o What are its thoughts on privatizing parts of Eskom? 
o What are its thoughts on the IPP programme, relative to energy, coal and gas? 
RE I4P 
 Please describe the process: how, when, why, and by whom, was renewable energy initiated in the country? 
 Could you tell me more of how the IPP came into formation?  
 Are there impending changes to the IPP office given its success? (Probe for ISMO bill status, and how this office could be the implementing agent 
for that bill) 
 Who does the IPP office it derive its mandate from?  (Look out for New Generation capacity of 2009. Probe for accountability, and from which 
government departments does it constitute, relate it to organizational capacity, knowledge base) 
 How does the IPP office participate, provide inputs, or how is it consulted during electricity price negotiations or not? (What task teams is it 
involved in, considering the electricity planning in the country). 
 How does the work of the IPP office align to energy policy? (for example in the IRP, and Integrated Energy Planning-IEP) 
 What are some of the challenges, barriers that IPP face, in order to mainstream their activities?  
 How do IPPs engage with government, regulators, legislators, lobby groups and industry?    
 It seems that the IPP has strong relations with the private sectors? Is this true? (has good credibility given the risks involved) 
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 Are IPPs involved in any wheeling agreement with vital industrial stakeholders? (probe for bypassing Eskom completely and going directly to 
mining companies) 
 SAIPP (South Africa Independent Power Producers association) - How does the SAIPP network respond to the IRP? What are its thoughts of the 
future of IPP in the country? 
 DOE- in the IRP there was mentioned of the solar corridor as an infrastructure development to support the roll out of renewables, what is that 
status on this?  
 DOE- the RE IPP has been very successful, what are lessons that can be learnt from this? 
 DOE-how is government handling the increasing costs of Eskom MYPD applications?  Is the option of IPP a mechanism for the future?  (it would 
seem that the IPP is a side stepping mechanism in order to mitigate the monopoly of Eskom?) 
 SAPVIA, Sastela, SAWEA, SAIPPP (all renewable energy networks) - what are the challenges, threats and opportunities for renewable energy in the 
country? 
o What are its sentiments on IPP programme? 
o How does it participate, provide inputs and work with Eskom, regulators, policy makers and industrial networks? (probe for organizational 
networks, and associations) 
Paper 3 
 Please describe the process: how, when, why, and by whom, was gas initiated in the country? 
 How does the gas IPP align to the country energy plan and industrial development? 
 Could you tell me more about the gas to power IPP?  
 Could you tell me about the term “anchor demand” as a way of implementing the use of gas in the country?  
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 Given that there will be high costs involved with infrastructure for gas to be fully realized, is this not a barrier? (Probe for alignment with existing oil 
and gas infrastructure, why spend so much on this and not the solar corridor?) 
 Could you give me an update of the Gas Utilization Master Plan (GUMP)? How does it align to the MRPDA?   
 Why are we pursuing industrial strategies that contradict green growth? 
 How does industry perceive the plans for Gas IPP, and what are its broader implications? (probe for discursive narratives on broader applications of 
gas) 
 SAGOA (South Africa Oil and Gas Association) - what are its thoughts on the gas to power programme? 
 What are the plans for gas to power in the country? (Would this be related to mid merit load? Probe for flexibility of gas and how it could facilitate 
more use of renewables)  
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Appendix C: Overview of the secondary data sources used in data 
collection  
 
Types of data sources Relevant examples of 
sources 
Relevance to the thesis  
Government documents White Paper on Energy, 
(1998) 
White Paper on 
Renewable Energy (2003) 
State of Renewables 
(2015) 
 
Industrial Policy Action 
Plan (annual by the dti) 
 
 
National Development 
Plan (NDP, 2012) 
 
 
Integrated Resources Plan 
(IRP, 2010, update 2013, 
2019) 
 
 
Significant energy policies 
formulated by 
government.   
 
 
 
Relevant for gas 
industrialisation plans in 
the country. 
 
Key national priorities-
which articulates socio-
economic goals.   
 
Critical strategy which 
articulates the energy mix 
that can meet the 
electricity needs of the 
country. 
Regulatory documents  Multi Year Price 
Determination (MYPD) 
reports by NERSA  
 
Electricity Regulation Act 
(ERA), 2006-Section 34 
 
New Generation Capacity 
(2011) 
 
Relevant for insights into 
NERSA mandates, 
decisions made on tariffs 
changes, IPP policy 
instruments 
Parliamentary hearings  
 
 
The Mineral Resources 
and Energy Portfolio 
Committee  
 
 
The Environment, 
Forestry, and Fisheries 
Portfolio Committee 
 
 
 
Key energy policy debates, 
IRP updates, quarterly 
performance, electricity 
tariffs,  
 
Plans for reduction in GHG 
emissions, ratification of 
Paris Agreement all have 
implications on Eskom, 
and RE I4P 
implementation.  
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The Public Enterprises 
Portfolio Committee 
 
 
Standing Committee on 
Appropriations  
 
 
Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts (SCOPA) 
 
 
 
 Shareholder Ministry-
convenes numerous 
stakeholder engagements 
 
Eskom special 
appropriation bills  
 
 
Scrutinises financial 
statements, Eskom board 
decisions and forensic 
investigations.    
Industry reports  Eskom reports- Integrated 
results, released annually  
 
 
 International Gas Union 
(IGU) 
 
 
Critical documents, which 
outlines key developments 
in Eskom 
 
Global association which 
provides rich technical 
data into gas.   
Newspaper articles  Business Day 
 
Mail and Guardian  
 
Engineering news  
Up to date developments 
and policy debates, 
particularly useful in 
formulating questions for 
interviewees, in order to 
validate statements or 
quotes made in public 
records.      
Academic articles  International Journals- 
Environmental Innovation 
and Societal Transitions 
(EIST), Energy policy, 
Energy Research and 
Social Science (ERSS),  
 
South African Journals- 
Journal of Energy, Journal 
of Southern African 
Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgy (SAIMM) 
Useful theoretical insights 
into sustainability 
transitions, energy 
research and policy 
 
 
 
Useful for gaining insights 
into local research 
concerning Eskom, mining, 
coal and gas.   
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Appendix D: Glossary of salient terms and definition 
 
Terms  Definitions 
Agency  In this research, agency is defined as the capacity of actors to 
express action through routines, habits, the imagination of possible 
alternatives of the future and practical judgement of ambiguous or 
constantly evolving circumstances in the present (Emirbayer and 
Mische, 1998). 
Conversion  
 
Redeployment of old institutions to new purposes and new goals.  
Drift 
 
According to institutional change theory, drift represents an effort 
to hold on to existing rules in the face of contextual change, where 
that change creates a need for new rules (Hacker et al., 2015). 
Displacement 
 
Removal of existing rules and replacing them with new ones. 
Layering 
 
Layering is a mode of institutional change in which a new rule is 
added to existing rules rather than replacing them outright (Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005). 
Regime  
 
 
Relatively stable and aligned sets of rules directing the behaviour of 
actors along the trajectory of incremental innovation, present in a 
single socio-technical system (Geels and Shot, 2010, p. 12). The 
combination of rules and resources, in turn, manifests itself in 
recurrent patterns of practice (e.g. the trajectory towards 
incremental innovation in mature system). 
Rule 
 
A humanly devised constraint that structures human action leading 
to a regular pattern of practice, present in a single socio-technical 
system (Schot and Kanger, 2018). The rules of socio-technical 
regimes account for the stability and lock in of socio-technical 
systems. Building on neo-institutional theory, Geels (2004) using 
Scott’s (2008) three rules proposed that regimes contain three 
types of rules: cognitive, regulative and 
 
 Examples of regulative rules are regulations, standards and 
laws. 
 Examples of cognitive rules are belief systems, guiding 
principles, goals, innovation agendas, problem definitions 
and search heuristics. 
 Examples of normative rules are role relationships, values 
and behavioural norms. 
Socio-
technical 
system- 
 
Configuration of actors, technologies and institutions for fulfilling a 
certain societal function. 
Structures  
 
Defined as reproduction in cognitive, regulative and normative rule, 
which are influencing features that guide actor’s behavior. It is the 
process of alignment and embedding of these rules within society, 
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as well as their ongoing reproduction and enactment which leads to 
the creation of structures (Geels and Schot, 2010) 
Regime shift  Regime shift involves changes in technologies and technical 
artefacts as well as in user practices, policies, markets, industrial 
structures, and supporting infrastructures. (Markard and Truffer, 
2008 p.603) 
 
Elaboration of rules as it is understood from institutional theory. The basis by which 
rules are enacted through regulative, normative and cognitive institutions (Scott, 2008) 
 
 Regulative Normative  Cognitive  
Compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken for granted 
Order Regulative rules Binding expectations  Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms  Coercive  Normative pressure Mimetic  
Logic  Instrumentality  Appropriateness  Orthodoxy  
Indicators  Rules, laws, sanctions Certification, accreditation  Common beliefs shared 
logics of action 
Basis of 
legitimacy  
Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported 
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Appendix E: Visual representation of the changes and events in South Africa’s electricity 
system over social media.   
 
Eskom 
Announcement by the Presidency office, on the 15th Jan 2019. The Eskom sustainability 
task team, which has advised the president on the potential action to resolve the utility 
operational, structural and financial challenges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Announcement by the president, Cyril Ramaphosa on unbundling Eskom, into 
generation, transmission and distribution in his State of the Nation Address (SONA), 20 
June 2019, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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Trade unions  
Congress of the South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which are very important in the 
negations of Eskom’s future.  Here the march is against the privatization of Eskom, as 
announced by voice of the Cape on the 19th February 2019.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The National Union of Mineworkers in South Africa (NUMSA), response to Eskom, as the 
utility suggested an earlier shutdown of its older coal mines, in order to accommodate 
renewables. The announcement here is on the 14th and 20th June 2018 respectively.   
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Gas  
A statement by Jeff Radebe, Minister of Energy on the 5th September 2018, at the Africa 
oil and power conference, Cape Town, South Africa. This highlights the significance gas 
in the country’s energy mix.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
